.  OF  CALIF.  LIBRARY,  LOS  ANGELIS 


Beauts 


A  STUDY  IN  PHILOSOPHY 


REV. 

Professor  ofJ'hilosopbiy  i 


ROTHER,  S.J. 

St.  Louis  University 


B.  HERDER 

17  SOUTH  BROADWAY,  ST.  Louis,  Mo. 

AND 
68,  GREAT  RUSSELL  ST.,  LONDON,  W.  C. 

1917 


IMPRIMI  POTEST 

A.  J.  Burrowes,  S.  J. 
Provincial  of  the  Missouri 
Province,  S.  J. 

NIHIL  OBSTAT 

Sti.  Ludovici,  die  12.  Oct.  1916 

F.  G.  Holweck, 

Censor  Librorum 
I 

IMPRIMATUR 
Sti.  Ludovici,  die  12.  Oct.  1916 

^•Joannes  J.  Glennon, 
Archiepiscopus 
Sti.  Ludovici. 

Copyright,  1916 

by 
Joseph  Gummersbach 

All  rights  reserved 
Printed  in  U.  S.  A. 


INTRODUCTION 

Beauty  is  the  crowning  glory  of  all  things; 
yet  few  subjects  have  been  so  much  misrepre- 
sented. Hence  the  importance  and  the  need  of 
explaining  the  nature  of  beauty  and  of  refuting 
the  false  theories  advanced  in  regard  to  it.  To 
do  this  is  the  purpose  of  the  following  pages. 

The  study  of  beauty  is,  however,  beset  with 
peculiar  difficulties.  For  beauty  is  essentially 
something  spiritual  embodied  ordinarily  in  sen- 
sible objects.  On  this  account,  it  readily  escapes 
observation  or  is  confounded  with  what  is  sen- 
sible. This  is  why  even  philosophers  have  de- 
vised so  many  false  theories  of  the  beautiful. 
But  there  have  been  philosophers,  such  as  Aris- 
totle, Cicero,  St.  Augustine,  and  St.  Thomas, 
who,  by  their  singular  penetration  and  mature 
judgment,  have  eminently  qualified  themselves  to 
be  our  masters  in  the  study  of  this  subject.  In 
this  treatise  we  shall  follow  their  example  and 
pass,  step  by  step,  from  what  is  evident  and  on 
the  surface  to  what  is  less  evident  and  more  sci- 
entific. This  natural  method  of  procedure  will 
more  easily  produce  conviction  and  make  the 
iii 


iv  Introduction 

treatise  more  helpful  to  the  student  of  philosophy 
in  studying  the  nature  of  beauty,  and  to  the  stu- 
dent of  rhetoric  in  applying  the  principles  of 
beauty. 

For  clearness'  sake  the  leading  thoughts  will 
be  cast  into  the  form  of  theses. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

INTRODUCTION iii 

CHAPTER 

1  THE  EFFECT  OF  BEAUTY I 

2  BEAUTY  IN  RELATION  TO  THE  HUMAN  FACULTIES  .  4 

Art.    i  Beauty  in  relation  to  sense   ...  4 
Art.    2  Beauty  in  relation  to  the  intellect  and 

will 16 

3  THE  ESSENCE  OF  BEAUTY  IN  GENERAL  ....  46 

Art.    i  Order  essential  to  beauty  ....  46 

Art.    2  Beauty  the  splendor  of  order  ...  60 

4  PREREQUISITE  FOR  THE  ENJOYMENT  OF  BEAUTY  .     .  68 

5  SPECIAL  KINDS  OF  BEAUTY 71 

Art.    i  Sensible  beauty 71 

Art.    2  Symbolic  beauty 86 

Art.    3  Beauty  proper  to  man 90 

6  BEAUTY  IN  RELATION  TO  GOD 101 

Art.  i  Divine  ideals  the  measure  of  created 

beauty 101 

Art.  2  Created  beauty  a  reflection  of  un- 
created beauty 103 

7  OBJECTIVITY  OF  BEAUTY 106 

8  THE  STANDARD  OF  TASTE 1 10 

9  VARIOUS  FALSE  SYSTEMS  OF  BEAUTY 118 

CONCLUSION 131 

ALPHABETICAL  INDEX 133 


BEAUTY 

CHAPTER  FIRST 
THE  EFFECT  OF  BEAUTY 

Summary:    Thesis  —  Proof    of    thesis  —  Confirmation 
of  proof. 

THESIS  I 

The  beautiful  is  something  which  af-    / 
fords  delight  to  the  one  contemplat- 
ing it. 

i.  Proof  of  Thesis.  The  truth  of  this  state- 
ment appears,  in  the  first  place,  from  a  con- 
sideration of  the  term  beautiful.  For  the  term 
beautiful  is  synonymous  with  the  terms  delight- 
ful, charming,  lovely,  fascinating,  and  the  like, 
as  every  dictionary  attests.  This  shows  that  ac- 
cording to  the  common  verdict  of  mankind  noth- 
ing is  regarded  as  beautiful  unless  it  delights, 
charms,  gives  joy.  A  few  illustrations  will  help 
to  place  this  inference  in  a  clearer  light. 

Go  out  early  on  a  fine  summer  morning  and 
gaze  eastward.  A  veil  of  light  haze  stretches 
along  the  line  of  the  horizon ;  beyond,  higher  up 
are  scattered  about  innumerable  downy  cloudlets 


2  Beauty 

forming  little  groups  which  look  like  a  flock  of 
lambs  grazing  in  the  blue  vault  of  heaven.  As 
you  contemplate  the  spectacle  before  you  the 
rosy  fingered  morn  begins  to  touch  the  haze  and 
the  cloudlets,  tingeing  them  with  hues  and  tints 
so  diversified  as  to  fill  your  whole  being  with 
keenest  delight  and  to  force  from  your  lips  the 
exclamation,  "  How  entrancing  a  scene,  how 
beautiful ! " 

But  cast  your  eyes  about  you.  You  are  stand- 
ing beside  a  lake;  its  gently  sloping  shores  are 
overgrown  with  wild  flowers  and  bushes.  Trees 
here  and  there  stretch  their  swaying  branches 
over  the  water's  edge.  A  babbling  brooklet  runs 
into  the  lake  not  far  from  you.  The  air  is  made 
vocal  by  the  chirping  and  the  twittering  of  birds. 
As  the  sun  rises  a  fish-hawk  is  seen  poised  over 
the  rippling  waves  and  peering  into  their  dark 
depths  below.  "  It  is  beautiful,"  you  say  under 
your  breath,  "  it  is  good  for  us  to  be  here ;  how 
charming,  how  delightful !  " 

Now  turn  to  a  higher  kind  of  beauty.  Yonder 
stands  a  cottage;  in  front  of  it,  under  a  fruit- 
laden  apple-tree,  are  seated  father  and  mother 
in  the  midst  of  their  rosy-cheeked  children.  A 
stranger  who  happens  to  pass  that  way  gazes  at 
that  peaceful  group  for  a  little  while  and  charmed 
with  what  he  sees  utters  in  a  whisper :  "  How 
lovely,  how  beautiful  a  gathering  this  is ! " 

To  take  one  more  example  from  the  world  of 


The  Effect  of  Beauty  3 

sound.  You  are  listening  to  some  one  whom 
nature  has  endowed  with  a  melodious  voice.  The 
words  he  utters  charm  you  even  apart  from  what 
they  convey.  The  music  of  his  voice  fascinates 
you.  Hence  you  say  that  he  has  a  beautiful 
voice. 

And  why  is  it  that  the  harmonious  maze  of 
many  voices  or  instruments  impresses  you  as 
beautiful?  Is  it  not  because  it  is  "  linked  sweet- 
ness long  drawn  out  "  ? 

So  we  might  go  on  heaping  up  instances  for 
ever.  We  infer  thence  that  the  beautiful  is  al- 
ways something  which  affords  delight. 

2.  Confirmation  of  Proof.  What  each  one's 
personal  experience  tells  him  might  be  confirmed 
by  an  appeal  to  the  voice  of  the  past  still  speak- 
ing to  us  through  the  signification  of  the  word 
"  beautiful."  For  the  present  signification  of 
the  word  "  beautiful "  has  been  handed  down  to 
us  from  the  remotest  times.  Now  all  the  docu- 
ments, especially  those  penned  by  poets,  dating 
back  to  the  very  dawn  of  civilization  testify  that 
the  term  "  beautiful"  was  only  applied  to  objects 
the  contemplation  of  which  gratifies,  delights, 
charms,  fascinates.  And  what  holds  true  of  the 
English  term  "  beautiful  "  likewise  holds  true  of 
the  equivalent  terms  of  other  languages,  as  the 
Greek  KoAoV,  the  Latin  "  pulchrum,"  the  French 
"  beau,"  the  German  "  schoen,"  the  Bohemian 
"  krasne,"  the  Polish  "  piekny,"  etc. 


CHAPTER  SECOND 

BEAUTY  IN  RELATION  TO  THE  HUMAN 
FACULTIES 

ARTICLE  i 
BEAUTY  IN  RELATION  TO  SENSE 

Summary:  Question  stated  —  Thesis  —  Method  of 
proof  outlined  —  First  proof  of  thesis  — 
Objection  to  the  statement  that  animals 
cannot  perceive  beauty  —  Objection  an- 
swered —  Second  proof  of  thesis  —  Third 
proof  of  thesis  —  False  views  of  certain 
philosophers  regarding  the  relation  of 
sense  to  the  perception  of  beauty  —  Beauty 
often  defined  in  reference  to  the  eye  and 
the  ear. 

3.  Question  Stated.  We  have  thus  estab- 
lished our  thesis  that  the  beautiful  is  something 
which  affords  delight  to  the  one  contemplating 
it.  The  question  now  arises  to  which  of  our 
faculties  the  beautiful  gives  delight.  Is  it  to  the 
cognitive  faculties  or  to  the  appetitive  faculties 
or  to  both?  But  before  we  can  settle  this  ques- 
tion we  must  first  answer  this  other,  which  of  our 
faculties  perceives  the  beautiful,  the  sensitive  or 
4 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  Human  Faculties      5 

the  intellectual  or  both?    To  this  question  we 
reply : 

THESIS  2 

The  beautiful  cannot  be  apprehended 
by  sense,  but  by  the  intellect  only. 
Hence  the  delight  which  the  beautiful 
affords  is  not  sensible  delight. 

4.  Method  of  Proof  Outlined.     Cicero  thus 
expressed  the  same  idea  centuries  ago :  "  Nul- 
lum   aliud   animal    (prseter   hominem)    pulchri- 
tudinem,     vennstatem,     convenientiam     partium 
sentit,"  *•  that  is,  "  No  other  animal  (except  man) 
perceives  beauty,  grace,  and  symmetry  of  parts." 
This  passage  asserting  the  inability  of  animals 
to  perceive  the  beautiful  supplies  the  ground  for 
the  proof  of  the  thesis.     For  if  the  senses  as 
such  could  perceive  the  beautiful,  brute  animals 
would  be  able  to  perceive  it  too,  since  they  are 
possessed  of  sense  organs  as  well  as  man.     But 
how  do  we  prove  that  brute  animals  are  incapa- 
ble of  perceiving  the  beautiful?    We  prove  this 
from  the  fact  that  they  never  give  any  evidence 
of  appreciating  the  beautiful;  for  if  they  give  no 
evidence  of  appreciating  the  beautiful,  we  a«v» 
justified  in  inferring  that  they  neither  do  not 
can  perceive  it. 

5.  First    Proof    of    Thesis.     To    convince 

Officiis,  lib.  I,  cap.  4. 


6  Beauty 

yourself  that  animals  never  show  any  signs  of 
appreciating  the  beautiful,  watch  them  when 
they  chance  to  be  in  the  presence  of  things  which 
all  regard  as  beautiful,  namely  works  of  art. 
Did  you  ever  see  an  animal  betray  indications 
of  realizing  the  excellence  of  a  production  of 
art?  Did  you  ever  see  a  brute  beast  stand  awe- 
struck before  a  charming  picture  or  statue,  or 
gaze  at  it  in  admiration  of  its  beauty?  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  if  brute  beasts  are  made  to  look 
upon  a  picture,  however  fascinating,  they  will 
show  by  their  utter  want  of  attention  and  in- 
terest that  they  do  not  even  recognize  the  re- 
semblance of  the  picture  to  any  real  object.  To 
add  a  further  illustration  from  the  art  of  music. 
Grand  concerts  are  often  held  in  parks  and  other 
public  places ;  yet  no  one  ever  heard  of  the  robins 
or  squirrels  or  domestic  animals  streaming 
thither  for  the  sake  of  gratifying  their  esthetic 
taste.  One  thing  then  is  certain  beyond  the 
shadow  of  a  doubt,  that  the  dumb  animals  show 
no  indication  of  appreciating  artistic  beauty. 

But  perhaps  animals  are  attracted  by  the 
beauty  of  natural  objects.  No,  neither  are  they 
attracted  by  that.  The  starry  heavens  at  night 
are  beautiful ;  the  sun  sinking  below  the  horizon 
in  the  midst  of  a  profusion  of  flaming  clouds  is 
beautiful;  the  lightning  shooting  zigzag  through 
the  pouring  rain  is  beautiful ;  yet  brute  beasts 
are  never  seen  gazing  in  mute  wonder  at  these 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  Human  Faculties         7 

sights,  as  men  often  are;  if  we  may  judge  by 
external  appearances,  animals  are  wholly  unaf- 
fected by  these  glories  of  nature. 

We  have  shown  then  that  brute  beasts  give 
no  indications  of  appreciating  beauty.  From 
this  we  further  infer  that,  in  point  of  fact,  they 
do  not  perceive  beauty. —  But,  you  say,  this  in- 
ference is  illogical.  For  granted  that  animals 
give  no  sign  of  perceiving  the  beautiful  how  does 
it  follow  that  they  do  not  actually  perceive  it? 
Might  they  not  be  hiding  their  real  emotions? 

We  reply  that  such  a  supposition  is  prepos- 
terous. For  it  is  impossible  that  the  entire  ani- 
mal kingdom  should  for  ages  have  been  filled 
with  delight  at  the  sight  of  the  beautiful,  and  yet 
persistently  have  refrained  from  expressing  this 
delight  outwardly,  all  the  more  so  as  brute  beasts 
have  no  control  over  their  feelings,  but  are 
driven  on  by  irresistible  impulse  to  follow  them. 

From  the  fact  that  animals  do  not  perceive 
beauty  we  lastly  deduce  that  they  are  incapable 
of  doing  so.  For  a  natural  capacity  inherent  in 
an  entire  class  of  beings  is  sure  to  assert  and 
manifest  itself  when  all  the  conditions  for  its  ex- 
ercise obtain,  as  they  certainly  do  obtain  in  the 
case  of  animals  so  often  placed  in  the  most  favor-/ 
able  circumstances  for  the  perception  of  beauty. 
It  would  be  an  indictment  of  God's  Wisdom  to 
claim  that  there  are  in  brutes  certain  instincts  or 
endowments  which  always  have  been  and  still  are 


8  Beauty 

completely  dormant.  Consequently  our  assertion 
stands  that  animals  and,  therefore,  the  senses 
cannot  perceive  beauty.  Hence  beauty  can  be 
perceived  by  the  intellect  only,  since  besides  the 
senses  there  is  no  other  perceptive  faculty  in  man 
except  the  intellectual.  It  follows  further  that 
the  pleasure  which  the  beautiful  affords  directly 
is  not  sensible  pleasure.  For  the  pleasure  caused 
directly  by  the  perception  of  an  object  corre- 
sponds to  the  nature  of  the  perception,  that  is,  it 
is  sensible  or  mental  according  as  the  perception 
is  sensible  or  mental.  We  say  directly,  for  we 
shall  show  further  on  (thes.  7,  p.  79)  that  indi- 
rectly through  the  intellect  the  beautiful,  in  a 
way,  affords  pleasure  to  the  senses. 

6.  Objection  to  Statement  that  animals  can- 
not Perceive  Beauty.  But  is  it  universally 
true  that  animals  are  not  attracted  by  beauty?  If 
they  are  not  attracted  by  beauty,  why  do  the  song- 
sters of  our  woods  warble  and  trill  and  pipe  in 
spring  and  summer  so  as  to  turn  the  orchards  and 
forests  and  shady  groves  into  veritable  temples 
of  song?  Again,  is  it  not  a  matter  of  common 
experience  that  certain  animals  when  they  hear 
harmonious  strains  of  music,  as  the  playing  of  a 
lute,  stand,  as  if  transfixed,  and  listen,  as  if  lost 
in  admiration?  We  are  all  familiar  with  the  lines 
of  Shakespeare  in  his  "  Merchant  of  Venice  "  :  l 

1  Act  5,  Scenp  i 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  Human  Faculties         9 

"  For  do  but  note  a  wild  and  wanton  herd, 
Or  race  of  youthful  and  unhandled  colts,  / 

Fetching  mad  bounds,  bellowing,  and  neighing  loud, 
Which  is  the  hot  condition  of  their  blood ; 
If  they  but  hear  perchance  a  trumpet  sound, 
Or  any  air  of  music  touch  their  ears, 
You  shall  perceive  them  make  a  mutual  stand, 
Their  savage  eyes  turn'd  to  a  modest  gaze, 
By  the  sweet  power  of  music." 

Further,  are  there  not  many  animals  that  love 
to  live  in  beautiful  surroundings?  The  butter- 
flies and  other  insects  disport  themselves  amid  the 
most  pleasant  natural  scenery ;  the  humming  birds 
delight  to  hover  on  poised  wings  before  the  sweet- 
scented  flowers  of  the  honeysuckle;  many  birds 
build  their  nests  in  the  dense  foliage  of  magnifi- 
cent trees  or  on  the  banks  of  rivers  or  on  the 
shores  of  lakes,  the  very  homes  of  natural  beauty. 
Besides,  many  animals  are  of  a  most  graceful 
form,  most  tastily  adorned  with  varicolored 
stripes  and  spots  in  divers  patterns.  Only  call  to 
mind  the  tiger,  the  leopard,  the  parrots,  the  but- 
terflies. Are  all  these  animals  insensible  to  their 
own  beauty  and  that  of  their  kind? 

7.  Objection  Answered.  To  these  apparent 
objections  we  reply  by  granting  the  facts  stated, 
but  by  denying  the  inference  thence  drawn  that 
brute  beasts  are  capable  of  appreciating  the  beau- 
tiful. All  the  indications  pointing  to  a  relish  of 
the  beautiful  on  the  part  of  animals  are  due  to 


io  Beauty 

other  causes.  But  as  a  satisfactory  solution  of 
this  difficulty  is  important,  it  will  be  good  to  in- 
troduce our  explanation  by  something  analogous 
to  the  point  under  discussion.  —  Suppose  you  are 
in  the  presence  of  a  man  with  whom  you  are  not 
well  acquainted.  You  want  to  find  out  whether 
his  senses  are  in  a  proper  condition.  For  that 
purpose  you  hold  a  little  bell  before  his  open  eyes ; 
he  shows  no  sign  whatever  of  seeing  the  bell. 
You  conclude  from  his  complete  unconcern  that 
he  is  blind.  You  now  sound  the  little  bell ;  at 
once  the  person's  attention  is  aroused.  Does  this 
show  that  you  are  mistaken  and  that  the  man  is 
not  blind  ?  Not  at  all ;  it  only  proves  that  his  at- 
tention was  aroused,  not  by  the  light  from  the  bell, 
but  by  the  sound  coming  from  it.  You  vary  the 
experiment.  You  place  a  piece  of  paper  before 
his  eyes.  No  sign  of  recognition.  You  replace 
the  piece  of  paper  by  a  fragrant  rose  or  by  a  burn- 
ing coal.  Again  the  man  is  all  animation.  For 
although  he  cannot  see  he  can  smell  and  feel. 
Now  apply  this  analogy  to  the  case  under  con- 
sideration. Beautiful  objects  do  affect  animals, 
not,  however,  just  because  they  are  beautiful  and 
impress  the  animals  as  beautiful,  but  for  other 
reasons,  because  those  objects  excite  pleasant  sen- 
sations in  the  animals,  tickle  the  palate,  gratify 
the  eye  and  ear,  or  prove  useful  for  some  purpose 
or  other,  as  for  food,  for  shelter,  for  building 
nests,  and  the  like.  Thus  birds  pour  forth  their 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  Human  Faculties       II 

gladsome  notes  in  order  to  call  their  mates  or  to 
satisfy  an  instinctive  craving  which  impels  them 
to  fill  the  air  with  their  song.  Or  perhaps  they 
are  urged  on  by  the  Author  of  nature  to  sing  so 
charmingly  in  order  to  delight  man,  for  whose 
sake  the  world  has  been  created.  —  The  playing  of 
a  lute  causes  wanton  colts  to  halt  in  their  wild 
frolics  and  listen  attentively,  because  its  mellow 
sweetness  soothes  their  ears.  —  The  butterfly 
seeks  out  brilliant  flowers  to  feed  upon  their  nec- 
tar or  to  lay  its  eggs  upon  their  leaves.  —  Many 
animals  spend  their  days  in  pleasant  natural  sur- 
roundings, because  they  find  there  what  ministers 
to  their  bodily  wants.  The  pleasing  and  artistic 
colorings  often  observable  in  animals  may  answer 
various  purposes,  as  to  enable  the  brute  beasts  to 
distinguish  one  from  another  more  readily,  to  af- 
ford sensible  satisfaction  to  their  organs  of  sight, 
and  no  doubt  also,  to  add  variety  and  splendor  to 
the  works  of  nature,  in  order  that  man,  seeing  the 
beauty  of  the  visible  universe,  may  be  filled  with 
wonder  and  ecstasy  and  praise  the  Lord  God,  the 
Maker  of  all  things. 

We  see  then  that  what  might  seem  to  be  an  in- 
dication of  fondness  for  natural  beauty  on  the 
part  of  animals  is  traceable  to  quite  different 
sources. 

8.  Second  Proof  of  Thesis.  That  animals  do 
not  perceive  the  beautiful  can  be  confirmed  by  an 
appeal  to  common  sense  or  the  collective  opinion 


12  Beauty 

of  men.  The  argument  based  on  the  consensus 
of  men,  though  not  in  every  case  absolutely  infal- 
lible, nevertheless  always  carries  great  weight,  as 
it  is  very  unlikely  that  so  many  minds  applying 
themselves  to  the  solution  of  a  question  should  all 
be  mistaken.  —  At  first  sight,  it  must  be  confessed, 
the  verdict  of  common  sense  would  seem  to  be 
against  us.  For  if  you  ask  the  ordinary  man 
what  he  thinks  beauty  is,  he  will  probably  answer 
by  giving  you  some  concrete  instances  of  sensible 
beauty.  He  will  tell  you  perhaps,  an  ornamented 
watch  is  beautiful,  or  the  bright  smile  of  a  rosy- 
cheeked  child  is  beautiful.  These  answers  would 
appear  to  indicate  that  he  regards  beauty  as  some- 
thing sensible  and  hence  perceivable  by  animals. 
But  no ;  for  if  you  inquire  further  whether  in  his 
opinion  a  sheep  regards  an  ornamented  watch  as 
pretty  or  whether  he  thinks  that  the  pony  sees 
beauty  in  the  smiling  countenance  of  the  lad  about 
to  leap  upon  its  back,  he  will  think  that  you  are 
joking.  No  doubt,  people  of  tidy  habits  often 
paint  and  otherwise  decorate  places  in  which 
animals  are  kept;  they  do  this,  however,  not  to 
suit  the  esthetic  taste  of  the  animals  shut  up  in 
them,  but  to  please  themselves  and  their  children 
and  their  neighbors.  The  animals  themselves  will 
do  their  best,  as  far  as  lies  in  them,  to  destroy 
every  vestige  of  beauty. —  Hence  people  do  not 
think  that  animals  are  capable  of  perceiving 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  Human  Faculties       13 

beauty  and  thus  indirectly  admit  that  the  beautiful 
cannot  be  apprehended  by  sense  as  such. 

9.  Third  Proof  of  Thesis.     There  is  still  an- 
other argument  to  show   conclusively  that  the 
senses  as  such  do  not  perceive  beauty.     This  ar- 
gument, however,  supposes  what  we  shall  prove 
further  on  in  theses  4  and  5.    There  we  shall 
show  that  the  essence  of  beauty  involves  order, 
proportion,    harmony,    and    symmetry.     Conse- 
quently, a  faculty  incapable  of  apprehending  and 
appreciating  these  is  likewise  incapable  of  appre- 
hending and  appreciating  beauty.     Now   order, 
proportion,    harmony,    and    symmetry    are    es- 
sentially relations,  and  these  sense  is  unable  to 
perceive.     For  the  senses  can,  indeed,  perceive 
things  which  are  related,  but  they  cannot  per- 
ceive relations  as  such.     From  this  we  infer  that 
the  senses  cannot  perceive  beauty.     Hence  our 
thesis  stands  confirmed  by  all  those  philosophers, 
as   Plato,   Aristotle,   Cicero,   St.  Augustine,   St. 
Thomas,  and  others,  who  make  beauty  consist  in 
harmony  and  proportion.     (For  quotations  from 
these  writers  see  thesis  4,  p.  53  sqq.). 

10.  False  Views  of  Certain  Philosophers  re- 
garding  Relation  of   Sense   to   Perception   of 
Beauty.     It   must   be    admitted,    however,    that 
there  are  philosophers  who  regard  the  beautiful  as 
something  appealing  solely  to  our  sensuous  per- 
ception.    They    are    chiefly    the    sensists    and 
materialists  who,  as  they  do  not  admit  any  other 


14  Beauty 

knowledge  besides  sense  knowledge,  are  com- 
pelled by  the  logic  of  their  systems  to  view  the 
delight  caused  by  the  beautiful  as  a  mere  sensa- 
tion. Their  mistake  in  the  matter  proceeds 
from  a  fundamentally  wrong  system  of  phil- 
osophy which  sees  no  essential  difference  between 
sense  and  intellect ;  hence  their  theory  must  be 
summarily  dismissed. 

ii.  Beauty  often  Defined  in  Reference  to 
the  Eye  and  the  Ear.  But  if  sense  is  incapable 
of  perceiving  beauty,  how  comes  it  that  the  beau- 
tiful is  not  unfrequently  defined  with  reference 
to  the  eye  and  the  ear?  Thus  Webster  says: 
"  Beauty  is  an  assemblage  of  graces  and  proper- 
ties pleasing  to  the  eye,  the  ear,  the  intellect,  the 
esthetic  faculty,  or  the  moral  sense."  St. 
Thomas  himself  gives  this  definition  of  the  beau- 
tiful, "  Pulchra  sunt  quse  visa  placent,"  "  Those 
things  are  beautiful  the  sight  of  which  pleases."  1 
And  in  another  place 2  he  tells  us :  "  Isti  sensus 
praecipue  respiciunt  pulchrum  qui  sunt  maxime 
cognoscitivi,  sc.  visus  et  auditus  rationi  subser- 
vientes,"  which  means,  "  Those  senses  chiefly  re- 
late to  the  beautiful  which  are  most  highly  cog- 
nitive, viz.  sight  and  hearing:  for  they  minister 
to  reason"  (in  the  perception  of  the  beautiful). 

The  answer  to  this  question  will  be  given  in 
another  place  (thesis  7,  p.  79  sqq.),  where  we 

1  Sum.  Theol.  i,  q.  5,  a.  4,  ad  i. 

2  Ibid,  i,  2,  q.  27,  a.  I,  ad  3. 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  Human  Faculties       15 

shall  speak  professedly  of  the  part  the  senses 
take  in  the  apprehension  of  the  beautiful.  It 
will  suffice  here  to  state  that  the  beautiful  is  said 
to  be  the  object  of  sight  and  hearing,  not  because 
these  senses  truly  perceive  the  beautiful  as  such, 
but  because  they  present  beautiful  objects  to  the 
intellect  and  thus  as  ministers  or  instruments  of 
the  intellect  share,  in  their  own  way,  in  the  intel- 
lectual delights  of  the  beautiful.  Hence  it  is, 
too,  that  St.  Thomas  in  the  second  passage  quoted 
does  not  say  that  sight  and  hearing  perceive  the 
beautiful,  but  merely  that  they  are  related 
(respiciunt)  to  it. 

As  regards  the  well-known  definition  of  the 
beautiful,  "  Pulchra  sunt  quse  visa  placent,"  note 
that  the  word  "  visa  "  in  the  definition  bears  a 
twofold  interpretation.  First,  "  visa "  may  be 
taken  to  signify  the  same  as  "  cognita,"  the  verb 
"  video "  often  having  the  meaning  of  "  cog- 
nosce." In  this  acceptation  of  the  particle 
"  visa "  the  above  definition  may  be  rendered 
thus:  "Those  things  are  beautiful  the  contem- 
plation of  which  pleases."  In  the  second  place, 
we  may  take  "  visa "  in  the  literal  sense  of 
"  seen."  Then  "  pulchra  sunt  quse  visa  placent  " 
should  be  translated  by  "  Those  things  are  beau- 
tiful the  sight  of  which  gives  pleasure"  (sc.  to 
the  intellect). 

It  is  noteworthy  that  "  sight "  alone,  and  not 
also  "  hearing "  is  mentioned  in  this  definition. 


1 6  Beauty 

The  reason  probably  is  that  beauty  as  perceived 
by  sight  is  more  common  and  better  understood 
than  beauty  perceived  by  hearing.  However, 
beauty  of  sound  is  not  excluded  by  the  definition ; 
it  is  merely  not  expressly  mentioned. 


ARTICLE  2 

BEAUTY  IN  RELATION  TO  THE  INTELLECT 
AND  WILL 

Summary:  Question  stated  —  Thesis  —  Preliminary 
remarks  —  Ontological  truth  —  Everything 
is  true  —  Ontological  truth  in  relation  to 
God  and  creatures  —  Ontological  falsity  — 
The  good  —  Everything  is  good — Defi- 
nition and  division  of  love  —  Wholly  un- 
selfish love  —  Opposite  of  good,  or  evil  — 
Opposite  of  love,  or  hatred  —  First  proof 
of  first  part  of  thesis  —  Second  proof  of 
same  —  Third  proof  of  same  —  No  special 
intellectual  faculty  needed  for  the  percep- 
tion of  beauty — Proof  of  second  part  of 
thesis  —  Love  of  an  object  not  always  pro- 
portionate to  its  beauty  —  How  the  beauti- 
ful contributes  to  our  own  good  —  Two 
kinds  of  intellectual  delight. 

12.  Question  Stated.  We  have  shown  thus 
far  that  it  is  the  intellect  and  not  sense  which 
apprehends  the  beautiful,  and,  consequently,  that 
the  delight  which  the  beautiful  affords  is  not  sen- 
sible delight.  The  question  now  awaits  solution 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  Human  Faculties       17 

to  which  of  the  faculties  of  the  soul  the  beautiful 
gives  delight,  whether  to  the  intellect  or  to  the 
will  or  to  both.  The  following  thesis  states  what 
we  think  on  this  question: 

THESIS  3 

The  beautiful  as  beautiful  begets  in- 
tellectual delight  only;  but  in  so  far 
as  it  is  identified  with  the  good,  it  also 
arouses  love  in  the  soul. 

13.  Preliminary  Remarks.     Before  taking  up 
the  thesis  we  must  make  some  general  remarks 
on  the  true  and  the  good  by  reason  of  the  very 
close  connection  of  these  concepts  with  the  beau- 
tiful.    In  fact  so  close  is  the  connection  that 
many  have  identified  the  beautiful  with  the  true 
or  with  the  good  or  with  both. 

14.  Ontological      Truth.     To      understand 
what  is  meant  by  the  true  we  must  begin  by  de- 
fining truth  in  general.     Truth  in  general  is  con- 
formity between  thought  and  thing.     This  con- 
formity is  threefold,  namely  conformity  of  thing 
with  thought,  called  ontological  truth ;  conformity 
of  thought  with  thing,  called  logical  truth;  and, 
conformity  of  words  with  thought,  called  moral 
truth.     Here  we  are  concerned  only  with  onto- 
logical truth  or  simply  the  "  true."     For,  as  will 
soon  appear,  the  truth  considered  identical  with 
beauty  is  ontological   truth.     Ontological   truth 


1 8  Beauty 

or  conformity  of  thing  with  a  concept  (or 
thought)  may  be  considered  under  a  twofold  as- 
pect. For  a  concept  may  either  serve  as  a  pat- 
tern according  to  which  something  is  made,  or  it 
may  serve  as  a  norm  according  to  which  some- 
thing is  estimated.  Thus  things  are  said  to  be 
true  in  the  first  sense  in  respect  to  the  Divine 
concept  according  to  which  all  existing  things 
have  been  made,  and  in  general  in  respect  to  any 
concept  guiding  an  artist  in  his  work,  as  in  the 
examples,  "  the  Universe  is  true  to  the  concept 
God  has  of  it,"  and  "  the  Sistine  Madonna  is  true 
to  the  concept  of  Raphael."  —  We  use  truth  in 
the  other  sense,  namely  as  a  norm  according  to 
which  something  is  estimated,  when  we  speak 
v.  g.  of  true  friendship,  of  true  humility,  of  true 
loyalty.  For  true  friendship,  true  humility,  true 
loyalty  is  friendship,  humility,  loyalty  conform- 
able to  the  concepts  of  friendship,  humility,  and 
loyalty.  However,  for  ontological  truth  actual 
conformity  of  a  thing  to  the  intellect  is  not  re- 
quired, it  is  sufficient  that  the  thing  be  capable 
of  being  conformed  to  the  intellect.  Hence  con- 
formity of  thing  to  thought,  whether  actual  or 
potential,  constitutes  the  essence  of  ontological 
truth.  —  But  ontological  truth  is  also  sometimes 
employed  in  a  less  proper  sense  to  designate  the 
object  itself  which  is  conformable  to  the  intellect 
without  special  regard  to  its  conformity  to  the 
intellect.  Ontological  truth  thus  taken  is  rather 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  Human  Faculties       19 

the  matter  or  foundation  on  which  the  relation 
of  ontological  truth  strictly  so  called  is  founded ; 
it  is  what  the  scholastics  call  "  veritas  ontologica 
fundamentaliter  vel  materialiter  sumpta."  This 
extended  use  of  the  term  "  ontological  truth  "  is, 
however,  very  natural  and  appropriate.  For,  as 
we  shall  explain  a  little  further  down,  by  the  very 
fact  that  a  thing  is  a  thing,  it  is  essentially  con- 
formed to  the  Divine  intellect  and  (to  some  ex- 
tent) capable  of  conforming  itself  to  created 
mind,  therefore  ontologically  true.  Hence 
"  thing  "  and  "  the  true  "  are  really  one  and  the 
same,  only  conceived  somewhat  differently,  "  the 
true "  expressing  distinctly  what  "  thing "  de- 
notes implicitly.  Now  we  can  understand  how 
St.  Augustine  could  define  the  true  as  "  that 
which  is."  For  he  takes  ontological  truth  here 
for  the  foundation  of  ontological  truth. 

15.  Everything  is  True.  From  the  above 
exposition  it  readily  appears  that  everything  is 
(ontologically)  true.  For  whatever  is,  is  ac- 
tually conformed  to  the  Divine  intellect  and,  at 
least,  capable  of  being  conformed  to  finite  intel- 
lect. Now  since  conformity  either  actual  or  po- 
tential constitutes  truth,  therefore  everything  is 
(ontologically)  true.  Hence  the  true  is  a  trans- 
cendental notion;  for  a  transcendental  notion  is 
one  which  can  be  applied  to  all  things  whatso- 
ever; and  such  is  the  true  since,  as  just  explained, 
everything  is  ontologically  true. 


2O  Beauty 

1 6.  Ontological  Truth  in  Relation  to  God 
and  Creatures.     It  further  follows  that  things 
are  conformed  to  the  Divine  intellect  necessarily 
and  adequately,  for  God  is  infinite ;  but  not  so  as 
regards  finite  intellects,  and  this  for  the  reason 
that  they  are   finite.     Consequently   things   are 
true  to  the  Divine  intellect  primarily  and  abso- 
lutely, but  to  created  intellect  only  secondarily 
and  in  a  restricted  sense. 

17.  Ontological  Falsity.    Now  a  word  about 
the  opposite  of  Ontological  truth,  namely  onto- 
logical  falsity.     Ontological  falsity  is  defined  as 
disagreement  of  thing  with  thought.     It  is  clear 
that  there  can  be  no  Ontological  falsity  in  respect 
to  God,  the  All-Perfect.     As  regards  finite  be- 
ings, a  distinction  must  be  made  according  as  the 
thing  is  referred  to  the  finite  intellect  as  a  pat- 
tern or  as  a  norm.     (See  p.   18.)     Things  re- 
ferred to  finite  intellect  as  a  pattern  are  false 
when  they  do  not  conform  to  the  ideal  which  the 
artist  has  in  mind  but  fails  to  express.     How- 
ever in  this  case,  common  usage  does  not  sanc- 
tion the  word  "  false,"  but  has  settled  on  other 
terms.    Thus  v.  g.  a  picture  which  falls  short  of 
the  conception  of  an  artist  is  not  called  "  false," 
but  a  daub,  a  failure,  a  bungled  piece  of  work, 
and  the  like.     But  things  are  called  false  when 
not  conformed  to  the  intellect  as  a  norm  accord- 
ing to  which  they  are  judged,  as  when  we  speak 
of  a  false  friend,  false  virtue,  false  gods.    How- 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  Human  Faculties       21 

ever,  things  are  denominated  false  only  meta- 
phorically, either  because  they  can  prove  the  oc- 
casion of  a  false  judgment  or  because  the  mind 
has  falsely  attributed  a  certain  predicate  to  a  cer- 
tain subject.  For  example,  a  coin  is  called  false 
because  it  is  so  cunning  an  imitation  of  genuine 
money  as  easily  to  be  mistaken  for  it,  and  Her- 
cules is  called  a  false  god  because  he  has  been 
falsely  judged  by  the  pagans  of  Greece  and  Rome 
to  be  a  god.  The  scholastics  say  that  in  these 
cases  things  are  false  "  per  accidens,"  not  "  per 
se."  For  of  themselves  (per  se)  things  are 
necessarily  conformed  to  the  Divine  mind  and 
at  least  capable,  within  certain  limits,  of  being 
conformed  to  finite  intellect. 

1 8.  The  Good.  We  now  pass  to  the  other 
concept  to  be  elucidated,  namely  the  good.  —  The 
good  in  general  is  that  which  is  suitable  to  some- 
thing or  perfective  of  something.  Aristotle  de- 
scribes it  as  that  which  all  things  crave  (id 
quod  omnia  appetunt).  This  is  an  a  posteriori 
definition  of  the  good,  that  is,  a  definition  derived 
from  the  effect  which  the  good  produces.  For 
the  good  excites  a  tendency  (appetitus),  a  crav- 
ing, a  longing,  a  desire,  or  whatever  you  may 
call  it,  in  the  thing  for  which  it  is  suitable. 
Hence  it  is  that  desirability  (appetibilitas)  or  at- 
tractiveness is  regarded  as  the  chief  property  of 
the  good. 

A  thing  may  either  be  good  in  itself  (good  ab- 


22  Beauty 

solutely)  or  good  to  another  (good  relatively). 

19.  Everything    is    Good.    The    statement 
made  by  philosophers  that  everything  is  good  in 
itself,  may  sound  strange  at  first,  but  if  rightly 
understood  it  is  self-evident.     For  the  good  has 
a  twofold  meaning;  it  either  simply  means  any- 
thing suitable,  or  it  means  the  same  as  the  per- 
fect.    Now  it  is  in  the  first  of  these  two  mean- 
ings that  we  assert  everything  to  be  good,  not  in 
the  second.     In  other  words,  we  say  that  every- 
thing possesses  something  that  is  suited  to  it,  but 
not  that  everything  is  perfect.     The  statement 
may  be  thus  rendered  more  intelligible :     In  order 
that  a  thing  may  be  a  thing  it  must  be  consti- 
tuted  by   something.     Now   that   which   consti- 
tutes a  thing  makes  it  what  it  is,  and  what  makes 
a  thing  what  it  is,  is  its  essence;  and  its  essence 
is  something  suitable  to  the  thing. 

Since  everything  then  is  good  in  itself,  the 
good,  like  the  true,  is  a  transcendental  concept. 

We  infer  further  that  since  everything  pos- 
sesses some  goodness  of  its  own,  it  can  also  ben- 
efit other  beings  by  communicating  its  goodness 
to  them.  Thus  a  fly  is  a  source  of  good  at  least 
to  its  progeny,  even  though  under  every  other 
respect  it  were  an  utter  nuisance.  Hence  we 
see  that  everything  is  good  also  in  respect  to  at 
least  some  other  being  or  beings  and  conse- 
quently relatively  good. 

20.  Definition  and  Division  of  Love.    Since 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  Human  Faculties       23 

the  good  then  is  that  which  perfects,  it  engenders 
desire  and  love  in  rational  beings.  We  do  not 
consider  here  in  what  way  non-rational  beings 
are  attracted  by  the  good,  as  the  discussion  of  this 
question  is  foreign  to  our  purpose.  And  what  is 
love?  Love  in  general  is  a  certain  delight  or 
pleasure  the  will  takes  in  some  good  proposed  to 
it,  or,  as  St.  Thomas  says :  "  Amor  est  nihil  aliud 
quam  complacentia  appetibilis,"  *  that  is,  "  Love 
is  nothing  else  than  the  pleasure  taken  in  a  de- 
sirable object."  Love  is  twofold  according  to 
the  motive  inciting  to  love.  For  we  can  love  an 
object  either  for  its  own  sake,  for  the  sake  of  its 
inherent  goodness,  or  we  can  love  it  because  it 
redounds  to  our  own  good,  because  it  is  good  for 
us.  The  first  kind  of  love  is  wholly  unselfish 
and  hence  is  rightly  called  love  of  complacency, 
which  the  Standard  Dictionary  defines  as  "  love 
delighting  in  its  object  for  its  own  intrinsic  ex- 
cellency." It  is  also  sometimes  styled  love  of 
benevolence,  because  it  prompts  the  lover  to  pro- 
mote the  well-being  of  the  object  loved.  The 
same  Dictionary  defines  love  of  benevolence  as 
"  love  seeking  to  promote  the  welfare  of  its  ob- 
ject." If  the  love  of  benevolence  is  mutual  it  is 
called  love  of  friendship.  For  friendship  —  to 
quote  the  Standard  Dictionary  once  more  —  is 
"  the  mutual  liking,  esteem,  or  regard  cherished 
by  kindred  minds  as  the  basis  of  the  mutual  in- 

1  Sum.  Theol.  i,  2,  q.  26,  a.  I,  in  corp. 


24  Beauty 

terchange  of  kind  offices."  The  other  kind  of 
love  inclining  us  to  seek  something  as  good  for 
ourselves  is  called  love  of  desire  or  simply  desire, 
yearning,  or  longing.  It  may  be  regarded  under 
a  twofold  aspect  according  as  its  object  is  licit  or 
otherwise.  If  its  object  is  licit  it  is  named  well- 
ordered  self-love,  but  if  illicit,  inordinate  self- 
love.  For  self-love  as  such  does  not  necessarily 
imply  anything  reprehensible ;  it  is  merely  "  a 
desire  or  tending  that  leads  one  to  seek  to  pro- 
mote his  own  well-being." 

21.  Wholly  Unselfish  Love.  But  here  a 
difficulty  meets  us.  We  have  stated  that  there 
is  a  kind  of  love  which  is  wholly  unselfish.  Now 
is  it  possible  to  love  anybody  or  anything  with  a 
love  that  has  no  admixture  of  selfishness?  Do 
I  not  always  love  another  because  to  love  him  is 
beneficial  to  me?  A  somewhat  fuller  exposition 
of  this  point  is  of  the  greatest  importance  in  this 
treatise.  For  we  hold  that  the  love  of  the  beau- 
tiful is  the  love  of  a  thing  for  the  sake  of  its  own 
inherent  excellence  apart  from  all  selfish  con- 
sideration. To  solve  the  problem  satisfactorily 
we  shall  first  show  that  we  can  love  an  object  for 
its  own  sake,  on  condition,  however,  that  the  ob- 
ject redounds  in  some  way  to  our  own  good. 
Then  we  shall  answer  an  objection  which  might 
be  raised  from  the  apparent  incompatibility  of 
the  fulfilment  of  the  above  condition  with  purely 
unselfish  love. 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  Human  Faculties       25 

First,  then,  we  can  love  an  object  for  its  own 
sake.  The  voice  of  mankind  vouches  for  this. 
For  if  all  love  were  selfish  what  would  become 
of  the  meaning  of  friendship,  which  in  all  lan- 
guages denotes  disinterested  love  between  two  or 
more  persons?  The  grandeur  of  friendship  has 
been  exalted  to  the  sky  by  poets  and  romancers. 
Few  of  their  outpourings  have  met  with  a  readier 
response  than  those  composed  in  praise  of  friend- 
ship. Who  is  there  that  is  not  familiar  with  the 
old  legend  of  Damon  and  Pythias,  whose  heroic 
fidelity  to  one  another  melted  the  heart  of  even  a 
tyrant?  Recall  the  magnanimous  love  of  Jona- 
than for  David,  the  thought  of  which  stirs  the 
soul  of  everyone  who  reads  the  story.  "  And 
David  and  Jonathan  made  a  covenant,  for  he 
loved  him  as  his  own  soul.  And  Jonathan 
stripped  himself  of  the  coat  with  which  he  was 
clothed  and  gave  it  to  David,  and  the  rest  of  his 
garments,  even  to  his  sword  and  to  his  bow  and 
to  his  girdle."  * —  There  are  other  kinds  of  love 
besides  the  love  of  friendship  which,  at  least  gen- 
erally, are  not  based  on  self-interest.  There  is 
the  love  of  parents  for  their  offspring.  It  is  not 
for  their  own  sake  that  father  and  mother  wish 
to  see  their  children  happy,  but  for  the  sake  of 
the  children  themselves.  There  is  a  smile  of 
satisfaction  on  the  lips  of  the  dying  father  when 
he  sees  his  son  well  provided  for  and  successful. 

1 1  Kings,  xviii.  3  and  4. 


26  Beauty 

The  father  derives  no  advantage  from  the  suc- 
cess of  his  son  whom  he  is  about  to  leave  for- 
ever; yet  he  rejoices  amid  the  shadows  of  death. 
—  Again,  every  good  man  loves  his  fatherland, 
the  country  where  his  cradle  was  rocked.  Is  it 
merely  because  benefit  accrues  to  him  from  the 
country  of  his  birth  that  he  cherishes  it?  That 
may  sometimes  be  the  case,  but  by  no  means  al- 
ways. For  in  that  case,  would  a  man  be  willing 
to  sacrifice  all  his  goods  and  lay  down  his  very 
life  for  his  country,  even  when  its  cause  seems 
utterly  forlorn  and  hopeless?  —  And  lastly,  are 
there  not  many  who  love  their  Creator  not  so 
much  because  He  is  good  to  them,  but  because  He 
is  so  excellent  in  Himself,  so  wise,  so  kind,  so 
mighty,  so  beautiful? 

Moreover,  our  assertion  that  we  can  love 
others  for  their  own  inherent  excellence  regard- 
less of  self,  commends  itself  also  on  purely  a 
priori  grounds.  For  to  be  able  to  love  some- 
thing it  is  enough  that  it  should,  in  some  way,  be 
good  to  the  lover;  it  is  not  necessary,  however, 
that  the  gain  to  be  derived  by  the  lover  from  the 
thing  loved  be  the  motive  or  ground  of  his  love. 
It  is  only  when  the  motive  of  one's  love  is  one's 
gain  that  love  is  interested. 

We  have  thus  shown  that  it  is  possible  to  love 
another  for  his  own  sake.  We  now  pass  to  the 
proof  of  the  qualifying  clause  of  the  assertion 
above  made,  namely  that  we  cannot  love  another 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  Human  Faculties      27 

unless  such  love  redounds,  in  some  way,  to  our 
own  good. 

As  experience  and  reason  tell  us,  our  will  can- 
not love  anything  except  in  so  far  as  it  is  perfec- 
tive of  us  and,  consequently,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
good  for  us.  For  if  a  thing,  even  though  it  does 
us  no  harm,  does  not  perfect  us  in  any  way,  it  is, 
as  it  were,  non-existent  in  regard  to  us  and  hence 
cannot  excite  our  love.  It  is  therefore  against 
the  very  nature  of  a  rational  being  to  cherish  or 
incline  towards  something  which  does  not  at  all 
perfect  it..  Hence  for  an  object  to  be  lovable  it 
must  be  capable  of  enhancing  the  excellence  of 
an  intellectual  being. 

But  it  is  objected,  if  I  cannot  love  an  object 
unless  it  enhances  my  own  excellence,  then,  by 
that  very  fact,  love  ceases  to  be  disinterested  and 
becomes  interested.  We  answer  that  this  does 
not  follow.  For  the  aptitude  of  an  object  to 
render  a  person  more  excellent  may  be,  but  is  not 
necessarily,  the  motive  of  the  person's  love  for 
that  object;  it  may  be  merely  a  prerequisite,  the 
ontological  ground  rendering  love  possible,  a 
mere  condition  needed  for  love  to  spring  up  in 
the  heart,  and  it  is  only  when  the  perfection  of 
self  is  the  motive  for  loving  an  object  that  love  is 
the  love  of  desire  or  interested  love.  As  long 
as  the  perfection  of  self  is  merely  a  condition 
for  loving  a  thing  while  the  real  motive  for 
loving  it,  is  the  goodness  of  the  thing  in  itself, 


28  Beauty 

love  is  love  of  complacency  or  disinterested 
love.  To  illustrate  this  rather  subtle  distinc- 
tion by  an  example;  in  order  that  a  piece  of 
wood  may  burn,  it  must  be  dry;  nevertheless 
what  causes  it  to  burn  is  not  the  dryness  of  the 
wood,  but  the  fire  to  which  it  has  been  exposed. 
The  dryness  of  the  wood  merely  disposes  the 
wood  for  burning.  It  is  a  prerequisite,  a  condi- 
tion that  the  wood  may  take  fire.  Similarly,  in 
the  case  of  love  of  benevolence,  what  causes  a 
person  to  love  another  is  not  his  own  personal 
advantage  or  perfection,  but  something  distinct 
from  himself,  namely  the  advantage  and  perfec- 
tion of  another,  his  own  advantage  and  perfec- 
tion being  merely  a  condition  making  love  possi- 
ble. However,  it  is  not  necessary  that  this  con- 
dition should  be  explicitly  noticed. 

What  we  have  just  said,  has  been  well  sum- 
marized by  Fr.  Palmieri,  S.  J.,  in  these  words: 
"  Quod  bonum  ad  quod  ordinamur  sit  bonum 
nostrum,  est  conditio  quidem  cur  illud  .  .  .  dili- 
gamus,  non  est  autem  necessario  ratio  cur  dili- 
gamus.  Ratio  enim  suffkiens  est  haec,  nempe 
quia  est  bonum,  quse  est  ratio  formalis  volunta- 
tis;  conditio  vero  ilia,  quod  nempe  sit  bonum 
quoque  nostrum,  semper  adest,  etsi  explicite  non 
consideretur  a  volente,"  x  which  may  be  rendered 
thus :  "  That  the  good  which  nature  impels  us 
to  love  be  our  own  good,  is  indeed  a  condition, 

1  Anthropologia,  p.  565. 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  Human  Faculties      29 

but  not  necessarily  the  reason  why  ...  we  love 
the  good;  for,  the  good  being  the  proper  object 
of  the  will,  the  sufficient  reason  why  we  love  the 
good  is,  that  it  is  good.  But  this  condition  that 
the  good  be  also  our  own  good  is  always  present, 
although  it  be  not  expressly  adverted  to  by  the 
person  willing."  1 

These  abstract  statements  will  perhaps  become 
clearer  by  showing  how  the  unselfish  love  of 
friend  for  friend,  of  parent  for  child,  of  the 
patriot  for  his  country,  of  the  virtuous  man  for 
God,  supposes  the  good  of  the  lover  as  a  condi- 
tion. 

To  begin  with  the  love  of  friendship.  A  friend 
regards  his  friend  as  his  "  alter  ego,"  his  other 
self,  in  whom  he  finds  his  complement  and  com- 
pletion. Friends  are,  so  to  speak,  one  soul  in 
two  bodies.  Hence  it  is  that  true  friendship 
with  the  vicious,  the  depraved,  is  impossible,  since 
association  with  such  characters,  so  far  from  en- 
nobling, is  debasing.  Mutual  perfectibility  then 
is  a  necessary  condition  of  genuine  friendship. 

The  same  holds  true  in  regard  to  the  love  of 
parents.  It  is  a  law  of  nature  for  parents  to 
cherish  their  children.  If  they  were  not  their 
children  they  would  not  have  that  peculiar  fond- 
ness for  them  which  we  call  parental  affection. 
Parents,  in  point  of  fact,  look  upon  their  issue  as 

1  Cfr.  Suarez,  De  Anima,  L.  5,  c.  2° ;  also  Lahousse, 
Psych.,  p.  442,  n.  482, 


30  Beauty 

copies  of  themselves,  as  perpetuations  of  their 
own  personality.  This  consideration,  however, 
is  not  the  motive  of  their  love,  but  only  a  neces- 
sary prerequisite  for  loving  their  children. 

To  show  that  self  enters  into  the  love  of 
country  we  need  only  recall  a  few  stanzas  in 
which  patriots  have  poured  forth  their  enthusias- 
tic affection  for  the  land  of  their  birth.  Listen 
to  Sir  Walter  Scott's  inspired  words: 

"  Breathes  there  a  man  with  soul  so  dead, 
Who  never  to  himself  hath  said, 
This  is  my  own,  my  native  land." 

Recall  the  glowing  sentiments  expressed  in  our 
own  national  anthem: 

"My  country,  'tis  of  thee, 
Sweet  land  of  liberty, 
Of  thee,  I  sing." 

The  lover  of  his  country  then  considers  himself, 
so  to  speak,  identified  with  his  nation;  hence,  its 
progress  is  his  progress ;  its  victories  are  his  vic- 
tories; its  glories  are  his  glories.  The  patriot's 
own  good  is  therefore  a  necessary  condition,  not 
the  motive,  for  his  ardent  attachment  to  his 
country. 

And  finally,  as  regards  the  Supreme  Being. 
The  love  of  God  for  His  own  sake  likewise  re- 
dounds to  the  perfection  of  the  lover  in  in- 
numerable ways.  For  the  God  we  cherish 
with  such  fond  affection  is  our  God.  Do  we  not 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  Human  Faculties      31 

pray  to  Him  daily,  "  Our  Father  who  art  in 
heaven"?  We  are  sparks  of  the  Godhead,  so 
to  speak.  In  His  infinite  perfections,  each  one 
of  our  finite  perfections  is  included  in  a  super- 
eminent  manner.  Hence  if  God  is  glorified  I  am 
glorified ;  if  God  is  loved  I  am  loved ;  if  God  be- 
comes better  known  I  become  better  known.  It 
is  in  this  manner  that  when  I  love  God  for  His 
own  sake,  for  the  sake  of  His  infinite  beauty  and 
bounty,  I,  at  the  same  time,  conform  to  the  fun- 
damental law  of  my  nature  which  prevents  me 
from  loving  anything  except  in  so  far  as  it  is  per- 
fective of  me.  But,  to  repeat  it  once  more,  the 
longing  for  my  own  perfection  is  not  the  motive 
for  my  loving  God,  it  is  merely  a  condition  ren- 
dering such  love  possible. 

22.  The  Opposite  of  Good,  or  Evil.  The  op- 
posite of  good  is  evil  or  bad.  Hence  evil  may 
be  defined  as  that  which  is  unsuited  to  something, 
or  that  which  deprives  something  of  a  perfec- 
tion. Just  as  a  thing  can  be  good  in  itself  or  in 
regard  to  another,  so  a  thing  may  be  evil  in  itself 
or  in  regard  to  another.  Thus  blindness  and  sin 
are  evil  in  themselves,  a  just  judge  is  an  evil  for 
a  criminal,  an  energetic  school-teacher,  for  the 
lazy  boy.  This  shows  that  what  is  an  evil  for 
another,  is  often  excellent  in  itself,  as  the  just 
judge  and  the  energetic  teacher  in  our  example. 

The  definition  of  evil  just  given  is  the  defini- 
tion of  evil  in  the  concrete.  In  the  abstract,  evil 


Beauty 


may  be  described  as  the  privation  of  a  perfection 
due  to  a  being,  i.  e.  of  a  perfection  which  that  be- 
ing ought  to  have.  The  absence  of  a  perfection 
which  is  not  due  does  not  make  a  thing  evil  or 
bad.  Otherwise,  everything  except  God  would 
be  evil.  For  every  finite  being,  by  the  very  fact 
that  it  is  finite,  lacks  some  perfection.  Thus  man 
would  have  to  be  called  evil  for  this  alone  that 
he  is  devoid  of  the  power  of  flight,  a  perfection 
proper  to  most  birds. 

23.  The  Opposite  of  Love,  or  Hatred.    As 
the  good  attracts  and  begets  love,  so  evil  repels 
and  awakens  hatred.     Hence  love  and  hatred  are 
opposites.     It  is  not  necessary  to  give  the  various 
divisions  and  definitions  of  hatred,  as  every  one 
can  readily  derive  them  for  himself  from  the  di- 
visions and  definitions  of  love  by  bearing  in  mind 
that  love  and  hatred  are  opposites. 

24.  First   Proof   of   First   Part   of   Thesis. 
We  now  return  to  our  thesis  in  which  we  state 
that  the  beautiful  as  such  has  regard  to  the  in- 
tellect only. 

This  can  be  shown  first  from  the  almost  uni- 
versally accepted  definition  of  the  beautiful,  as 
the  thing  the  contemplation  of  which  gives  de- 
light. Hence  if  we  may  believe  the  consensus  of 
men  in  general,  the  delight  which  the  beautiful 
affords  is  delight  springing  from  contemplation, 
that  is,  delight  of  the  intellect. 

25.  Second  Proof  of  First  Part  of  Thesis. 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  Human  Faculties      33 

We  arrive  at  the  same  conclusion  by  considering 
what  the  beautiful  is  in  itself.  As  we  shall 
show  afterwards  (thes.  4),  the  beautiful  consists 
in  symmetry,  harmony,  proportion,  order.  Now 
all  these  constituent  principles  of  the  beautiful 
involve  relations  and  therefore  are  the  objects  of 
intellectual  perception  only.  (Cf.  p.  13.)  Con- 
sequently we  are  right  in  inferring  that  the  de- 
light which  the  beautiful  gives  is  intellectual  de- 
light, and  intellectual  delight  only. 

26.  Third  Proof  of  First  Part  of  Thesis. 
But  the  strongest  proof  that  beauty  appeals  to  the 
intellect,  and  to  the  intellect  only,  is  drawn  from 
the  testimony  of  consciousness.  For,  after  all, 
the  delight  which  beauty  causes  is  a  phenomenon 
of  our  inner  self,  a  manifestation  of  the  soul. 
Now  all  manifestations  of  the  soul  are  taken  no- 
tice of  directly  by  consciousness,  and  by  con- 
sciousness alone.  This  faculty  is  therefore  the 
court  of  final  appeal  in  this  matter.  We  must 
then  carefully  look  into  the  inner  recesses  of  our 
soul  and  see  what  goes  on  there.  It  is  hard  at 
times  to  arrive  at  certainty  by  this  process,  be- 
cause the  phenomena  taking  place  within  our 
minds  are  often  complicated,  fleeting,  and  tran- 
sient ;  none  of  them  is  ever  seen  by  itself,  but  al- 
ways accompanied,  preceded,  and  followed  by 
others.  Hence  it  often  requires  an  observant  and 
quick  mind  to  fix  and  hold  a  psychical  phe- 
nomenon at  all,  or,  at  all  events,  to  fix  and  hold 


34  Beauty 

it  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  mix  it  up  with  other 
phenomena  connected  with  it.  Our  case  is  sim- 
ilar to  that  of  a  person  wishing  to  seize  just  some 
one  particular  fish  swimming  about  in  a  pond 
filled  with  water-lilies,  weeds,  and  the  like.  He 
will  probably  not  catch  the  fish  at  all,  or,  if  he 
does,  he  is  likely  to  take  up  much  other  material 
with  it.  This  is  the  reason  why  where  conscious- 
ness is  our  only  guide,  so  many  mistakes  are  made 
in  matters  of  much  greater  importance  than  the 
one  under  consideration.  Hence  in  order  not  to 
be  deceived  in  the  search  after  truth,  we  must 
proceed  with  great  circumspection,  and  in  order 
not  to  deceive  ourselves,  we  must  set  about  our 
investigation  with  candor  and  singleness  of  pur- 
pose. 

Ask  yourself  then  what  faculty  of  your  soul 
feels  pleasure  when  you  look,  say  upon  a  beauti- 
ful lawn.  Is  it  your  eye,  or  is  it  your  intellect, 
or  is  it  your  will  ?  The  eye  certainly  feels  pleas- 
ure. However,  the  pleasure  it  experiences  is  a 
mere  sensitive  pleasure  and  hence  not  the 
pleasure  caused  by  the  beautiful.  For,  as  we 
have  shown  in  thesis  2,  the  senses  as  such  are 
incapable  of  perceiving  the  beautiful  and,  con- 
sequently, are  incapable  of  enjoying  it.  Hav- 
ing thus  eliminated  the  senses  as  such,  we  have 
narrowed  down  our  discussion  to  the  intellect 
and  the  will.  We  have  to  make  our  choice  be- 
tween them,  or  else  admit  that  both  are  equally 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  Human  Faculties      35 

concerned  in  the  enjoyment  of  the  beauti- 
ful. It  is  extremely  difficult  in  this  case  to 
make  a  choice  on  account  of  the  very  intimate 
connection  between  the  two.  For  the  will  fol- 
lows the  intellect;  what  the  intellect  pronounces 
as  excellent  the  will  feels  prompted  to  love. 
Nevertheless  if  we  watch  the  workings  of  our 
soul  closely,  we  find  that  the  delight  produced  by 
the  perception  of  the  beautiful  is  not  a  craving, 
it  is  not  a  tendency,  it  is  not  a  longing  to  be 
united  to  the  object,  it  is  not  a  rejoicing  in  the 
possession  of  the  object,  but  it  is  joy  arising  from 
merely  gazing,  an  absorption  in  the  sight  of  the 
object.  Hence  the  joy  is  purely  intellectual,  not 
volitional;  for  volitional  joy  is  consequent  upon 
the  union  of  the  faculty  with  its  object.  I  gaze 
at  a  foaming  waterfall.  I  do  not  regard  it  as 
perfective  of  myself;  I  do  not  desire  it;  I  do  not 
crave  it ;  I  do  not  tend  towards  it ;  I  do  not  want 
to  possess  it.  I  feel  delighted  in  simply  looking, 
gazing.  The  emotions  that  begin  to  stir  in  the 
will  on  beholding  the  beauty  of  the  waterfall  are 
distinct  from  the  delight  of  the  beautiful.  For 
they  are  caused,  not  by  the  apprehension  of  the 
beautiful  as  such,  but  by  the  realization  that  the 
beautiful  is  at  the  same  time  good,  and  the  good 
is  the  proper  object  of  the  will.  (Cf.  p.  38.) 

The  conclusion  we  have  arrived  at  regarding 
the  character  of  the  delight  of  the  beautiful  is 
confirmed  by  St.  Thomas,  who,  as  a  sincere  and 


36  Beauty 

acute  analyzer  of  intellectual  phenomena,  stands 
unrivaled.  He  says :  "  Pulchrum  respicit  vim 
cognoscitivam;  pulchra  enim  sunt  quae  visa 
placent," *  that  is  to  say,  "  The  beautiful  has 
reference  to  the  cognitive  power,  for  those  things 
are  beautiful  which  please  in  their  very  contem- 
plation." And  again :  "  Et  sic  patet  quod 
pulchrum  addit  supra  bonum  quendam  ordinem 
ad  vim  cognoscitivam,  ita  ut  bonum  dicatur  id 
quod  simpliciter  placet  appetitui,  pulchrum  autem 
dicatur  id  cujus  ipsa  apprehensio  placet,"  2  which 
means,  "  Whence  it  appears  that  the  beautiful 
adds  to  the  notion  of  the  good  a  peculiar  relation 
to  the  cognitive  powers;  and  while  the  good  is 
that  object  which  simply  gratifies  the  appetite, 
the  beautiful  is  that  which  gratifies  by  its  mere 
apprehension."  3 

We  have  thus  established  our  thesis  that  the 
beautiful  as  such  appeals  to  the  intellect  and  not 
to  the  will. 

27.  No  Special  Intellectual  Faculty  Needed 
for  the  Perception  of  Beauty.  The  question 
here  suggests  itself,  Is  man  possessed  of  a  special 
intellectual  faculty  for  the  perception  and  ap- 
preciation of  the  beautiful  distinct  from  the 
faculty  which  apprehends  other  intellectual  ob- 
jects? There  are  some  who  think  that  man  is 

1  Sum.  Theol.  p.  I,  q.  5,  art.  4,  ad  I. 

2  Ibid.  p.  I,  2,  q.  27,  art.  I,  ad  3. 

8Cf.  Rickaby,  Gen.  Met.,  pp.  148,  149. 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  Human  Faculties      37 

possessed  of  such  a  special  faculty,  which  they 
choose  to  call  "  the  sense  of  beauty "  or  "  the 
sense  of  the  beautiful."  Such,  however,  is  not 
the  case.  For  the  beautiful  contains  none  but 
intellectual  elements,  namely  symmetry,  har- 
mony, order.  (Cf.  theses  4  and  5.)  There- 
fore the  intellect  is  fully  competent  to  perceive 
these  elements  and  capable  of  the  enjoyment  con- 
sequent upon  that  perception.  Hence  to  uphold 
the  existence  of  such  a  sense  is  purely  arbitrary ; 
it  is  to  admit  a  special  faculty  without  any  foun- 
dation whatever,  and  according  to  the  scholastic 
axiom,  "  Entia  non  sunt  multiplicanda  sine 
necessitate,"  "  Entities  should  not  be  multiplied 
without  rhyme  or  reason."  Were  we  to  allow 
the  necessity  of  a  special  faculty  for  the  appre- 
hension of  the  beautiful,  why  not  do  the  same 
for  the  apprehension,  say  of  God,  of  substance, 
of  accident?  Where  would  we  ever  stop? 
However,  there  seems  to  be  no  objection  to  call- 
ing the  intellectual  faculty  as  perceptive  of  the 
beautiful  "  sense  of  beauty,"  just  as  the  same 
faculty  in  so  far  as  it  perceives  its  own  proper 
modifications  is  called  "  consciousness."  The 
word  "  sense "  as  applied  to  the  intellect  thus 
viewed  is  by  no  means  inappropriate.  For  the 
perception  of  the  beautiful  is  intuitive  knowl- 
edge, a  sort  of  intellectual  seeing  or  gazing,  and 
hence  bears  a  great  resemblance  to  sense  percep- 
tion. It  is  for  the  same  reason  that  the  intuitive 


38  Beauty 

power  of  the  mind  to  perceive  certain  self-evi- 
dent truths  is  called  common  sense. 

28.  Proof  of  the  Second  Part  of  Thesis. 
We  now  pass  to  the  second  part  of  the  thesis,  in 
which  we  state  that  the  beautiful,  in  so  far  as  it 
is  also  good,  excites  love  in  the  will.  That  the 
beautiful  should  excite  love  in  the  will  is  just 
what  we  would  expect  considering  the  object  of 
the  will  and  the  peculiar  relation  existing  be- 
tween the  intellect  and  the  will.  The  object  of 
the  will  is  the  good  proposed  to  the  will  by  the 
intellect.  Hence  whenever  the  intellect  appre- 
hends something  as  good  and  presents  it  to  the 
will,  the  will  is  attracted  by  it  and  drawn  to  love 
it.  Now  the  beautiful  and  the  good  coincide; 
for  as  we  shall  see  in  thesis  5,  p.  66,  the  beau- 
tiful is  the  same  as  the  perfect,  and  the  perfect 
is  identical  with  the  good  (cf.  thesis  3,  p.  22). 
Consequently,  as  soon  as  the  intellect  perceives 
the  beautiful,  a  tendency  arises  in  the  will  to  love 
it.  The  love  of  the  beautiful  follows  upon  the 
apprehension  of  it  just  as  the  flash  does  upon  the 
electric  spark.  Let  it  be  borne  in  mind,  however, 
that  the  love  we  speak  of  here,  is  the  noblest  kind 
of  love  of  which  the  soul  is  capable;  it  is  pure, 
unselfish  love,  consisting  in  the  mere  volitional 
gratification  of  the  will,  in  the  mere  volitional 
satisfaction  at  the  superlative  goodness  of  the  ob- 
ject contemplated.  This  sort  of  love,  as  will  be 
remembered,  is  called  love  of  complacency,  in 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  Human  Faculties      39 

contradistinction  to  the  so-called  love  of  desire 
which  regards  an  object  not  as  good  in  itself,  but 
as  good  and  useful  to  the  lover.  The  artist 
loves  the  flower  in  the  field  because  it  is  so  per- 
fect in  itself;  the  gardener  loves  it  because  it 
may  prove  profitable  to  him. 

29.  Love  of  an  Object  not  Always  Pro- 
portionate to  its  Beauty.  It  would  seem  to 
follow  from  what  we  have  just  said  that  the  love 
which  a  beautiful  object  enkindles  in  the  will, 
should  be  exactly  proportional  to  the  intellectual 
apprehension  of  the  beauty  of  that  object;  for 
beauty  arouses  love  in  the  will  only  in  so  far 
as  it  is  apprehended.  But  experience  shows  that 
the  will  does  not  always  love  what  the  intellect 
apprehends  as  beautiful.  Thus  many  do  not 
love  virtue  although  they  cannot  but  perceive  its 
excellence. 

In  regard  to  this  difficulty  we  say  that  the  love 
of  the  beautiful  would  always  precisely  corre- 
spond to  the  intellectual  perception  of  it,  if  the 
will  were  at  all  times  under  the  full  control  of 
the  intellect  and  not  free,  in  a  great  measure,  to 
oppose  the  attraction  of  the  beautiful  object  per- 
ceived by  the  intellect.  A  perverted  will,  a  will 
which  has  indulged  in  unlawful  loves,  may  be  at 
war  with  its  better  self  and  hate  what  the  intel- 
lect perceives  as  beautiful.  Nor  can  the  intel- 
lect in  such  a  case  give  itself  over  unreservedly 
to  its  own  delights;  for  the  volitional  faculty  is 


4O  Beauty 

sure  to  react  on  the  intellect  and  hamper  it  in 
its  enjoyment.  The  intellectual  fruition  of  the 
beautiful  will  thus  be  marred,  since  when  there  is 
strife  in  the  soul,  none  of  the  faculties  involved 
in  the  strife  can  receive  full  satisfaction.  In  this 
manner  it  may  happen  that,  though  the  intellect 
sees  the  beauty  of  God  or  of  virtue,  the  will  at- 
tached to  creatures  and  sense  may  refuse  to  be 
influenced,  and  may,  moreover,  like  a  false 
friend,  bend  all  its  energies  to  deprive  its  partner 
faculty  of  much  of  its  delight. 

30.  How  the  Beautiful  Contributes  to  our 
own  Good.  We  have  thus  established  that  the 
beautiful  as  beautiful  begets  intellectual  delight 
only,  but  that  in  so  far  as  it  is  identified  with  the 
good  it  also  arouses  love  in  the  soul.  This  love, 
as  we  have  shown,  is  love  of  benevolemce  and 
hence  entirely  unselfish  love.  Here  the  question 
arises  how  the  beautiful  contributes  to  our  own 
good ;  for  we  pointed  out  before  that  we  cannot 
love  anything  even  with  the  most  disinterested 
love  unless  it  promotes,  in  some  way,  our  own 
good.  (Cf.  thesis  3,  p.  26  sqq.)  Such  a  con- 
nection between  the  good  loved  and  our  own 
good,  we  proved  to  be  a  fundamental  condition 
for  love  to  arise  in  the  soul  at  all. 

To  this  question  we  reply  that  the  beautiful 
is  in  a  very  marked  way  our  own  good,  in  fact, 
it  is,  as  it  were,  part  and  parcel  of  our  own  selves. 
Hence  by  loving  the  beautiful  we  love  ourselves. 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  Human  Faculties      41 

To  understand  this  recall  the  well-known  axiom : 
"Similis  simili  gaudet "  ;  "  Like  loves  like." 
The  truth  of  this  axiom  rests  on  the  truth  of  the 
other  axiom  that  every  one  loves  himself.  For 
what  is  like  myself  is,  in  a  way,  myself,  since 
there  exists,  though  not  a  real,  yet  a  logical  iden- 
tity between  myself  and  what  is  like  myself. 
Consequently,  by  loving  what  is  like  me,  I  love 
myself.  Now  the  beautiful  is  like  man's  rational 
nature,  his  soul,  in  a  very  special  manner. 
Hence  by  loving  the  beautiful  I  love  myself. 
But  how  is  the  beautiful  like  myself?  It  is  so 
because  the  essence  of  the  beautiful  is  harmony, 
proportion,  and  order  (cf.  thesis  4),  and  the 
soul  is  essentially  harmony,  proportion,  and 
order.  For  the  soul  is,  of  its  very  essence,  a 
representative  principle,  i.  e.  a  principle  which 
through  its  faculties  exhibits  a  likeness  or  simili- 
tude of  things.  In  this  sense  the  soul  might  be 
rightly  called  a  harmony,  to  use  an  expression 
employed  by  the  Pythagoreans,  though  in  a  some- 
what different  sense.  Moreover,  the  intellect  is 
essentially  a  reasoning  faculty.  Now  reasoning 
is  a  complex,  yet  at  the  same  time,  a  most  orderly 
process.  For  it  consists  in  comparing  two  ideas 
with  a  third  and  then  drawing  a  conclusion  ac- 
cording to  the  principles :  "  Two  things  identi- 
cal with  a  third  are  identical  with  each  other," 
and  "  If  one  of  two  things  is  identical  with  a 
third  thing  and  the  other  is  not,  then  those  two 


42  Beauty 

things  are  not  identical  with  each  other." 
Hence  the  soul,  on  account  of  this  its  orderliness 
and  harmony,  is  like  the  beautiful  objects  which 
it  perceives,  and  therefore  it  is  that  the  will  loves 
the  beautiful  so  exceedingly.  The  orderliness 
and  harmony  of  the  soul  then  is  a  condition,  a 
prerequisite  for  the  soul  to  love  things  beautiful. 

What  we  have  just  said  may  be  confirmed  by 
a  sentence  of  Fr.  Liberatore  S.  J.1  He  says : 
"  Quod  si  causam  quaeris  cur  de  claritate  et  pro- 
portione  facultas  cognoscitiva  oblectetur,  ea  non 
incongrue  esse  dicitur,  quia  in  tali  objecto  cog- 
noscitiva facultas  aliquid  sibi  simile  reperit; 
similitudo  enim  causa  est  amoris  et  complacen- 
tiae,"  that  is  to  say,  "If  you  ask  the  reason  why 
the  cognitive  faculty  takes  delight  in  clearness 
an<i  proportion,  it  would  seem  to  be  that  the  cog- 
nitive faculty  finds  in  such  an  object  some  like- 
ness to  itself;  for  likeness  is  the  cause  of  love 
and  satisfaction." 

31.  Two  Kinds  of  Intellectual  Delight. 
Here  we  must  draw  attention  to  a  source  of  pos- 
sible confusion.  We  said  that  the  delight  of  the 
beautiful  is  intellectual  delight.  But,  some  one 
might  ask,  is  there  not  intellectual  delight  which 
does  not  spring  from  the  contemplation  of 
beauty?  Thus  the  solution  of  a  difficult  math- 
ematical problem  is  often  accompanied  by  in- 
tense intellectual  delight;  yet  this  delight  is  evi- 

1  Met.  Gen.  c.  i,  a.  8,  n.  54. 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  Human  Faculties      43 

dently  not  the  effect  of  the  perception  of  beauty. 
Is  there  any  way  of  discriminating  between  this 
kind  of  intellectual  delight  and  the  intellectual 
delight  produced  by  the  contemplation  of  beauty? 
As  regards  this  point  we  say  that  there 
are  two  kinds  of  intellectual  delight.  The  one 
kind  springs  from  the  mere  discovery  of  the 
truth  (v.  g.  of  a  complicated  mathematical  prob- 
lem), and  implies  reasoning.  It  might  be  called 
the  delight  of  "pure  knowledge."  The  other 
kind  of  intellectual  delight  arises  from  the  appre- 
hension of  what  is  symmetrical,  harmonious,  pro- 
portionate, in  a  word,  of  what  is  beautiful,  and 
as  such  does  not  imply  reasoning.  For  the  per- 
ception of  the  beautiful  is  mere  contemplation  or 
intuition,  mere  viewing  or  gazing.  To  mark  the 
difference  between  this  kind  of  mental  delight 
and  that  springing  from  the  mere  discovery  of 
the  truth,  the  word  "  contemplation "  has  been 
introduced  into  the  definition  of  the  beautiful; 
for  the  beautiful  is  defined  as  that  the  contempla- 
tion of  which  affords  delight.  Nor  is  it  difficult 
to  point  out  some  of  the  characteristics  distin- 
guishing the  delights  of  the  intellect  upon  the  dis- 
covery of  the  truth,  from  the  delights  of  the  in- 
tellect upon  the  apprehension  of  the  beautiful. 
The  delights  which  accompany  the  discovery  of 
the  truth  are  keen  and  stirring,  the  delights  which 
attend  the  apprehension  of  the  beautiful  are  gen- 
tle and  soothing.  The  pleasures  of  pure  knowl- 


44  Beauty 

edge  may  be  experienced  by  the  most  perverse, 
the  hard,  the  cold,  the  cruel ;  they  may  be  felt  by 
the  penetrating  intellect  of  the  tyrant  when  he 
has  hit  upon  some  ingenious  plan  of  ridding  him- 
self of  a  rival.  But  the  satisfaction  proceeding 
from  the  sight  of  the  beautiful  is  the  portion  of 
the  imaginative,  of  the  generous,  of  the  affec- 
tionate. Mere  knowledge,  deep  and  penetrating, 
may  lead  to  hatred;  the  perception  of  beauty 
gives  birth  to  love.  Thus  we  see  that  there  is  a 
notable  difference  between  the  delights  of  knowl- 
edge and  the  delights  caused  by  the  sight  of 
beauty.  The  delights  attending  the  contempla- 
tion of  beauty  might  not  be  ineptly  called  the 
joy  of  the  mind,  the  jubilation  of  the  intellect. 

However,  before  leaving  this  question,  a  word 
of  explanation  is  needed.  We  stated  above  that 
the  delight  accompanying  the  solution  of  a  dif- 
ficult mathematical  problem  is  not  the  delight 
peculiar  to  the  beautiful.  When  we  say  this,  we 
do  not  mean  to  assert  that  there  is  no  beauty  in 
mathematics  or  in  science  in  general.  Far  be  it 
from  us.  All  we  mean  to  say  is  that  the  pleasure 
accompanying  the  mere  investigation  and  appre- 
hension of  truth  is  a  pleasure  of  its  own,  distinct 
from  the  pleasure  proper  to  the  perception  of  the 
beautiful.  But  the  scientist  does  not  merely  in- 
vestigate and  apprehend  the  truth ;  he  does  much 
more.  He  arranges  and  combines  the  truths  ap- 
prehended into  systems  according  to  some  ra- 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  Human  Faculties      45 

tional  principle,  and  thus  erects  ideal  structures 
truly  beautiful,  structures  the  contemplation  of 
which  fills  him  and  all  his  fellow  scientists  with 
exquisite  delight.  The  very  expressions  used  to 
describe  science  —  as,  knowledge  reduced  to  law, 
knowledge  coordinated,  arranged  and  systema- 
tized —  indicate  that  order,  the  essential  element 
of  beauty  is  a  distinctive  feature  of  science  (cf. 
thesis  4,  p.  52  sq.).  It  was  the  recognition  of 
the  beauty  in  science  which  made  Ben  Jonson 
consider  poesy  as  the  soul  of  science  when  he 
wrote : 

"  O  sacred  poesy,  thou  spirit  of  Roman  art, 
The  soul  of  science,  and  the  queen  of  souls." 

The  pleasure  of  scientists  in  the  prosecution  of 
truth  and  their  delight  in  the  contemplation  of  a 
scientific  system  may  be  compared  to  the  pleas- 
ure the  builders  of  the  cathedrals  of  the  Middle 
Ages  felt  in  the  work  of  construction  and  the  de- 
light they  experienced  in  gazing  upon  the  fin- 
ished structures. 


CHAPTER  THIRD 
THE  ESSENCE  OF  BEAUTY  IN  GENERAL 

ARTICLE     I 
ORDER  ESSENTIAL  TO  BEAUTY 

Summary:  Question  stated  — Thesis  — Divisions  of 
beauty  —  Definition  and  divisions  of  order 
—  Precise  meaning  of  thesis  determined  — 
A  posteriori  proof  of  thesis  —  Confirmation 
of  proof  —  A  priori  proof  of  thesis  — 
Thesis  corroborated  by  authority  —  Excep- 
tions to  thesis  merely  apparent. 

32.  Question    Stated.     Thus    far    we    have 
spoken  of  beauty  in  its  relation  to  the  faculties 
which  it  affects.     In  the  next  two  theses  we  shall 
consider  beauty  as  it  is  in  itself,  in  its  inner  na- 
ture and  essence. 

THESIS  4 
Beauty  essentially  implies  order. 

33.  Divisions  of  Beauty.     Before   proceed- 
ing to  the  proof  of  the  thesis  we  must  set  down 
the  chief  divisions  of  beauty,  as  we  shall  have 
frequent  occasion  to  refer  to  them  in  what  fol- 
lows. 

46 


The  Essence  of  Beauty  in  General        47 

In  the  first  place,  beauty  is  either  uncreated 
or  created.  The  former  is  peculiar  to  the  Deity, 
the  latter  belongs  to  His  handiwork,  creatures. 

Another  division  of  beauty  is  into  spiritual 
and  material  beauty.  Spiritual  beauty  is  the 
beauty  of  spiritual  entities,  whilst  material  beauty 
is  the  beauty  of  corporeal  things. 

Spiritual  beauty,  in  turn,  is  either  intellectual 
or  moral,  according  as  it  regards  intellectual  or 
moral  excellence.  A  genius,  for  instance,  pos- 
sesses intellectual  beauty,  a  magnanimous  man, 
moral  beauty. 

Beauty  is  also  divided  according  to  the  nature 
of  the  beautiful  object  into  supersensible  and 
sensible  beauty.  If  the  beautiful  object  lies  be- 
yond the  perceptive  power  of  sense,  as  God, 
beauty  is  supersensible,  if  it  lies  within  the  sphere 
of  sense,  as  a  violet,  beauty  is  sensible. 

Sensible  beauty  is  sometimes  subdivided  into 
beauty  of  color  and  beauty  of  sound,  and  into 
beauty  of  form  and  beauty  of  movement.  The 
beauty  of  mathematical  construction  falls  under 
the  beauty  of  form. 

A  further  division  of  beauty  is  into  ideal  and 
real.  Ideal  beauty  is  peculiar  to  creations  of  the 
mind,  to  things  in  so  far  as  they  are  objects  of 
thought,  as  the  ideals  in  the  mind  of  God  or  the 
conceptions  of  an  architect  guiding  him  in  the 
exercise  of  his  art.  Real  beauty,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  the  beauty  of  things  regarded  in  them- 


48  Beauty 

selves.  This  may  be  subdivided  into  natural  and 
artistic  beauty,  or  the  beauty  of  the  works  of 
nature  and  the  beauty  of  works  of  art. 

The  last  division  of  beauty  is  that  into  sym- 
bolic and  intrinsic  (non-symbolic)  beauty.  A 
thing  possesses  symbolic  beauty  in  so  far  as  it  is 
the  symbol  or  emblem  of  an  object  which  is  beau- 
tiful in  itself;  but  when  the  object  is  beautiful  in 
itself,  and,  as  it  were,  in  its  own  right,  and  not 
precisely  as  suggesting  something  else,  it  is  said 
to  possess  intrinsic  beauty.  One  and  the  same 
object  may  possess  both  these  kinds  of  beauty. 
Thus  a  lily  is  beautiful  in  itself  and  also  as  the 
emblem  or  symbol  of  the  beautiful  virtue  of 
purity. 

34.  Definition  and  Divisions  of  Order. 
Prior  to  entering  upon  the  proof  of  the  thesis,  it 
is  further  necessary  to  explain  the  notion  of 
order. 

Order  is  defined  as  the  arrangement  of  several 
things  according  to  some  common  principle. 
For  order  then  we  must  have  several  things. 
One  thing,  it  is  plain,  cannot  be  set  in  order. 
Supposing  I  have  but  one  dot  (A)  on  a  piece  of 
paper,  order  in  regard  to  this  dot  is  inconceivable. 
But  even  if  I  have  several  things  and  these  things 
are  placed  at  random,  no  one  will  say  that  they 
are  arranged  in  an  orderly  way.  Hence  that 
there  may  be  order,  several  things  must  be  dis- 


The  Essence  of  Beauty  in  General         49 

posed  according  to  some  relation  or  common 
principle.  Suppose  v.  g.  that  to  the  dot  (A)  two 
more  dots  (B  and  C)  be  added  at  equal  distances 
from  (A),  then  these  three  dots  form  an  orderly 
arrangement.  Because  several  things  are  now 
arranged  according  to  a  given  relation,  namely 
equality  of  distance.  —  Take  another  more  com- 
plex example.  As  everybody  will  admit,  there 
is  order  in  a  watch.  And  why?  Because,  in 
the  first  place,  there  are  many  parts  in  a  watch, 
as  the  wheels,  springs,  levers ;  and  because,  in  the 
second  place,  these  parts  are  all  arranged  and 
combined  for  a  common  purpose,  namely  to  cause 
the  hands  of  the  watch  to  move  in  such  a  way  as 
to  indicate  the  correct  time.  Order  then  is  the 
unification  of  the  manifold,  multiplicity  reduced 
to  unity. 

Having  thus  explained  the  notion  of  order  in 
general,  we  shall  now  give  a  few  of  the  divisions 
of  order. 

Order  is  either  simple  or  compound.  Order 
is  simple  when  things  are  ordered  according  to 
one  principle  only,  and  it  is  compound  when  or- 
dered according  to  more  than  one  principle. 
Thus  if  I  arrange  the  books  in  a  library  accord- 
ing to  their  subject  only,  the  order  is  simple;  but 
if  I  arrange  them  according  to  their  subject, 
language,  and  size,  the  order  becomes  compound. 
The  order  of  the  universe  is  most  complex,  God, 


5O  Beauty 

the  great  Orderer  disposing  and  unifying  the 
endless  multiplicity  and  variety  of  things  in  a 
most  marvelous  manner. 

A  further  division  of  order  is  into  statical  and 
dynamical  order.  Statical  order  obtains  among 
things  that  are  fixed,  as  the  orderly  arrangement 
of  a  Byzantine  cathedral,  while  dynamical  order 
attaches  to  things  in  motion,  as  the  movements 
in  a  dance  or  the  evolutions  of  an  army  drawn 
up  for  drill. 

Again,  order  is  necessary,  when  it  arises  from 
the  essences  of  things,  as  the  moral  order;  and 
changeable  (contingent),  when  founded  on  some 
non-essential  principle. 

Another  very  important  division  of  order  is 
that  into  symmetrical  and  harmonious  order. 
Symmetrical  order  results  from  the  regular  rep- 
etition of  equal  or  similar  parts,  but  in  opposite 
directions.  Thus  the  orderly  arrangement  of 
the  parts  of  the  human  body  is  symmetrical,  be- 
cause one  side  of  the  body  is  the  exact  counter- 
part of  the  other.  Harmonious  order  arises 
from  the  balancing  of  dissimilar  elements  in  such 
a  way  as  to  produce  an  agreeable  impression. 
The  seven  colors  of  the  rainbow  and  the  com- 
bination of  sounds  in  a  good  musical  perform- 
ance are  instances  of  harmonious  order. 

Lastly,  there  is  a  species  of  order  in  which  the 
principle  of  order  is  some  end  to  be  obtained.  An 
example  of  this  kind  of  order  is  the  order  which 


The  Essence  of  Beauty  in  General         51 

a  general  establishes  when  drawing  up  his  troops 
for  battle,  or  the  order  which  a  good  ruler  main- 
tains among  his  subjects  for  the  securing  of  their 
temporal  happiness.  The  gaining  of  the  victory 
and  the  procuring  of  the  temporal  happiness  of 
the  governed,  are  the  ends  determining  the  ar- 
rangement of  the  general  and  the  regulations  of 
the  governor  respectively. 

35.  Precise  Meaning  of  Thesis  Determined. 
We  are  now  ready  to  establish  the  thesis  in  which 
we  stated  that  beauty  essentially  implies  order. 
All  we  mean  to  maintain  in  this  thesis  is  that 
where  there  is  no  order  there  can  be  no  beauty. 
Note  that  there  may  be  no  order  in  an  object  for 
two  reasons,  either  because  there  is  merely  and 
simply  an  absence  of  order  in  the  object,  or  be- 
cause there  is  actual  disorder  in  it.     In  the  first 
case,  the  expression  "  no  order  "  is  taken  nega- 
tively, in  the  second,  positively.     Our  contention 
is  that  lack  of  order  either  negative  or  positive 
is  incompatible  with  beauty,  but  with  this  differ- 
ence,  that   where  there   is  a   mere   absence   of 
order,  an  object  is  simply  wwbeautiful  without 
being  ugly,  whereas  when  there  is  disorder,  the 
object  is  positively  ugly. 

36.  A  Posteriori  Proof  of  Thesis.     Our  first 
argument  shall  be  drawn  from  experience.     COP- 
sider  a  single  point  on  a  sheet  of  paper  out  of  ah 
relation  to  any  other  point.     No  one  will  call 
this  point  beautiful;  nor  is  it  ugly;  it  is  simply 


52  Beauty 

unbeautiful.  Were  you  to  add  other  points  so 
as  to  form  a  perfect  circle,  there  would  be  order 
and  beauty.  —  Or  suppose  some  one  were  to  di- 
rect your  attention  to  a  single  stone  in  a  stately 
building  and  then  ask  you,  "  Is  that  stone  beau- 
tiful?" you  would  answer,  "Not  in  itself,  but 
as  a  part  of  the  whole  structure."  —  To  add  one 
more  example:  A  single  sound  in  a  symphony 
considered  apart  from  all  the  other  sounds  is 
not  thought  by  any  one  to  possess  beauty.  —  Ob- 
serve, however,  that  what  is  simple  and  devoid  of 
order  under  one  aspect,  may  be  complex  and  ar- 
ranged in  an  orderly  way  under  other  aspects 
and  so  far  forth  beautiful.  All  we  mean  to  say 
here  is  that  a  thing,  in  so  far  as  it  is  out  of  all 
relation  to  other  things,  is  not  deemed  beautiful. 
It  is  hardly  necessary  to  prove  that,  where  there 
is  positive  disorder,  there  is  not  only  no  beauty, 
but  actual  ugliness  and  unsightliness.  This  will 
be  best  brought  home  by  an  instance  or  two.  — 
Take  the  statue  of  a  man  with  the  eyes  of  un- 
equal size,  bulging  out,  and  very  far  apart  from 
one  another.  Every  one  will  pronounce  the  face 
of  this  statue  ugly.  —  And  what  is  it  that  makes 
poor  music  so  offensive  to  the  esthetic  sense  ?  Is 
it  not  want  of  harmony,  want  of  a  proper  com- 
bination of  notes  ? 

37.  Confirmation  of  Proof.  Some  addi- 
tional light  may  be  thrown  on  our  assertion  that 
beauty  implies  order,  by  a  consideration  of  the 


The  Essence  of  Beauty  in  General         53 

tendency  of  the  human  mind  to  discover  order  in 
things.  —  Consciousness  tells  us  that  the  mind 
delights  in  discovering  unity  amid  variety,  in  uni- 
fying the  manifold.  This  discovery  of  unity 
amid  variety,  this  unification  of  the  manifold  is 
one  of  the  chief  charms  of  scientific  pursuits. 
Now  unity  amid  variety  constitutes  order. 
Since  then  the  natural  propensity  of  our  minds 
leads  us  to  ferret  out  the  hidden  order  of  things, 
it  would  seem  to  follow  that  unless  an  object  ex- 
hibits an  orderly  arrangement  of  parts,  we  can 
take  no  pleasure  in  contemplating  it,  in  other 
words,  we  can  see  no  beauty  in  it. 

38.  A  Priori  Proof  of  Thesis.     It  can  also 
be  shown  a  priori  that  there  can  be  no  beauty 
without  order.  —  The  human  mind  is  an  intel- 
lectual faculty;  hence  it  estimates  things  accord- 
ing to  their  proper  worth.     Now  a  thing  which 
is  in  a  state  of  disorder  or  confusion  is  positively 
defective.     How     then     can     the     intellect     be 
charmed  by  it?    Again,  since  order  is  one  of  the 
chief  excellencies  of  things,  is  it  surprising  that 
the  mind  should  be  left  cold  and  indifferent  in 
gazing  upon  a  thing  that  is  so  simple,  so  plain,  so 
uniform,  as  not  even  to  possess  the  first  element 
of  order,  namely  a  multiplicity  of  parts? 

39.  Thesis     Corroborated     by     Authority. 
Lastly,  it  will  be  well  to  confirm  our  arguments 
from  reason  by  an  appeal  to  authority.     Many 
of  the  most  distinguished  philosophers  of  both 


54  Beauty 

ancient  and  modern  times  tell  us  that  beauty  es- 
sentially implies  order,  or,  what  comes  to  the 
same  thing,  proportion,  symmetry,  fitness,  unity 
in  variety,  and  the  like.  It  is  not,  however,  our 
intention  to  indorse  the  views  of  all  these 
philosophers  in  every  respect.  We  quote  their 
words  merely  to  show  that,  to  their  minds,  beauty 
essentially  implies  order. 

Let  us  begin  with  Plato.  According  to  Plato 
the  essence  of  the  beautiful  lies  in  the  fit- 
ness and  symmetry  resulting  from  the  relation 
of  the  concept  to  the  plurality  of  phenomena.1 
Aristotle,  Plato's  disciple,  tells  us :  "  The  chief 
elements  of  beauty  are  order,  symmetry,  and 
definiteness  " 2 ;  and  again :  "  Beauty  implies  a 
certain  magnitude  and  order."  3  Cicero  shall  be 
our  next  witness.  He  says :  "  Sicut  corporis 
est  quaedam  apta  figura  membrorum  cum  coloris 
quadam  suavitate,  sic  in  animo  opinionum 
judiciorumque  aequalitas  et  constantia  cum  firmi- 
tate  quadam  et  stabilitate  virtutem  subsequens  aut 
virtutis  vim  ipsam  continens,  pulchrituclo  voca- 
tur,"  *  which  may  be  rendered  thus :  "  Just  as 
in  respect  to  the  body,  a  certain  apt  configuration 
of  the  members  together  with  a  certain  charm  of 
coloring  is  called  beauty,  so  also  in  regard  to  the 
soul,  the  equipoise  and  harmony  of  views  and 

1  See  Ueberweg,  History  of  Philosophy,  v.  i,  p.  129. 

2  Met.  3,  1078,  n.  361. 
8  Poet.  chap.  7. 

4  Tuscul.  quaest.  4,  c.  13. 


The  Essence  of  Beauty  in  General         55 

judgments  either  springing  from  virtue  or  con- 
stituting the  very  essence  of  virtue  is  called 
beauty."  St.  Augustine,  who  was  a  great  phi- 
losopher as  well  as  a  great  theologian,  has  the 
following :  "  Quid  est  corporis  pulchritudo  ? 
Congruentia  partium  cum  quadam  coloris  suavi- 
tate."1  In  English,  "What  is  bodily  beauty? 
The  harmonious  arrangement  of  parts  with  a 
certain  charm  of  coloring."  In  another  place 2 
he  defines  beauty  in  general  as  the  "  splendor 
ordinis,"  "the  splendor  of  order,"  a  definition 
so  pithy  that  it  has  become  famous.  St.  Thomas 
asserts  in  a  number  of  places  that  beauty  consists 
in  order,  proportion,  and  the  like.  Thus  in  his 
Sum.  Theol.  he  states :  "  Unde  pulchrum  in 
debita  proportione  consistit 3 ;  "  Hence  beauty 
consists  in  proper  proportion."  In  another 
place  of  the  same  Sum.  Theol.  we  read: 
"  Ad  pulchritudinem  tria  requiruntur,  primo 
quaedam  integritas  sive  perfectio  .  .  .  et  debita 
proportio  sive  consonantia  et  item  claritas  "  * ; 
that  is :  "  For  beauty  three  things  are  re- 
quired, first,  a  certain  integrity  or  perfec- 
tion, .  .  .  secondly,  due  proportion  or  harmony, 
and  lastly  clearness."  From  among  the  modern 
philosophers  we  single  out  Fr.  Tongiorgi  S.  J., 
who  has  obtained  a  wide  and  well-deserved  rep- 

1  Epis.  3,  n.  4. 

2  De.  Ver.  Relig.  c.  4,  n.  77. 

3  Sum.  Theol.,  p.  i,  q.  5,  ad  I. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  i,  q.  39,  a.  8. 


56  Beauty 

utation  for  his  philosophical  acumen.  He  says: 
"  Pulchritudinis  essentiam  atque  intima  constitu- 
tiva  continet  Celebris  ex  Platone  et  Augustino 
definitio,  '  unitas  in  multitudine  et  varietate,'  qua 
nulla  verier  et  pulchrior  excogitari  potest," 1 
which  is  translated :  "  The  essence  and  inner- 
most elements  of  beauty  are  contained  in  the 
famous  definition  of  Plato  and  Augustine,  '  unity 
in  multiplicity  and  variety/  than  which  no  truer 
and  more  beautiful  definition  can  be  thought 
out."  We  shall  conclude  the  list  of  authorities 
by  three  quotations  from  well-known  writers  on 
the  Beautiful  in  the  English  language.  S.  T. 
Coleridge,  quoted  in  Webster's  Dictionary  says : 
"  The  old  definition  of  beauty  in  the  Roman 
school  was  '  multiplicity  in  unity/  and  there  is 
no  doubt  that  such  is  the  principle  of  beauty." 
The  "  Vocabulary  of  Philosophy "  under 
"  Beauty  "  states  that  "  according  to  Hutchison 
the  general  foundation  and  occasion  of  the  idea 
of  beauty  is  uniformity  and  variety."  Words- 
worth speaks  of  the  "  production  of  beauty  by  a 
multiplicity  of  symmetric  parts,  uniting  in  a  con- 
sistent whole."  2 

40.  Exceptions  to  Thesis  merely  Apparent. 
But  here  a  serious  doubt  interrupts  our  progress : 
though  it  is  true  that  order  or  unity  amid  variety 
is  often  discernible  in  beautiful  objects,  yet  there 

1  Ontologia,  n.  307. 

2  Cf.  Webster's  Dictionary  under  "  Beauty." 


The  Essence  of  Beauty  in  General         57 

seem  to  be  many  exceptions  to  the  rule,  and  if  so, 
order  cannot  be  considered  essential  to  beauty, 
since  nothing  can  be  without  that  which  is  es- 
sential to  it.  It  will  be  convenient  to  set  down 
a  few  of  these  apparent  exceptions  and  test  them. 

The  full  moon  is  certainly  beautiful ;  poets 
have  sung  of  its  charm  since  time  immemorial, 
and  yet,  so  our  objector  says,  the  full  moon  pre- 
sents itself  to  the  beholder  as  a  mere  flat,  almost 
undiversified,  luminous  disk  hanging  in  the  sky. 
Where  is  there  sufficient  variety  here  for  order? 
Hence  order  would  not  seem  to  be  necessarily  re- 
quired for  the  beautiful.1 

This  objection  rests  on  a  misconception.  For 
we  must  not  consider  the  moon  by  itself,  but  to- 
gether with  its  surroundings.  Look  at  the  moon 
on  a  bright,  cloudless  night.  Behold  the  circu- 
lar disk  as  it  sends  forth  its  soft  light  and  moves 
slowly  through  the  mighty  dome  of  heaven, 
while  on  the  earth  below  everything  is  bathed  in 
its  mellow  rays.  Or  watch  it  when  the  sky  is 
partially  overcast;  see  how  it  sails  through  the 
clouds,  now  half-hidden,  now  disappearing  al- 
together, now  reappearing  again.  —  In  this  view, 
the  moon  certainly  presents  enough  variety  to 
render  it  exceedingly  beautiful. 

A  green  lawn,  not  variegated  with  flowers,  is 
deemed  beautiful,  and  yet  —  so  some  think  — 
there  is  no  variety  here. 

1  See  Urraburu,  Ont.  p.  533. 


58  Beauty 

As  regards  this  instance,  we  wish  to  note  first 
that  we  must  not  confound  the  pleasure  of  the 
beautiful  with  the  agreeable  sensation  certain 
colors  produce  in  us.  Just  as  sugar  is  pleasant 
to  the  taste,  so  certain  colors  are  agreeable  to  the 
eye.  But  this  sensible  pleasure  does  not  consti- 
tute the  pleasure  of  the  beautiful,  as  some  have 
imagined.  (Cf.  p.  120.)  However,  we  think 
that  a  green  lawn  is  not  only  agreeable  to  the 
sight,  it  is  likewise  truly  beautiful.  For  it  shows 
forth  unity  amid  variety.  It  is  formed  of  many 
blades,  each  symmetrical  in  form,  broader  at  the 
base  and  tapering  to  a  point.  The  upper  side  of 
each  leaflet  is  of  a  different  shade  of  green  from 
the  lower.  Perhaps  a  gentle  breeze  is  stirring 
the  grass  causing  it  to  sway  to  and  fro  in  grace- 
ful movements.  Moreover  —  and  this  is  very 
important  in  the  present  case  —  by  reason  of  the 
pleasant  sensation  produced  by  the  sight  of  the 
lawn,  the  mind  is  enabled  to  perceive  that  green 
is  adapted  or  suited  to  the  eye,  and  adaptation  or 
suitability  always  implies  order.  (Cf.  thesis  7, 
part  2.)  It  is  not  true,  then,  that  a  green  lawn 
is  beautiful  without  presenting  the  necessary  ele- 
ments of  order.  It  must  not  be  supposed,  how- 
ever, that  the  intellect  always  adverts  to  the  ele- 
ments of  order  in  an  object  explicitly  and  by  a 
reflex  act;  no,  as  a  rule  it  takes  them  in  intui- 
tively, very  rapidly,  and  almost  unconsciously; 
that  is  sufficient  for  the  appreciation  and  enjoy- 


The  Essence  of  Beauty  in  General         59 

ment  of  the  beauty  of  an  object.  —  We  shall  add 
one  more  instance  from  the  region  of  sound. 
One  single  tone  can  be  beautiful.  Here  again, 
there  would  seem  to  be  beauty  without  variety. 
In  answering  this  difficulty,  we  might  repeat 
(mutatis  mutandis)  what  we  said  in  respect  to  a 
single  color  (green),  namely  that  we  must  not 
confound  the  agreeable  with  the  beautiful,  and 
that  the  perfect  adaptation  of  a  single  sound  to 
the  ear  is  alone  sufficient  to  impart  beauty  to  the 
sound.  (Cf.  thesis  7,  p.  74.)  But  a  single  tone 
taken  in  its  isolation  can  also  be  called  beautiful, 
because,  even  considered  in  itself,  it  exhibits  or- 
der or  unity  amid  variety.  For  in  every  note 
we  can  discern  at  least  three  elements,  namely 
pitch,  intensity,  and  timbre.  Now  these  ele- 
ments may  be  blended  and  correlated  according 
to  certain  proportions,  and  a  good  ear  detecting 
these  proportions  will  discern  beauty  in  a  single 
tone.  Moreover,  on  hearing  a  sweet,  musical 
note,  the  musician  may  recall  pleasing  airs  heard 
before,  and  thus  the  single  note  becomes  beauti- 
ful by  association.  (See  thesis  8.)  Hence  the 
aforesaid  exceptions  to  the  general  statement  that 
beauty  essentially  implies  order,  are  exceptions 
only  in  appearance. 


60  Beauty 

ARTICLE  2 
BEAUTY  THE  SPLENDOR  OF  ORDER 

Summary:  Transition  to  new  phase  of  subject  —  The- 
sis—  Meaning  of  thesis  illustrated  —  A 
posteriori  proof  of  thesis  —  A  priori  proof 
of  thesis  —  Answer  to  query  —  Authori- 
ties vouching  for  truth  of  thesis  —  Corol- 
lary :  Scale  of  beauty  —  Relationship  be- 
tween the  true,  the  beautiful,  and  the 
good. 

41.  Transition  to   New  Phase  of  Subject. 

We  have  thus  established  the  thesis  that  there 
can  be  no  beauty  without  order.  We  next  ask: 
Is  any  kind  of  order  sufficient  to  constitute 
beauty?  To  this  question  we  answer: 

THESIS  5 

Beauty  as  such  consists  not  in  any 
kind  of  order  but  in  order  that  is 
resplendent,  or,  to  use  an  expression 
of  St  Augustine,  in  the  "  splendor  of 
order." 

42.  Meaning    of    Thesis    Illustrated.    Our 
contention  then  is  that  it  is  only  order  of  a  cer- 
tain degree  of  perfection  which  constitutes  the 
beautiful.     Nor  should  this  seem  strange;   for 
there  are  many  things  which  consist  in  a  quality 


The  Essence  of  Beauty  in  General         61 

of  a  certain  degree  of  intensity.  Thus  genius  is 
exalted  intellectual  power,  remarkable  aptitude 
for  some  special  pursuit;  patriotism  is  devotion 
to  one's  country,  i.  e.  ardent  love  or  affection  for 
one's  native  land. 

43.  A  Posteriori  Proof  of  Thesis.  Our  first 
and  strongest  argument  is  based  on  experience. 
Make  two  points  (A  and  B)  upon  a  piece  of 
paper.  There  is  order  here;  for  the  one  point 
may  be  regarded  as  standing  in  relation  to  the 
other  according  to  a  certain  principle,  v.  g.  it  may 
be  regarded  as  just  above  or  below  the  other,  or 
so  many  inches  to  the  left  or  the  right  of  the 
other;  yet  no  one  perceives  any  beauty  in  the 
simple  arrangement.  Join  the  two  points  by  a 
straight  line.  There  is  order  in  a  straight  line 
as  the  very  name  "  straight  "  indicates.  Still  we 
think  we  will  not  be  contradicted  if  we  say  that 
a  mere  straight  line  is  not  regarded  as  beautiful 
by  people  generally.  Now  add  a  third  point  (C) 
at  equal  distances  from  the  other  two  (A  and  B) 
and  draw  two  straight  lines  from  C  to  A  and  B. 
The  resulting  figure  will  be  an  isosceles  or  equilat- 
eral triangle.  Now  order  becomes  more  pro- 
nounced and  beauty  begins  to  appear.  Continue 
to  render  the  figure  more  complex  by  turning  one 
of  the  lines,  say  AB,  about  the  point  A,  and  now 
look  at  the  diagram  thus  obtained ;  it  is  a  perfect 
circle ;  all  its  parts  are  disposed  in  a  definite  order 
about  a  point  called  the  centre ;  it  looks  beautiful. 


62  Beauty 

The  more  complex  and  well-made  a  mathemati- 
cal construction,  the  more  it  charms,  provided, 
of  course,  that  the  relations  of  the  parts  to  each 
other  and  to  the  whole  are  clearly  perceived  by 
the  beholder.  So  much  beauty  is  there  in  math- 
ematical figures  that  the  type  of  beauty  accord- 
ing to  many  is  a  wavy  line  called  the  "  line  of 
beauty."  We  see  now  that  order  of  a  certain 
degree  of  complexity  is  required  for  beauty. 
Hence  it  is,  too,  that  things  which  are  plain  and 
unadorned,  as  a  plain  house,  a  homely  dress,  a 
simple  knife,  are  regarded  as  possessing  beauty 
either  in  no  degree  or,  at  best,  in  a  very  low  de- 
gree. 

44.  A  Priori  Proof  of  Thesis.     The  thesis 
may  also  be  established  a  priori  from  the  consid- 
eration of  the  definition  of  beauty  thus :     Beauty 
is  defined  as  that  the  contemplation  of  which  af- 
fords delight  to  the  intellect.     Now  delight  is  not 
an  ordinary,  weak  affection  of  the  soul,  it  is  an 
affection  of  a  certain  intensity.     But  an  intense 
emotion  requires  a  proportionate  cause.     Hence 
it  stands  to  reason  that  only  order  of  some  de- 
gree of  perfection  can  give  rise  to  the  pleasure 
of  the  beautiful. 

45.  Answer  to  Query.     But  here  a  difficulty 
arises :  if  beauty  is  order  of  some  degree  of  per- 
fection, how  can  I  ever  know  whether  an  object 
possesses  the  degree  of  perfection  required  to 
make  it  beautiful?  and  if  I  cannot  know  that, 


The  Essence  of  Beauty  in  General         63 

how  can  I  know  whether  an  object  is  beautiful 
or  not  ? 

To  this  inquiry  we  reply:  It  is,  indeed,  hard 
at  times  to  point  out  the  exact  line  of  demarca- 
tion between  what  is  beautiful  and  what  is  not 
beautiful,  but  it  by  no  means  follows  that  we 
can  never  distinguish  the  beautiful  from  the 
non-beautiful,  as  will  readily  appear  from  a  few 
parallel  instances.  Who  can  tell  just  when  dawn 
ends  and  day  begins?  Can  we  therefore  never 
discern  dawn  from  day?  The  colors  of  the  rain- 
bow shade  very  gradually  one  into  the  other,  and 
yet  no  one  will  deny  that  there  is  a  certain  num- 
ber of  distinct  colors  in  the  rainbow.  The  boy 
becomes  a  youth  and  the  youth  a  man;  but  can 
any  one  indicate  the  exact  second  or  minute  when 
this  takes  place?  There  may  be  doubt  at  times 
whether  a  certain  object  is  beautiful  or  not,  when 
it  lies  in  the  region  of  transition  from  non-beauty 
to  beauty ;  but  in  most  instances  persons  of  some 
discernment  can  readily  tell  whether  an  object 
gives  intellectual  delight  or  not.  They  will  tell 
you  that  a  Corinthian  column  is  beautiful  while 
a  plain  pillar  used  for  support  is  not,  that  a 
mansion  built  in  Queen  Anne's  style  is  handsome, 
while  a  square  brick  house  is  not,  and  so  forth 
and  so  forth. 

46.  Authorities  Vouching  for  Truth  of 
Thesis.  Nor  is  our  thesis  without  the  support 
of  eminent  authorities.  We  have  already  quoted 


64  Beauty 

the  words  of  St.  Augustine  in  the  formulation  of 
the  thesis.  According  to  Plato,  beauty  is  the 
"  splendor  veri,"  1  "  the  splendor  of  (ontological) 
truth."  This  definition  is  less  explicit  than  that 
of  St.  Augustine,  but  it  amounts  to  the  same 
thing.  St.  Thomas  has  the  following :  "  Ratio 
pulchri  in  universal!  consistit  in  resplendentia 
formse  super  partes  materiae  proportionatas  et 
super  diversas  vires  et  actiones,"  that  is  to  say: 
"  The  general  character  of  the  beautiful  is  the 
splendor  of  the  form  in  different  parts  of  matter 
or  in  different  powers  and  activities."  2  In  an- 
other place  St.  Thomas  cites  the  pseudo-Dio- 
nysius  in  favor  of  this  view.  He  says :  "  Ad 
rationem  pulchri  duo  concurrunt  secundum  Di- 
onysium,  sc.  consonantia  et  claritas." 3  This 
means,  "  The  essence  of  beauty  requires  two 
things,  namely  proportion  and  lustre."  Accord- 
ing to  Leibnitz  beauty  is  the  perfection  of  things 
which,  inasmuch  as  it  is  apprehended,  affects  us 
with  pleasure.4  We  shall  conclude  with  a  quo- 
tation from  Fr.  Rickaby,  S.  J.,  which,  besides  giv- 
ing his  own  view,  also  contains  the  opinions  of 
two  other  English  authorities  in  regard  to  the 
point  at  issue.  He  says:  "There  must  be  an 

iThis  definition  of  beauty,  though  not  found  in  any 
of  Plato's  works,  has  been  ascribed  to  him  by  tradition. 
It  is  certainly  the  definition  of  the  Platonists.  (See 
Urraburu,  Ont.  p.  529.) 

2  Opus,  "De  Pulchro  et  Bono." 

*  Sum.  Theol.  p.  i,  q.  39,  a.  81. 

4  Cf.  Am.  Cath.  Quart  1885,  p.  724. 


The  Essence  of  Beauty  in  General         65 

element  of  distinction,  as  Mr.  Arnold  would  have 
said,  of  lustre,  as  Mr.  Faber  puts  it ;  and  this  .  .  . 
distinction,  or  lustre  is  often  supplied  by  some 
pleasing  instance  of  '  unity  in  variety,'  which 
many  make  to  be  the  very  definition  of  the  beau- 
tiful." * 

47.  Corollary:    Scale    of    Beauty.    It    fol- 
lows as   a   corollary    from  the   thesis   that   the 
greater  the  perfection  of  a  thing,   the  greater 
is  its  beauty.    As  there  is  an  ascending  scale  of 
perfection   in   creation,   so   is   there   of   beauty. 
Beauty  is  lowest  in  the  mineral  kingdom,  higher 
in  the  vegetative  and  animal  kingdoms,  and  high- 
est of  all  in  men  and  angels ;  while  above  all 
these,  as  the  source  of  all  beauty,  is  the  infinite 
beauty  of  the  Creator  Himself. 

48.  Relationship    between    the    True,    the 
Beautiful,  and  the  Good.     This  would  seem  to 
be  the  proper  place  to  point  out  more  explicitly 
the  relationship  which  exists  between  the  true, 
the  beautiful,   and  the  good.     Are   these   three 
concepts  and  their  objects  the  same  or  are  they 
different  ? 

In  the  first  place,  the  concepts  of  the  true,  the 
beautiful,  and  the  good  are  certainly  not  the 
same.  For  if  they  were  the  same,  it  would  be 
inexplicable  why  there  are  three  distinct  terms  in 
every  language  corresponding  to  the  English 
"  the  true,  the  beautiful,  the  good,"  as  "  verum, 

1  Gen.  Met.  p.  151. 


66  Beauty 

pulchrum,  bonum  "  in  Latin,  "  TO  dAr?0es,  TO 
TO  aya66v  "  in  Greek ;  "  le  vrai,  le  beau,  le  bon," 
in  French ;  "  das  Wahre,  das  Schoene,  das  Gute," 
in  German,  etc.  etc.  —  The  same  also  appears 
from  the  consideration  of  the  ordinary  meanings 
of  these  three  terms.  For  a  thing  is  called  a  true 
thing,  in  so  far  as  it  is  conformable  to  the  idea  of 
itself ;  it  is  called  beautiful,  in  so  far  as  its  con- 
templation affords  delight  to  the  beholder,  and 
it  is  called  good,  in  so  far  as  it  is  suited  to  some- 
thing and  excites  desire.  —  But  if  we  regard  the 
true,  the  beautiful,  and  the  good  in  themselves, 
then  the  true  and  the  good  in  one  of  their  sig- 
nifications are  identical  with  the  beautiful,  and 
in  another  they  differ  from  it.  For  the  true 
sometimes  denotes  the  same  as  that  which  is  con- 
formable to  the  Divine  ideal,  and  hence  denotes 
the  same  as  the  perfect ;  and  the  good  sometimes 
signifies  the  same  as  that  which  possesses  what- 
ever it  should  have,  and  hence  likewise  signifies 
the  same  as  the  perfect.  (Cf.  thesis  3,  p.  17 
sqq.)  The  true  and  the  good  taken  in  these  two 
meanings  respectively  are  identical  with  the 
beautiful  or  perfect.  But  frequently  the  true 
means  anything  that  is  knowable,  even  though  it 
be  very  imperfect,  and  the  good  anything  that 
possesses  reality,  even  though  it  is  devoid  of 
some  perfections  it  should  have.  Thus  under- 
stood, the  true  and  the  good  are,  of  course,  not 
identical  with  the  beautiful.  For  the  beautiful 


The  Essence  of  Beauty  in  General         67 

is  always  something  perfect  in  its  kind.  From 
the  above  it  is  also  seen  that  one  and  the  same 
thing  may  at  once  possess  truth,  beauty,  and 
goodness,  but  under  different  aspects.  For  ex- 
ample, a  spirited  race  horse  is  a  true  horse,  be- 
cause it  is  conformable  to  the  idea  of  a  horse ;  it 
is  beautiful,  because  it  is  a  perfect  horse,  and  it 
is  good,  because  it  is  desirable  to  its  owner.  It 
is  on  account  of  this  close  relationship  of  these 
concepts  that  Plato  couples  TO  Ka\6v  and  TO  ayaOov, 
and  that  Goethe  and  Cousin  class  together  the 
true,  the  beautiful,  and  the  good. 


CHAPTER  FOUR 

PREREQUISITE  FOR  THE  ENJOYMENT  OF 
BEAUTY 

Summary:  Thesis  —  Thesis  explained  —  Obstacles  to 
proper  appreciation  of  beauty  —  Sense  in 
which  beauty  may  be  called  relative. 

THESIS  6 

Beauty,  in  order  to  be  fully  appre- 
ciated and  enjoyed,  must  be  clearly 
perceived  by  the  mind. 

49.  Thesis  Explained.     This   statement,   al- 
though self-evident,  may  be  thus  brought  into 
clearer  light.     In  order  that  beauty  may  be  ap- 
preciated and  enjoyed  it  must  be  presented  to  the 
mind.     Now    it   is    presented    to   the    mind   by 
knowledge.     Hence  the  more  clearly  the  beauti- 
ful is  known,  the  more  it  will  be  appreciated  and 
enjoyed.     The    clear    perception    of    beauty    is 
therefore  a  necessary  requisite  or  condition  for 
relishing  beauty. 

50.  Obstacles    to    Proper    Appreciation   of 
Beauty.     But  there  are  many  obstacles  both  on 
the  part  of  the  object  and  on  the  part  of  the  mind 

68 


Prerequisite  for  Enjoyment  of  Beauty        69 

on  account  of  which  the  beautiful  often  remains 
hidden  from  the  beholder.  One  of  the  princi- 
pal obstacles  on  the  part  of  the  object  is  the 
very  excellence  of  the  beautiful.  The  arrange- 
ment of  the  parts  of  an  object,  although  most 
orderly  in  itself  and  most  perfectly  adapted  to 
the  end  for  which  the  object  is  intended,  is  at 
times  so  complex,  so  intricate  as  to  baffle  the  pen- 
etration of  the  observer.  Here  is  an  ingeniously 
constructed  machine.  It  is  really  beautiful,  but 
the  ordinary  man  sees  no  beauty  in  it,  because  he 
fails  to  understand  its  workings.  Certain  games, 
as  baseball  and  football,  seem  meaningless  and 
devoid  of  beauty  to  the  uninitiated,  yet  to  him 
who  understands  the  purpose  of  the  distribution 
of  the  players,  their  shrewd  tactics,  and  dex- 
terous movements,  such  sports  possess  a  great 
charm.  But  it  is  chiefly  beauty  in  nature  that  is 
often  of  such  excellence  as  to  remain  unrecog- 
nized. The  more  we  search  into  the  works  of 
nature,  the  more  beauty  they  reveal  to  our  gaze. 
And  no  wonder;  for  they  are  the  handiwork  of 
the  infinite  Artist  whose  designs  and  purposes  no 
finite  mind  can  fathom. 

The  beautiful  is  furthermore  not  always  duly 
appreciated,  because  it  is  not  properly  manifested 
through  the  medium  of  speech  and  the  other  signs 
which  serve  as  vehicles  for  the  expression  of 
beauty.  Thus  a  poem,  or  statue,  or  painting,  no 
matter  how  exquisite  in  its  external  finish,  affords 


70  Beauty 

but  little  esthetic  delight  if  it  expresses  the 
artist's  idea  or  ideas  obscurely  and  vaguely. 

Lastly,  a  want  of  proper  appreciation  of  the 
beautiful  is  often  traceable  to  the  partial  or  total 
absence  of  taste.  Taste  is  defined  as  "  the  faculty 
of  the  mind  by  which  we  both  perceive  and  enjoy 
whatever  is  beautiful,  harmonious,  and  true  in 
the  works  of  nature  and  art,  the  perception  of 
these  qualities  being  attended  with  emotions  of 
pleasure."  (See  Standard  Dictionary.)  Taste 
for  beauty,  though  found  in  most  men  in  some 
measure,  is  very  rarely  found  in  a  high  degree 
of  perfection.  That  such  should  be  the  case,  is 
in  full  accord  with  the  ordinary  dealings  of  Di- 
vine Providence  which  bestows  with  a  less  lavish 
hand  gifts  intended  chiefly  for  the  enjoyment  of 
men,  such  as  wit,  a  talent  for  music  or  poetry, 
and  also  a  taste  for  beauty. 

51.  Sense  in  which  Beauty  may  be  Called 
Relative.  What  has  just  been  said  shows  beauty 
to  be  something  relative  in  the  sense,  that  the  ap- 
preciation and  enjoyment  of  beauty  is  greater  or 
less  according  to  the  greater  or  less  capacity  of 
the  agent  for  such  appreciation  and  enjoyment. 


CHAPTER  FIVE 
SPECIAL  KINDS  OF  BEAUTY 

ARTICLE  i 
SENSIBLE  BEAUTY 

Summary :  Preliminary  remarks  —  Thesis  —  Precise 
meaning  of  sensible  beauty  —  Proof  of  first 
part  of  thesis  —  Proof  of  second  part  of 
thesis  —  The  two  aspects  of  sensible  beauty 
illustrated  —  Several  difficulties  answered 
—  First  scholium :  Light  and  sensible 
beauty  —  Second  scholium :  How  the  senses 
can  be  said  to  enjoy  the  beautiful  — 
Higher  and  lower  senses  in  relation  to 
sensible  beauty  —  Sensible  beauty  and 
touch  —  Dangers  incident  to  contempla- 
tion of  sensible  beauty. 

52.  Preliminary  Remarks.  After  develop- 
ing the  elements  of  beauty  in  general,  we  shall 
next  take  up  the  consideration  of  a  particular 
kind  of  beauty,  namely  sensible  beauty,  which,  on 
account  of  its  special  connection  with  us  men, 
calls  for  separate  treatment.  If  sensible  beauty 
is  true  beauty  it  must,  of  course,  embody  all  the 
essential  elements  of  beauty,  and  this  it  does,  as 
we  shall  show  in  the  next  thesis. 


72  Beauty 

THESIS  7 

Sensible  beauty  is  of  two  kinds,  the 
one  absolute,  found  in  the  sensible 
object  considered  in  itself,  the  other 
relative,  found  in  the  sensible  object 
in  its  relation  to  sense.  Absolute 
sensible  beauty  consists  in  regularity 
of  form,  in  the  symmetrical  arrange- 
ment of  colors,  and  the  harmonious 
combination  of  sonnds;  relative  sen- 
sible beauty  consists  in  the  due  adap- 
tation of  the  sensible  object  to  the 
organs  of  sense. 

53.  Precise   Meaning  of   Sensible   Beauty. 

Note  first  that,  when  we  speak  of  sensible  beauty, 
we  do  not  mean  beauty  perceived  by  sense,  but 
beauty  perceived  by  the  intellect  in  the  objects 
of  sense.  For  we  showed  before  (thesis  2)  that 
the  senses  as  such  are  incapable  of  perceiving 
beauty. 

54.  Proof   of    First   Part   of    Thesis.    The 
thesis  has  two  parts.     In  the  first  part  we  state 
that  there  is  beauty  in  the  sensible  objects  them- 
selves and  that  this  beauty  consists  in  regularity 
of  form,  the  symmetrical  arrangement  of  colors, 
and    the    harmonious    combination    of    sounds. 
That  there  is  beauty  in  the  sensible  objects  them- 
selves needs  no  proof,  as  it  is  admitted  by  all  ex- 


Special  Kinds  of  Beauty  73 

cept  those  who  erroneously  maintain  that  beauty 
is  not  objective.  (See  thesis  12.)  That  there 
is  a  kind  of  sensible  beauty  which  consists  in 
regularity  of  form,  symmetrical  arrangement  of 
colors,  and  the  harmonious  combination  of 
sounds,  is  shown  by  experience.  Take  a  sen- 
sible object  which  is  universally  regarded  as 
beautiful,  one  of  those  butterflies  which  every- 
body instinctively  pronounces  beautiful,  pretty, 
handsome,  for  example  the  swallowtail  or  the 
painted  beauty,  so  common  both  in  North  Amer- 
ica and  in  Europe.  What  is  it  that  pleases  us  so 
much  in  these  butterflies?  It  is  their  regularity 
of  form  and  the  symmetrical  arrangement  of 
their  coloring.  The  two  halves  of  these  winged 
creatures  are  perfectly  alike,  the  fore  wings  and 
the  hind  wings  on  the  right  being  perfect  counter- 
parts of  the  fore  wings  and  the  hind  wings  on 
the  left.  Further,  there  are  all  sorts  of  markings 
on  the  wings  and  the  bodies,  as  bars,  bands,  eyes, 
spots  of  diverse  colors  often  shading  insensibly 
one  into  another  all  arranged  in  most  consum- 
mate harmony. 

The  beauty  of  a  sensible  object  is  greatly  en- 
hanced by  the  graceful  movements  of  its  parts. 
A  beautiful  object  constantly  changing  in  form 
without  losing  its  symmetry  and  harmony  is,  as  it 
were,  equivalent  to  a  number  of  beautiful  objects 
presenting  themselves  in  succession  to  the  eye. 
Look  at  a  pair  of  leopards  disporting  themselves 


74  Beauty 

in  their  cage ;  how  much  their  gambols  and  antics 
add  to  the  beauty  of  their  bodies.  This  is  also 
the  charm  of  certain  drills,  as  of  a  corps  of  cadets 
or  of  a  squadron  of  cavalry.  The  beauty  of  such 
drills  is  chiefly  due  to  the  multiplicity  of  sym- 
metrical groupings  incessantly  varying. 

As  regards  sound,  the  same  holds  true.  A 
beautiful  musical  composition  is  characterized  by 
the  exact  proportion  in  which  the  various  sounds, 
often  consisting  of  a  veritable  maze,  stand  to  one 
another.  Good  music  essentially  implies  concord 
and  harmony. 

55.  Proof  of  Second  Part  of  Thesis.  We 
now  come  to  the  second  part  of  our  thesis  where 
we  state  that  there  is  another  kind  of  sensible 
beauty,  which  belongs  to  the  object  regarded  in 
its  relation  to  sense  and  consists  in  the  adaptation 
of  the  sensible  object  to  the  organ  of  sense. 
Adaptation  of  one  thing  to  another,  the  accurate 
adjustment  of  means  to  an  end,  especially  where 
this  adjustment  is  of  a  somewhat  intricate  char- 
acter, is  always  indicative  of  purpose  and  orderly 
arrangement,  and  hence  always  impresses  us  as 
beautiful.  There  is  beauty  in  the  ingenious 
mechanism  of  clocks  and  other  skilful  contriv- 
ances, because  they  answer  their  purpose  so  well. 
— The  eye,  so  wonderfully  fitted  for  the  end  in- 
tended by  the  Creator,  is  very  beautiful  indeed. 
If  it  does  not  strike  us  as  such,  the  reason  is  that 
we  do  not  sufficiently  understand  the  marvelous 


Special  Kinds  of  Beauty  75 

suitability  of  this  organ  for  its  functions.  Now 
objects  of  sense  are  likewise  suited  or  adapted  to 
our  senses,  and  that  often  in  a  singular  manner. 
A  fresh  rose  gratifies  the  eye  and  the  smell;  the 
nightingale's  song  soothes  the  ear.  But  the  rose 
and  the  nightingale's  song  could  not  produce  these 
pleasant  effects  if  they  were  not  adapted  to  the 
sense  of  sight,  smell,  and  hearing  respectively. 
The  mind  perceiving  this  adaptation  or  suitability 
or  adjustment  finds  it  beautiful.  Note,  we  do  not 
say  that  the  pleasure  which  the  senses  experience 
constitutes  beauty;  for  beauty  is  not  sensible 
pleasure ;  but  this  pleasure  is  a  token  of  the  adap- 
tation of  the  object  of  sense  to  the  organ  of  sense, 
and  it  is  this  adaptation  which  the  mind  considers 
as  beautiful.  Nor  does  beauty  become  merely 
subjective  on  this  account,  since  it  is  not  the  sub- 
jective pleasure  which  we  regard  as  beautiful,  but 
the  (objective)  adjustment  of  the  object  to  the 
organ;  the  pleasure  merely  reveals  the  existence 
of  the  adjustment.  Now  we  can  readily  see  why 
even  a  single  color  or  a  single  note  should  affect 
us  as  beautiful,  as  the  uniform  tint  of  a  single 
petal  or  a  single  sound  of  the  human  voice.  We 
now  understand,  too,  why  attractiveness  or  charm 
of  coloring,  and  sweetness  or  agreeableness  of 
sound  enter  as  elements  into  several  definitions  of 
corporeal  beauty  given  by  eminent  authorities. 
Thus  Cicero  in  the  4th  Tusculine  disputation  de- 
fines this  particular  kind  of  beauty  as  "the  apt 


76  Beauty 

configuration  of  the  members  together  with  a  cer- 
tain charm  (suavitas)  of  coloring."  (See  p.  54.) 
St.  Augustine  *  asks  the  question,  "  What  is 
bodily  beauty  ?  "  and  he  answers,  "  The  harmoni- 
ous arrangement  of  parts  with  a  certain  charm 
(suavitas)  of  coloring."  (See  p.  55.) 

56.  The  Two  Aspects  of  Sensible  Beauty 
Illustrated.  Of  these  two  phases  or  aspects  of 
sensible  beauty,  the  absolute  and  the  relative, 
sometimes  the  one  and  sometimes  the  other  pre- 
dominates, whilst  sometimes  they  are  equally  or 
nearly  equally  blended.  Take  a  Gothic  cathedral 
with  its  arches,  buttresses,  and  windows  all  sym- 
metrically disposed,  and  with  its  turrets,  steeples, 
and  spires  soaring  towards  the  sky.  It  is  beau- 
tiful in  very  deed,  but  its  beauty  is  chiefly  archi- 
tectural, resulting  from  the  graceful  and  artistic 
arrangement  of  its  parts.  In  like  manner,  the 
charm  of  a  concert  is  principally  due  to  the  intri- 
cate maze  of  sounds  combined  in  perfect  unison. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  beauty  of  a  smooth  lawn, 
of  the  blue  vault  of  the  sky,  of  the  individual  notes 
of  a  flute  or  an  organ  is  mainly  traceable  to  the 
perfect  adaptation  of  certain  colors  and  sounds 
to  the  eye  and  ear  respectively.  Objects  sym- 
metrical in  arrangement  and  suited  to  sense,  in 
about  an  equal  degree  are,  for  instance,  a  garden 
well  laid  out  or  a  piece  played  on  a  sweet  violin 
by  a  skilled  performer. 

1  Epist.  3.  4. 


Special  Kinds  of  Beauty  77 

57.    Several     Difficulties     Answered.    The 

twofold  aspect  of  sensible  beauty  will  explain 
away  a  difficulty  which  might  be  urged  against 
the  view  that  makes  beauty  consist  in  order.  For 
some  one  might  say,  Are  there  not  many  objects 
which  are  symmetrical  in  form  and  yet  are  re- 
garded as  ugly,  as  a  toad,  the  face  of  the  monkey, 
certain  kinds  of  insects,  and  the  like?  Thus 
Shakespeare  in  "  As  You  Like  It,"  *  says : 

"  Sweet  are  the  uses  of  adversity 
Which  like  the  toad  ugly  and  venomous 
Wears  yet  a  precious  jewel  in  her  head." 

Ennius  2  calls  the  monkey  "  a  very  ugly  beast  " 
(turpissima  bestia). 

To  meet  this  objection  we  must  first  distinguish 
between  intellectual  beauty  and  sensible  beauty. 
The  animals  mentioned  are  all  very  beautiful 
from  the  purely  intellectual  standpoint.  Their 
structure,  like  that  of  any  other  of  God's  crea- 
tures, is  most  wonderfully  adapted  to  the  end  of 
their  existence,  as  every  scientist  will  readily 
admit.  But  they  do  not  possess  sensible  beauty. 
This  is  partly  due  to  the  fact  that  they  affect  the 
sense  of  sight  disagreeably,  just  as  certain  gaudy 
colors  do.  Hence  these  objects  are  not  adapted 
to  our  sense  of  sight.  The  intellect,  discovering 
this  want  of  adjustment  by  the  unpleasant  sen- 
sation their  aspect  produces,  pronounces  them 
ugly,  so  far  as  their  sensible  appearance  goes. 

1  Act.  2,  Scene  I. 

2  Ann.  ii,  15. 


78  Beauty 

The  Author  of  nature  has  established  this  dis- 
proportion between  sense  and  object  in  certain 
cases  for  wise  reasons  of  His  own,  often  un- 
known to  us.  One  of  the  reasons  for  His  doing 
so  is  perhaps,  to  enhance  the  beauty  of  beautiful 
sensible  objects  by  contrast.  We  admit,  how- 
ever, that  the  aversion  we  feel  for  certain  things 
is  often  traceable  to  other  causes,  as  ignorance, 
prejudice,  custom,  fear,  and  the  like.  We  at- 
tribute to  certain  objects  disagreeable  or  hurtful 
qualities,  and  then,  viewing  them  in  the  light  of 
our  subjective  conceptions,  regard  them  as  ugly. 
But  these  causes  alone  do  not  explain  why  we 
turn  from  certain  things  at  first  sight  with  an 
instinctive  disgust  and  loathing,  of  which  with 
the  best  of  intentions  we  cannot  rid  ourselves. 

58.  First  Scholium:  Light  and  Sensible 
Beauty.  To  complete  our  thesis  we  must  add  a 
few  remarks.  —  First  of  all,  we  wish  to  direct  at- 
tention to  the  part  which  light  plays  in  the  domain 
of  sensible  beauty.  It  not  only  reveals  the  grace 
of  form  and  the  delicacy  of  coloring,  but  it  itself, 
if  not  too  intense,  delights  the  eye.  Only  think 
of  the  mellow  glow  of  dawn,  of  the  glory  of  the 
setting  sun,  or  of  a  landscape  sleeping  in  the  sun- 
light. Nor  should  we  forget  the  share  which 
shadows  have  in  enhancing  the  sensible  beauty  of 
objects.  How  beautiful  a  grove  looks  late  in  the 
afternoon  with  all  its  trees  painted  in  shadows 
upon  the  grass  as  if  by  an  invisible  hand. 


Special  Kinds  of  Beauty  79 

59.  Second  Scholium:  How  the  Senses 
can  be  Said  to  Enjoy  the  Beautiful.  Another 
remark  we  wish  to  make  here  regards  the  ques- 
tion whether  and  to  what  extent  the  senses  can 
be  said  to  enjoy  the  beautiful.  It  is  plain  that 
the  senses  cannot  enjoy  the  beautiful  of  them- 
selves; for,  as  we  have  shown  in  thesis  2,  the 
senses  as  such  cannot  apprehend  beauty;  hence 
neither  can  they  relish  it.  But  this  does  not  show 
that  the  senses  are  unable  to  enjoy  the  beautiful 
in  so  far  as  they  administer  to  the  intellect. 
For  by  ministering  to  the  intellect  they  become, 
so  to  speak,  united  to  it,  one  with  it,  and  in  vir- 
tue of  this  union  are  elevated  to  a  higher  plane. 
Thus  they  become  capable  of  doing  what  of 
themselves  they  could  not  do,  just  as  matter 
which  of  itself  is  incapable  of  feeling,  becomes 
capable  of  it  by  its  substantial  union  with  the 
soul.1  This  would  seem  to  be  the  reason  why  so 
many  definitions  of  beauty  state  expressly  that 
the  beautiful  gives  delight  to  the  eye  or  to  the 
ear,  as  the  definition  of  St.  Thomas,  "  Pulchra 
sunt  quae  visa  placent,"  "  Those  things  are  beau- 
tiful the  sight  of  which  affords  delight " ;  and  the 
definition  of  Webster  quoted  before,  "  Beauty  is 
an  assemblage  of  graces  and  properties  pleasing 
to  the  eye,  the  ear,  the  intellect,  the  esthetic 
faculty,  or  the  moral  sense."  In  fact  St.  Thomas 
tells  us  in  as  many  words  that  the  senses  take  de- 

1  See  Liboratore,  Psych,  n.  72. 


8o  Beauty 

light  in  what  is  proportionate  and  hence  beauti- 
ful. For  he  says :  "  Unde  pulchrum  in  debita 
proportione  consistit,  quia  sensus  delectantur  in 
rebus  debite  proportionatis  ...,"*  that  is  to  say, 
"  Hence  the  beautiful  consists  in  due  proportion, 
because  the  senses  are  delighted  at  things  which 
are  proportionate  .  .  ." 

That  sight  and  hearing  can  enjoy  the  beautiful 
as  instruments  of  the  intellect  can  also  be  shown 
in  a  slightly  different  way  thus:  There  can  be 
no  doubt,  in  general,  that  the  mind  can  influence 
the  body.  The  blush  of  modesty  or  of  shame, 
the  pallor  of  fear,  the  trembling  of  the  limbs  at 
the  thought  of  danger,  bear  witness  to  this.  Why 
then  should  not  something  similar  happen  in  our 
case?  Why  should  not  the  intellectual  percep- 
tion of  beauty  react  on  the  eye  and  the  ear  and 
produce  in  them  delights  which  are  not  their 
own,  but  which  are  communicated  to  them  by  the 
intellect  ?  The  eye  and  the  ear  present  beautiful 
objects  to  the  intellect;  and  the  intellect,  in  its 
turn,  floods  these  senses  with  pleasures  of  sin- 
gular delicacy  and  refinement. 

What  we  have  said  of  sight  and  hearing  ap- 
plies also,  and  even  more,  to  the  imagination  and 
fancy.  For  the  imagination  is,  as  it  were,  the 
storehouse  of  all  the  other  senses.  It  preserves 
the  impressions  made  on  the  other  senses  and 
reproduces  them  either  spontaneously  or  at  the 

1  Sum.  Theol.  p.  i,  q.  5,  art.  4,  ad  i. 


Special  Kinds  of  Beauty  81 

beck  of  the  will.1  Further,  it  is  not  only  capable 
of  reproducing  former  sense  impressions;  it  can 
likewise  recombine,  in  new  and  original  ways, 
the  elements  furnished  by  the  senses,  slough  off 
what  is  commonplace,  jarring,  ugly  in  them,  and 
transform,  exalt,  and  glorify  the  outer  world  en- 
tering into  it  through  the  portals  of  the  outer 
senses.  The  creative  power  of  the  imagination 
is  the  birthright  of  the  poet  who  fashions  for 
himself  and  his  readers  a  world  even  more  beau- 
tiful than  the  real,  everyday  world  in  which  we 
live.  The  fancy  differs  from  the  imagination 
chiefly  in  this  that  it  is  more  playful,  airier,  less 
deep,  less  serious  than  the  imagination. 

60.  Higher  and  Lower  Senses  in  Relation 
to  Sensible  Beauty.  But  what  is  the  reason 
that,  when  treating  of  the  enjoyment  of  the  beau- 
tiful on  the  part  of  the  senses,  we  only  refer  to 
the  higher  senses  of  sight  and  hearing  and  not 
also  to  the  three  lower  senses  of  smell,  taste,  and 
touch?  The  reason  for  this  is  that  the  lower 
senses,  although  they  relish  the  beautiful,  do  so 
much  less  perfectly  than  the  higher  senses.  The 
great  superiority  of  the  higher  senses  over  the 
lower  in  the  enjoyment  of  beauty  appears  from 
the  unequal  capacity  of  the  different  senses  to 
perceive  proportion  or  order.  True,  none  of  the 
senses  can  apprehend  order  as  such  and  in  the 
abstract  —  that  is  the  exclusive  prerogative  of 

1Cf.  Lahousse,  Psych,  n.  102. 


82  Beauty 

the  intellect.  Nevertheless  the  eye,  the  ear,  and 
the  imagination  can  apprehend  order  in  the  con- 
crete, and  that  to  a  very  high  degree.  No  doubt, 
a  relation  of  parts  is  often  perceived  by  means 
of  the  lower  senses,  but  of  so  vague  and  confused 
a  character  as  hardly  to  deserve  the  name  of 
beautiful.  Moreover,  the  subjective  element  in 
the  case  of  these  senses  often  predominates  to 
such  an  extent  as  to  divert  the  attention  almost 
entirely  from  the  object  and  the  diversity  of  its 
parts  and  qualities.  When  a  man  eats  a  luscious 
pear,  what  he  adverts  to  chiefly  is  the  taste,  the 
object  itself  is  hardly  noticed.  We  admit,  how- 
ever, that  by  each  of  the  lower  senses  the  mind 
can  apprehend  a  sensible  object  as  suited  to  the 
organ  of  sense  and  so  far  forth  as  beautiful. 
Still  custom  does  not  sanction  the  application  of 
the  word  beautiful  to  objects  of  the  lower  senses, 
not  because  they  are  devoid  of  all  beauty  what- 
ever, but  because  they  possess  only  that  special 
kind  of  sensible  beauty  which  consists  in  the 
adaptation  of  the  object  to  sense.  We  call  per- 
fumes agreeable,  viands  delicious,  a  cooling 
breeze  refreshing,  rather  than  beautiful. 

What  we  have  just  said  accords  fully  with 
what  St.  Thomas  tells  us:  "Ad  rationem  pul- 
chri  pertinet  quod  in  ejus  aspectu  seu  cognitione 
quietetur  apprehensio;  unde  et  illi  sensus  pra- 
cipue  respiciunt  pulchrum  qui  maxime  cognos- 
citivi  sunt,  sc.  visus  et  auditus  rationi  deservien- 


Special  Kinds  of  Beauty  83 

tes;  dicimus  enim  pulchra  visibilia  et  pulchros 
sonos.  In  sensibilibus  aliorum  sensuum  non 
utimur  nomine  pulchritudinis.  Non  enim  dici- 
mus pulchros  sapores  et  odores,"1  which  may  be 
rendered  thus :  "  When  we  speak  of  the  beau- 
tiful we  mean  something  the  sight  or  perception 
of  which  quiets  the  apprehensive  faculty.  Hence 
those  senses  chiefly  regard  the  beautiful  which 
possess  cognitive  capacity  of  the  highest  degree, 
namely  sight  and  hearing  as  ministering  to  the 
intellect.  For  we  say  that  sights  are  beautiful 
and  that  sounds  are  beautiful.  But  in  respect  to 
the  sensible  qualities  perceived  by  the  other 
senses,  we  do  not  make  use  of  the  word  beauti- 
ful ;  for  we  do  not  say  that  tastes  and  odors  are 
beautiful."  Note  in  regard  to  this  passage  — 
St.  Thomas  does  not  say  that  the  eye  and  the  ear 
only  relate  to  the  beautiful,  but  that  they  do  so 
chiefly  (praecipue),  nor  does  he  say  that  tastes 
and  odors  are  not  beautiful,  but  that  we  do  not 
use  the  word  beautiful  in  regard  to  them. 

61.  Sensible  Beauty  and  Touch.  To  avoid 
confusion  we  must  add  some  explanation  in  re- 
gard to  the  sense  of  touch.  This  sense  perceives 
objects  as  soft,  smooth,  cooling,  warm,  light,  and 
the  like,  but  it  also  perceives  them  as  extended, 
as  possessing  parts  outside  of  parts.  Now  when 
we  say  that  objects  of  touch  are  not  called  beau- 
tiful, we  mean  to  say  that  the  word  beautiful  is 

1  Sum.  Theol.  i,  2,  q.  27,  art.  I,  ad  3. 


84  Beauty 

not  applied  to  them  in  so  far  as  they  are  soft, 
smooth,  cooling,  warm,  light,  or  possessed  of  sim- 
ilar qualities.  But  they  may  be  truly  called  beau.- 
tiful  when  presented  to  us  by  the  sense  of  touch 
as  being  made  up  of  parts.  For  in  so  far  as 
touch  perceives  parts  outside  of  parts,  it  can  per- 
ceive proportion  in  the  concrete  just  as  the  eye 
can,  and  hence  offer  to  the  intellect  an  object 
truly  beautiful.  Thus  a  blind  person,  by  passing 
his  hand  over  a  well  constructed,  raised  math- 
ematical figure,  can  trace  the  relations  of  the 
parts  of  the  figure  to  each  other  and  in  this  man- 
ner apprehend  it  as  beautiful. 

62.  Dangers  Incident  to  Contemplation  of 
Sensible  Beauty.  This  seems  to  be  an  appro- 
priate occasion  for  making  a  few  remarks  on  the 
dangers  of  contemplating  sensible  beauty,  es- 
pecially human  sensible  beauty.  It  is  well  for 
us  to  know  whence  these  dangers  arise,  lest  what 
is  the  crowning  glory  of  a  thing  should  prove  a 
pitfall  and  a  curse.  The  reason  for  the  slipperi- 
ness  of  sensible  beauty  is  not  far  to  seek.  The 
perception  of  sensible  beauty  is  always  accom- 
panied by  sensible  gratification  of  the  eye  and 
ear  or  imagination.  Now  sensible  gratification, 
even  when  lawful,  is  liable  to  suggest  and  pave 
the  way  for  gratification  that  is  unlawful  and 
thus  often  leads  the  unwary  into  deplorable  ex- 
cesses. Hence  Jeremias  cries  out :  "  Death  is 


Special  Kinds  of  Beauty  85 

come  up  through  our  windows  " 1  i.  e.  through 
our  eyes.  This,  it  seems  to  us,  explains  why  so 
many  poets  have  an  unsavory  reputation  in 
morality  and  why  so  much  poetry,  both  ancient 
and  modern,  is  sensual  and  unreadable.  This 
only  proves  the  truth  of  the  ancient  maxim: 
"  Corruptio  optimi  pessima,"  "  The  best  thing, 
when  not  used  in  the  right  way,  becomes  the  most 
loathsome."  It  further  shows  that  the  Author 
of  nature  who  made  things  beautiful  for  wise 
reasons  of  his  own,  nevertheless  wishes  us  to 
use  much  caution  and  moderation  and  good  sense 
in  viewing  sensible  beauty.  However,  what  we 
have  said  of  the  contemplation  of  sensible  beauty 
does  not  at  all  apply  to  the  consideration  of 
beauty  in  general  and  of  spiritual  beauty.  On 
the  contrary,  the  thought  of  the  beauty  of  God, 
of  virtue,  of  heroism,  has  a  most  refining,  elevat- 
ing, and  exalting  influence.  Hence  it  is  that 
some  of  the  most  upright  of  men,  as  St.  Thomas 
and  St.  Augustine,  have  written  most  forcibly 
and  eloquently  on  the  subject  of  beauty. 

1  Jerem.  ix.  21. 


86  Beauty 

ARTICLE  2 
SYMBOLIC  BEAUTY 

Summary:  Importance  of  consideration  of  symbolic 
beauty  —  Thesis  —  Elucidation  of  thesis  — 
Symbolic  beauty  a  particular  case  of  asso- 
ciation of  ideas. 

63.  Importance  of  Consideration  of  Sym- 
bolic Beauty.     Besides  sensible  beauty,  sensible 
objects  also  possess  symbolic  beauty.    As  this 
kind  of  beauty  renders  sensible  objects  suitable 
for  the  expression  of  the  highest  kind  of  beauty, 
namely  spiritual  beauty,  it  will  be  well  to  treat 
of  it  in  a  special  thesis. 

THESIS  8 

Sensible  objects,  besides  their  own 
inherent  beauty,  also  possess  sym- 
bolic beauty. 

64.  Elucidation    of    Thesis.    A    symbol    is 
"  anything  that  (not  being  a  portrait)  stands  for 
something  else  and  serves  either  to  represent  it 
or  bring  to  mind  one  or  more  of  its  qualities." 1 
Hence  symbolic  beauty  is  the  power  an  object  has 
of  suggesting  or  bringing  to  mind  beauty  which 
lies  outside  and  beyond  itself.    To  establish  our 

1  Standard  Dictionary. 


Special  Kinds  of  Beauty  87 

thesis  then  we  must  make  it  clear  that  sensible 
things  can  signify  or  express  beauty  which  is  not 
their  own.  That  they  can  do  this  can  be  easily 
shown.  For,  in  the  first  place,  sensible  objects 
often  bear  a  natural  relation,  as  of  coexistence, 
cause  or  effect,  to  some  beautiful  object.  Look 
at  yonder  bridge  sweeping  in  graceful  curves 
from  pier  to  pier  over  the  broad  expanse  of  the 
Mississippi  River.  The  bridge  is  beautiful  in 
itself,  but  it  likewise  speaks  to  you  of  the  genius 
of  its  architect,  and  of  the  energy,  industry,  and 
civilization  of  the  people  who  promoted  the  erec- 
tion of  the  imposing  structure.  It  thus  opens 
out  a  vista  of  beauty  lying  beyond  its  stone  piers 
and  steel  spans  and  trusses  and  trestles  and  the 
seething  and  gurgling  waters  beneath.  Or  watch 
that  buoyant  life-boat  shooting  swiftly  and 
securely  along  the  rocky  coast  of  the  ocean.  It 
is  a  thing  of  beauty;  it  looks  like  a  gull  cutting 
through  the  foaming  waves.  But  this  life-boat 
can  tell  a  story  that  conjures  up  pictures  of  still 
greater  beauty  —  of  how  in  a  stormy  night  it 
cleaved  its  way  through  the  surging,  pounding 
billows  and  carried  off  a  precious  burden  of  many 
lives  from  a  foundering  ship.  Or  gaze  up  at  the 
castle  there  built  on  a  jutting  rock  centuries  ago. 
How  its  lofty  keep,  its  many  towers  round  and 
square,  its  parapets  and  battlements,  all  sym- 
metrically arranged,  delight  the  eye !  But  it  also 
recalls  the  days  of  yore,  the  days  of  the  minstrels, 


88  Beauty 

of  the  troubadours,  of  the  minnesingers;  it  re- 
minds you  of  tilts  and  tournaments  fought  within 
its  walls  and  of  many  a  gallant  deed  in  champion- 
ship of  defenseless  innocence  and  knightly  honor. 

The  above  are  instances  in  which  the  connec- 
tion between  the  sensible  object  and  the  beauty 
symbolized  is  natural.  Often,  however,  this  con- 
nection is  conventional  or,  at  best,  rests  on  some 
remote  and  fancied  resemblance;  nevertheless 
the  beauty  symbolized  is  frequently  of  a  most 
supersensible  and  exalted  nature.  Thus  the  lily 
is  regarded  as  the  symbol  of  purity ;  the  rose,  of 
love;  the  violet,  of  modesty;  the  lamb,  of  meek- 
ness; the  lion,  of  courage;  the  oak,  of  strength. 
A  piece  of  silk  ornamented  with  stars  and  stripes 
has  been  chosen  by  the  United  States  to  repre- 
sent her  might,  her  majesty,  her  honor,  and 
whatever  else  is  dearest  to  her.  All  the  above 
symbols  have  each  a  sensible  beauty  of  their 
own,  but  the  sensible  beauty  inherent  in  them  is 
greatly  enhanced  by  their  suggestion  of  spiritual 
beauty. 

Symbolic  beauty  is  sometimes  possessed  even 
by  things  which  do  not  themselves  appeal  to  the 
senses.  For  even  an  unsightly  object  may  sug- 
gest something  very  beautiful.  Here  is  a  gray- 
haired  old  man  lying  stretched  out  in  his  coffin. 
The  pale,  emaciated  countenance* is  not  beautiful; 
but  it  reminds  you  of  a  career  well-spent,  of  de- 
votion to  duty,  of  fortitude  in  adversity,  of  mod- 


Special  Kinds  of  Beauty  89 

eration  in  success ;  it  speaks  to  you  with  an  elo- 
quent tongue  of  the  beauty  of  a  good  and  noble 
life.  —  The  carnage  after  a  battle  is  horrid  to  be- 
hold; it  brings  tears  to  the  eyes,  it  sickens  the 
heart;  yet  it  has  its  beauty.  For  it  manifests  to 
you  the  love  of  country  that  burned  in  the  breasts 
of  these  heroes  now  lying  stiff  in  death  before 
you. —  Isaias  tells  us  of  the  Man  of  Sorrows  dur- 
ing the  hours  of  his  passion :  "  There  is  no 
beauty  in  him  nor  comeliness,  and  we  have  seen 
him  and  there  was  no  sightliness  that  we  should 
be  desirous  of  him."  *  And  yet  that  same  Man 
of  Sorrows  was  never  more  beautiful  than  in 
those  dread  hours.  For  his  bruises  and  wounds 
said  to  all  who  could  understand :  "  Greater 
love  than  this  no  man  hath  than  that  a  man  lay 
down  his  life  for  his  friends."  2 

65.  Symbolic  Beauty  a  Particular  Case  of 
Association  of  Ideas.  It  will  be  well  to  note 
here  that  the  connection  in  virtue  of  which  sen- 
sible beauty  suggests  invisible  beauty  is  but  a 
particular  case  of  association  of  ideas,  by  which 
is  meant  "  any  connection  or  relation  between 
objects  or  ideas  that  unites  them  in  thought." 

1  Isaias  liii.  2. 

2  John  xv.  13. 


90  Beauty 

ARTICLE  3 
BEAUTY  PROPER  TO  MAN 

Summary:  Transition  to  new  subject  —  Thesis  — 
Proof  of  thesis  from  consideration  of  fine 
arts — A  priori  proof  of  thesis  —  Thesis  as 
a  corollary  —  Synonyms  of  beauty  —  The 
sublime  —  The  opposite  of  the  beautiful,  or 
the  ugly. 

66.  Transition  to  New  Subject.    We  have 
seen  that  sensible  beauty  can  be  and  often  is 
symbolical.     There    now    arises    a    question    of 
prime  importance  to  us  as  men.     Is  there  among 
the  various  kinds  of  beauty  one  which  is  peculiar 
to  human  beings,  one  which  is,  as  it  were,  their 
birthright  and  appeals  to  them  in  a  special  man- 
ner ?    We  shall  give  our  answer  to  this  query  in 
our  next  thesis. 

THESIS  9 

The  beauty  which  gives  the  highest 
satisfaction  to  man  is  spiritual  beauty 
expressed  by  means  of  an  appropriate 
sensible  symbol. 

67.  Proof  of  Thesis  from  Consideration  of 
Fine  Arts.     We  shall  show  the  correctness  of 
our  thesis,  first,  by  a  consideration  of  the  fine 
arts,  since  they  are  acknowledged  by  all  to  be 


Special  Kinds  of  Beauty  91 

the  very  embodiment  of  the  beauty  which  ap- 
peals most  to  man.  Let  us  start  with  music. 
Take  a  composition  by  one  of  the  great  masters. 
Why  does  it  give  such  exquisite  delight?  Be- 
cause, by  means  of  melodious  and  harmonious 
sounds,  it  expresses  some  exalting  or  inspiring 
idea,  such  as  love,  hope,  kindness,  pity,  mercy, 
and  the  like,  and  through  this  idea  stirs  the  heart 
to  emotion.  Good  music  then  is  a  sensible  sym- 
bol of  a  supersensible  conception.  Music  which 
does  not  express  an  idea  is  mere  pleasing  sound, 
mere  empty  jingling  possessed  of  but  little 
beauty.  That  the  function  of  genuine  music  is 
really  such  as  just  described,  may  be  confirmed 
by  its  definition  as  "  the  science  combining  tones 
in  melodious,  rhythmic,  and  harmonious  order 
so  as  to  excite  the  emotion  and  appeal  to  the  in- 
tellect." 1 

What  holds  true  of  music  holds  true  likewise 
of  painting,  a  graphic  art,  and  of  sculpture,  a  plas- 
tic art.  The  finest  paintings  and  sculptures  are 
those  which  fitly  symbolize  some  spiritual  con- 
ception. Take  the  Sistine  Madonna  regarded 
by  everybody  as  one  of  the  most  beautiful  paint- 
ings ever  produced  by  the  genius  of  man.  The 
painting  derives  its  charm  chiefly  from  expressing 
on  canvas  the  stainless  purity  of  the  Virgin  and 
her  tender  maternal  love  for  her  Infant  Son.  So 
true  is  it  that  the  beauty  of  painting  and  sculpture 

1  Cf.  Americ.  Encyclop. 


92  Beauty 

is  the  symbolization  of  spiritual  conceptions, 
that  some  of  the  most  valuable  pictures  and 
statues  are  mere  personifications  of  abstract  qual- 
ities or  ideas,  such  as  faith,  hope,  charity,  liberty, 
courage,  etc. 

As  regards  architecture,  another  of  the  fine 
arts,  almost  the  same  remarks  will  apply.  A 
cathedral  looming  up  before  you,  symmetrical, 
well-proportioned,  harmonious,  majestic,  is  beau- 
tiful to  behold.  But  its  visible  beauty  becomes 
transformed  into  the  beauty  of  a  higher  order, 
when  you  have  grasped  the  meaning  of  the 
stately  pile  before  you,  when  you  come  to  con- 
sider it  as  the  emblem  of  the  invisible,  of  some- 
thing lying  beyond  the  ken  of  the  eye.  "  This  is 
no  other  than  the  house  of  God  and  the  gate  of 
heaven."  1  All  the  excellence  and  magnificence 
of  a  cathedral  is  but  a  tribute  to  the  Great  Arch- 
itect of  the  universe.  The  massive  walls  tell  of 
God's  power,  the  broad  dome,  of  His  immensity, 
the  lofty  roof  and  towers,  of  His  majesty,  the 
multifarious  decorations,  of  His  lovableness. 
This  is  the  full  significance  of  the  architectural 
beauty  of  a  temple  of  the  true  God. 

Finally,  we  must  add  a  word  more  about 
poetry,  which  is  universally  regarded  as  the 
special  realm  of  the  beautiful.  What  is  poetry? 
It  may  be  defined  as  "  the  form  of  literature  that 
embodies  beautiful  thought,  feeling,  or  action  in 

1  Gen.  xxviii.  17. 


Special  Kinds  of  Beauty  93 

melodious,  rhythmical,  and  (usually)  metrical 
language,  in  imaginative  and  artistic  construc- 
tion"  (Standard  Dictionary).  The  secret  of 
poetry  then  consists  in  presenting  to  the  mind  of 
the  reader  some  beautiful  conception  by  the  aid 
of  language.  Now  language,  while  essentially  a 
sensible  symbol  of  thought,  is  at  the  same  time  a 
symbol  so  flexible,  so  pliant,  so  adaptable,  as  to 
lend  itself  to  the  expression  of  every  thought  and 
of  every  shade  and  nicety  of  meaning.  A  good 
poet  turns  all  the  advantage  to  be  derived  from  a 
skilful  handling  of  speech  chiefly  to  a  twofold  use. 

First  by  means  of  speech  he  calls  up  in  the  im- 
agination and  fancy  sensible  scenes  which  them- 
selves are  emblems  of  beautiful  ideas.  The 
whole  sensible  universe  lies  open  before  the  poet ; 
he  now  carries  you  up  to  the  starry  heaven,  now 
he  takes  you  down  into  the  caverns  of  the  earth, 
now  he  conducts  you  into  the  open  fields  and  the 
darkling  woods,  now  he  makes  you  navigate  the 
stormy  seas;  and  all  this  in  order  to  lead  you 
into  regions  of  spiritual  beauty.  —  Similar  to  this 
device  of  the  poet  for  conjuring  up  visions  of 
beauty,  is  the  use  of  figures  of  speech,  such  as 
metaphor,  metonomy,  synecdoche,  the  chief 
charm  of  which  consists  in  associating  the  im- 
material with  the  material. 

In  the  second  place,  the  poet  presses  into  serv- 
ice all  the  aids  which  language,  regarded  as  mere 
material  utterance,  offers  for  the  better  and  more 


94  Beauty 

effectual  expression  of  thought.  Hence  he 
builds  up  his  sentences  most  artistically,  he 
marshals  his  words  into  verses  which  please  by 
their  rhythm,  he  chooses  words  and  assemblages 
of  words  which  are  music  to  the  ear.  Who  can 
point  out  all  the  artifices  of  the  poetic  genius  to 
set  aflame  the  imagination  of  the  reader  and  to 
communicate  to  him  his  own  conceptions,  ardor, 
and  enthusiasm? 

We  see  then  that  the  delight  of  poetry  results 
from  the  expression  of  beautiful  thoughts 
through  the  apt  use  of  symbolism. 

68.  A  Priori  Proof  of  Thesis.  The  argu- 
ment just  given  in  proof  of  our  thesis  is  an  a 
posteriori  argument.  We  can  also  prove  our 
contention  a  priori  thus :  The  human  mind  in  its 
present  state  of  union  with  the  body  cannot  ex- 
ercise its  functions  unless  aided  by  sense  cog- 
nition. Such  is  the  dependence  of  man's  intel- 
lectual activity  on  sense  conditions,  that  even 
when  engaged  in  most  abstract  speculations,  the 
mind  cannot  dispense  with  the  services  of  the 
imagination.  No  doubt,  this  dependence  is  only 
extrinsic,  but  it  is  true  dependence  nevertheless. 
Hence  it  is  that  thinking  fatigues  the  brain  and 
that  when  the  imagination  is  deranged,  thought 
cannot  go  on  properly.  No  wonder  then  that 
the  spiritual  must  be  clothed  in  appropriate  sen- 
sible symbols  before  the  intellect  can  realize  and 
enjoy  it.  For  in  this  way  abstract  beauty  is,  as 


Special  Kinds  of  Beauty  95 

it  were,  rendered  concrete  and  thus  brought  down 
to  the  level  of  man  and  placed  within  his  reach. 
Disembodied  spirits  are  not  hampered  by  such 
restrictions,  but  man,  the  lowest  of  intelligent 
beings,  cannot  soar  into  the  regions  of  beauty 
without  the  aid  of  his  lower  nature. 

69.  Thesis    as    a    Corollary.     Lastly,    our 
thesis  follows  as  a  corollary  from  a  previous  con- 
sideration.    For,  as  stated  (p.  79  sq.),  the  de- 
light which  the  intellect  derives  from  the  contem- 
plation of  the  beautiful,  in  a  manner,  overflows 
and  pours  itself  out  into  the  sensitive  and  material 
part  of  our  compound  nature.     Now  such  a  com- 
munication between  the  immaterial  and  material 
part  in  man  could  hardly  take  place  unless  there 
were  some  intervening  bond  to  bridge  over  the 
chasm  between  intellect  and  sense,  and  this  bond 
is  the  sensible  symbol  under  which  beauty  pre- 
sents itself.     It  is  by  means  of  this  bond  that  it 
becomes  possible  for  sense  life  to  share  in  the 
pleasures  of  the  intellect. 

70.  Synonyms   of   Beauty.     Before   leaving 
this  thesis  dealing  with  the  nature  and  kinds  of 
beauty,  it  will  be  useful  to  direct  attention  to 
some  of  the  synonyms  of  the  adjective  beautiful, 
namely,  beauteous,  handsome,  pretty,  fair,  lovely, 
comely,  graceful,  and  picturesque.     But  first  ob- 
serve that  beautiful  itself  is  used  in  two  mean- 
ings.    Sometimes  beautiful  merely  expresses  in 
the  concrete  what  beauty  taken  in  its  greatest 


96  Beauty 

generality  expresses  in  the  abstract.  In  this 
meaning  the  word  beautiful  is  not  synonymous 
with  the  aforenamed  adjectives,  but  denotes  the 
genus  under  which  the  concepts  signified  by  those 
adjectives  fall  as  species  or  varieties.  It  is  thus 
that  the  term  beautiful  has  been  employed  hith- 
erto. But  frequently  it  has  a  specific  meaning, 
just  as  the  term  animal  besides  its  generic  mean- 
ing of  sentient  being  has  also  the  specific  mean- 
ing of  irrational  sentient  being.  Beautiful  in 
this  specific  sense  signifies  "  possessing  the  no- 
blest and  most  spiritual  beauty  which  affords  the 
highest  satisfaction  to  the  mind."  Now  it  is  in 
this  signification  that  beautiful  is  synonymous 
with  the  eight  terms  just  enumerated.  As  there 
is  question  here  of  the  common  meaning  of  words 
we  shall  let  a  dictionary,  the  Century,  speak  for 
us :  "  Beauteous  is  chiefly  poetic  and  covers  the 
less  spiritual  part  of  the  beautiful.  Handsome 
is  founded  upon  the  notion  of  proportion,  sym- 
metry, as  the  result  of  cultivation  or  work.  A 
handsome  figure  is  strictly  one  that  has  been 
developed  by  attention  to  physical  laws  into  the 
right  proportions.  It  is  less  spiritual  than  beau- 
tiful. A  handsome  face  is  not  necessarily  a 
beautiful  face.  Handsome  applies  to  larger  and 
more  important  things  than  pretty,  as  a  handsome 
house ;  a  pretty  cottage.  It  is  opposed  to  homely. 
Pretty  applies  to  that  which  has  symmetry  and 


Special  Kinds  of  Beauty  97 

delicacy,  a  diminutive  beauty  without  the  higher 
qualities  of  gracefulness,  dignity,  feeling,  pur- 
pose, etc.  A  thing  not  small  of  its  kind  may  be 
called  pretty  if  it  is  of  little  dignity  or  conse- 
sequence ;  as  a  pretty  dress  or  shade  of  color ; 
but  it  is  not  used  of  men  or  their  belongings,  ex- 
cept in  contempt.  Fair  starts  from  the  notion 
of  brightness  that  catches  the  eye;  it  notes  that 
sort  of  beauty  which  delights  the  eye  by  com- 
plexion and  feature.  In  this  sense  it  is  now  less 
common  in  prose.  Lovely  is  a  strong  word  for 
that  which  is  immediately  pleasing  to  the  eye ;  it 
applies  primarily  to  that  which  excites  admiration 
and  love.  Comely  applies  rather  to  the  human 
figure,  chiefly  to  its  proportions;  it  is  used  less 
commonly  than  handsome  to  express  the  result 
of  care  and  training.  Graceful  is  used  particu- 
larly of  motions,  looks,  speech,  as  a  graceful 
walk,  a  graceful  deportment,  a  graceful  speaker, 
a  graceful  air.  Picturesque  is  applied  to  objects 
forming  or  fitted  to  form  an  interesting  or  strik- 
ing picture,  as  a  mountain,  a  water-fall,  a  pine- 
covered  headland,  a  gay  costume  amid  appro- 
priate surroundings." 

71.  The  Sublime.  There  still  remains  an- 
other concept  closely  allied  to  the  beautiful  which 
claims  our  attention,  namely  the  sublime.  The 
sublime  may  be  defined  to  be  that  which  is  so  per- 
fect as  to  surpass  the  comprehension  of  the  one 


98  Beauty 

contemplating  it.1  For  this  reason  the  sublime 
strikes  the  mind  with  a  sense  of  grandeur  and 
power,  physical  or  moral,  and  awakens  senti- 
ments of  awe,  veneration,  and  the  like.  Compar- 
ing the  concept  of  the  sublime  with  that  of  the 
beautiful  we  find  that  they  at  once  agree  and 
differ :  they  agree  in  this  that  they  both  relate  to 
perfection;  and  they  differ  in  this  that  the  per- 
fection which  the  sublime  regards  passes  beyond 
the  ken  of  the  human  mind  and  can  only  be  par- 
tially apprehended  by  it,  whereas  the  perfection 
which  constitutes  the  beautiful  lies  wholly  within 
the  reach  of  man's  comprehension  and  can  be 
easily  and  clearly  grasped  and  understood. 
Hence  it  is  that  the  effects  produced  in  us  by  the 
contemplation  of  the  sublime  and  of  the  beauti- 
ful are  quite  unlike.  These  different  effects  of 
the  sublime  and  the  beautiful  have  been  excel- 
lently set  forth  by  Hamilton.  He  says :  "  The 
feeling  of  pleasure  in  the  sublime  is  essentially 
different  from  our  feeling  of  pleasure  in  the 
beautiful.  The  beautiful  awakens  the  mind  to  a 
soothing  contemplation;  the  sublime  rouses  it  to 
strong  emotion.  The  beautiful  attracts  without 
repelling,  whereas  the  sublime  at  once  does  both ; 
the  beautiful  affords  us  a  feeling  of  unmingled 
pleasure,  in  the  full  and  unimpeded  activity  of 
our  cognitive  powers;  whereas  our  feeling  of 
sublimity  is  a  mingled  one  of  pleasure  and  pain, 

1  See  Urraburu,  Ont.  p.  546. 


Special  Kinds  of  Beauty  99 

—  of  pleasure,  in  the  consciousness  of  strong 
energy,  of  pain,  in  the  consciousness  that  this 
energy  is  vain." 1 

72.  The  Opposite  of  the  Beautiful,  or  the 
Ugly.  Before  concluding  this  thesis  it  will  be 
well  to  add  a  few  remarks  on  the  opposite  of  the 
beautiful,  namely  the  ugly,  the  unsightly  or  de- 
formed; for  a  concept  is  often  rendered  clearer 
by  contrasting  it  with  its  opposite.  —  Since  the 
beautiful  is  agreeable  in  appearance  and  pleasing 
to  the  esthetic  sense,  the  ugly  will  be  disagreeable 
in  appearance  and  displeasing  to  the  esthetic 
sense ;  and  whereas  the  beautiful  is  constituted  by 
order,  proportion,  symmetry,  and  harmony,  the 
ugly  results  from  disorder,  disproportion,  irregu- 
larity, and  discord.  The  defects  and  blemishes 
which  mar  and  disfigure  objects  and  render  them 
repulsive  are  either  physical,  intellectual,  or 
moral.  In  fact,  there  are  as  many  kinds  and  de- 
grees of  ugliness  as  there  are  of  beauty.  How- 
ever, there  is  a  neutral  field  between  the  beauti- 
ful and  the  ugly,  the  unbeautiful  made  up  of 
things  that  are  neither  beautiful  nor  ugly,  but  oc- 
cupy a  place  between  the  two.  The  beautiful,  by 
slow  and  imperceptible  degrees,  shades  off  into 
the  unbeautiful,  and  the  unbeautiful  as  gradually 
merges  into  the  positively  ugly.  As  stated  before 
(p.  62  sq.),  it  is  impossible  exactly  to  fix  the 

1  Metaphysics  Lect.  46,  p.  628. 


10O  Beauty 

boundary  lines  between  these  regions ;  there  can, 
however,  be  no  doubt  that  these  regions  actually 
exist.  —  But  as  we  are  treating  of  ugliness  only 
incidentally,  these  few  remarks  will  suffice  on  this 
side  issue. 


CHAPTER  SIXTH 

BEAUTY  IN  RELATION  TO  GOD 

ARTICLE  i 

DIVINE  IDEALS  THE  MEASURE  OF  CREATED 
BEAUTY 

Summary:    Transition     to     new     subject  —  Thesis  — 
Proof  of  thesis. 

73.  Transition   to   New   Subject.     Hitherto 
we  have  viewed  beauty  in  itself  and  in  relation  to 
the  human  faculties;  in  the  next  thesis  we  shall 
consider  it  in  relation  to  God. 

THESIS  10 

The  closer  a  beautiful  object  ap- 
proaches its  Divine  ideal,  the  more 
beautiful  it  is. 

74.  Proof    of   Thesis.     To    understand    this 
statement  we  must  first  define  what  is  meant  by 
an  ideal.     An  ideal  is  generally  understood  to  be 
a  conception  regarded  as  a  standard  of  perfec- 
tion, that  is,  a  conception  free  from  all  deformi- 

101 


IO2  Beauty 

ties,  defects,  or  blemishes  seen  in  actual  ex- 
istence. Now  everything  created  or  creatable 
has  such  an  ideal  of  itself  in  the  Divine  mind. 
For  God  is  the  all-perfect  Architect  of  the  uni- 
verse, the  Artist  of  artists.  But  an  artist  always 
acts  according  to  a  preconceived  model,  and  the 
more  perfect  the  artist,  the  more  perfect  the 
model ;  hence  God  being  the  most  excellent  artist 
is  guided  in  His  work  by  models  that  fully  ex- 
press the  perfection  which  a  certain  being  can 
and  should  possess ;  and  these  models  or  stand- 
ards are  the  Divine  ideals  of  created  or  creatable 
things.  Therefore  the  nearer  a  beautiful  object 
comes  to  its  ideal  in  the  Divine  mind,  the  more 
beautiful  it  is.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  created  ob- 
jects, especially  if  they  are  of  a  somewhat  com- 
plex nature,  very  rarely  reach  the  perfection  of 
their  models  or  ideals.  Where  is  there  a  man, 
for  instance,  who  has  not  his  defects,  and  where 
is  there  an  object  in  nature  or  art  which  does  not 
fall  short  of  perfection?  This  thought  is  well 
stated  by  Lessius :  "  Omnia  possibilia  continen- 
tur  ...  in  (divina)  sapientia  in  exemplar i  for- 
mali  in  quo  etiam  existunt  objective  modo  per- 
f ectissimo  et  illustrissimo ;  magis  enim  ibi  fulgent 
quam  in  suis  naturis  creatis."  x  In  the  vernacu- 
lar, "  All  possible  things  are  contained  in  the 
(Divine)  Intellect  as  in  a  true  pattern  in  which 
they  have  objective  existence  in  a  most  perfect 

1  De  Perfectionibus  Moribusque  Divinis,  1.  5,  c.  2,  19. 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  God  103 

and  excellent  manner;  for  there  they  shine  forth 
with  even  greater  luster  than  in  their  own  created 
natures."  Something  similar  is  found  in  Long- 
fellow's "  Masque  of  Pandora  "  where  he  says : 

..."  The  ideal  beauty 
Which  the  creative  faculty  of  mind 
Fashions  and  follows  in  a  thousand  shapes 
More  lovely  than  the  real." 


ARTICLE  2 

CREATED  BEAUTY  A  REFLECTION  OF  UN- 
CREATED BEAUTY 

Summary:     Question  stated  —  Thesis  —  Elucidation  of 
thesis  —  Objection  answered. 

75.  Question  Stated.     In  the  last  article  we 
considered  created  beauty  in  respect  to  the  Di- 
vine ideals.     It  remains  for  us  to  show  in  what 
precise  relation  it  stands  to  the  Divine  essence. 

THESIS  ii 

All  created  beauty  is  but  a  faint  re- 
flection of  the  beauty  of  the  Divine 
essence. 

76.  Elucidation   of   Thesis.     This   assertion 
is  merely  an  inference  of  the  broader  truth  that 
all  things  whatever,  whether  actual  or  possible, 


IO4  Beauty 

are  contained  in  the  Godhead,  not,  indeed,  just 
as  they  are  in  themselves  with  all  their  defects 
and  limitations,  but  in  an  infinitely  higher  man- 
ner, in  an  "  eminent "  manner,  to  use  a  technical 
expression. 

That  all  things  are  in  some  manner  contained  in 
God's  essence  is  plain.  For,  were  it  not  so,  there 
would  be  some  perfection  outside  of  God,  that  is 
in  no  way  in  Him  ;  but  this  is  opposed  to  God's  in- 
finity, which  is  the  boundless  ocean  of  all  reality. 
That  finite  things  are  in  the  Godhead  in  an  in- 
finitely higher  degree  than  they  are  in  themselves, 
likewise  follows  from  God's  infinity,  since  what- 
ever is  in  God,  is  God  and  is  consequently  in- 
finitely perfect.  God  then  is  the  superlatively  ex- 
cellent Exemplar  of  all  finite  beings ;  finite  beings, 
on  the  other  hand,  are  copies  of  God,  but  falling 
infinitely  short  of  Him  in  perfection ;  they  are,  as 
it  were,  the  footprints  of  the  Creator  in  the  sands 
of  time,  His  image  dimly  traced  in  His  handi- 
works. Hence  we  infer  that  created  beauty  is  a 
faint  reflection  of  the  beauty  of  God,  who  is  not 
only  beautiful,  but  Beauty  itself,  the  "splendor 
veri "  and  the  "  splendor  orclinis  "  in  the  very 
highest  sense  of  the  word.  He  is  unlimited  in  the 
variety  of  His  perfections,  and  yet  possessed  of 
the  greatest  conceivable  unity,  since  in  Him  per- 
fections infinite  in  number  and  degree  are  all 
identified  with  His  essence.  —  To  confirm  what 


Beauty  in  Relation  to  God  105 

we  have  said  by  a  passage  from  St.  Thomas  x : 
"  Pulchritude  enim  creaturae  nihil  aliud  est  quam 
similitude  divinae  pulchritudinis  in  rebus  partici- 
pata,"  that  is,  "  The  beauty  of  the  creature  is 
nothing  else  than  Divine  beauty  shared  by 
things." 

77.  Objection  Answered.  But,  it  is  urged, 
how  can  God  be  beautiful  in  the  true  sense  of  the 
word,  since  beauty  is  order,  and  order  in  God  is 
inconceivable?  For  order  requires  divers  parts, 
and  parts  in  God  have  no  place. 

This  objection  need  not  disturb  us.  For  to 
have  order,  it  is  not  necessary  to  have  parts 
actually  separable  or  even  really  distinct;  it  is 
enough  to  have  parts  in  the  sense  that  one  and 
the  same  object  be  equivalent  to  many  perfections 
which  are  in  harmony  with  one  another.  Now 
this  is  the  case  with  God.  For,  as  reason  teaches 
us,  the  Divine  essence,  though  excluding  every- 
thing in  the  nature  of  parts,  is  nevertheless 
equivalent  to  endless  perfections  which  stand  in 
the  most  orderly  relation  to  one  another.  —  We 
refrain  from  speaking  of  the  great  mystery  of 
the  Ever  Blessed  Trinity,  of  Three  in  One,  as 
this  is  known  to  us  by  revelation  only. 

1  In  expositione  in  Dionys.  c.  4,  I.  5. 


CHAPTER  SEVEN 
OBJECTIVITY  OF  BEAUTY 

Summary:  Transition  to  new  subject  —  Thesis  —  Ex- 
act scope  of  thesis  explained  —  Thesis 
established. 

78.  Transition  to  New  Subject.    We  now 
pass  to  the  examination  of   a  question   which 
really  follows  as  a  corollary  from  what  precedes, 
but  which,  on  account  of  its  importance  and  the 
opposition  it  has  met  with,  needs  more  detailed 
treatment,  namely  the  objectivity  of  beauty. 

THESIS  12 

Beauty  is  not  subjective,  but  objec- 
tive. 

79.  Exact  Scope  of  Thesis.     It  is  not  our 
purpose  in  this  thesis  to  disprove  the  doctrine  of 
idealism  according  to  which  all  reality,  and  hence 
also  beauty,  is  in  its  nature  psychical,  i.e.  existent 
only  in  the  mind.     For  this  system  is  so  utterly 
opposed  to  common  sense  as  to  deserve  no  con- 
sideration here.     It  is  our  intention  rather  to 
weigh  the  merits  of  the  view  according  to  which 

106 


Objectivity  of  Beauty  107 

beauty  consists  essentially  in  certain  mental  qual- 
ities capable  of  being  stimulated  into  action  by 
outer  objects.  These  outer  objects,  however,  it 
is  held,  are  not  in  themselves  beautiful ;  they  are 
merely  excitants  of  delightful  emotions  and  out- 
ward signs  of  the  beauty  within  the  soul.  Hence 
this  theory  makes  beauty  wholly  subjective. 
But  it  will  be  well  to  let  one  of  the  advocates  of 
this  theory,  David  Hume,  speak  for  himself. 
He  says  in  his  dissertation  "  Of  the  Standard  of 
Taste  " :  "  Though  it  be  certain  that  Beauty  and 
Deformity,  more  than  sweet  and  bitter,  are  not 
qualities  in  objects,  but  belong  entirely  to  senti- 
ment, it  must  be  allowed  that  there  are  certain 
qualities  in  objects  which  are  fitted  by  nature  to 
produce  particular  feelings." 

Now  what  is  to  be  thought  of  this  view?  We 
answer,  it  is  opposed  to  well-established  conclu- 
sions, it  leads  to  scepticism,  and  it,  moreover, 
rests  on  confusion  of  ideas. 

80.  Thesis  Established.  And  first,  the  view 
that  beauty  is  subjective  is  opposed  to  well-es- 
tablished conclusions.  In  a  previous  thesis  we 
showed  that  beauty  consists  in  symmetry,  har- 
mony, proportion ;  briefly,  in  order.  But  order 
is  something  objective.  For  it  results  from  the 
relations  existing  between  the  elements  consti- 
tuting a  thing.  Now  if  the  elements  constituting 
a  thing  are  objective  —  and  who  will  deny  this 
but  a  confirmed  sceptic  ?  —  the  relations  obtaining 


io8  Beauty 

between  these  elements  will  also  be  objective. 
You  might  just  as  well  say  that  the  angles  and 
the  sides  of  a  triangle  are  real,  but  that  the  rela- 
tions between  them  are  purely  subjective. 

Again,  the  view  we  are  refuting  leads  to  scep- 
ticism. For  if  the  concept  of  beauty  is  not  ob- 
jective, what  right  have  we  to  ascribe  objectivity 
to  any  other  concept,  as  substance,  cause,  virtue, 
goodness  ?  They  are  all  on  a  par  with  beauty  as 
far  as  objectivity  is  concerned.  They  are  all  re- 
garded as  objective  because  the  mind  clearly  rep- 
resents them  as  objective.  And  if  we  are  de- 
ceived by  the  mind  as  to  the  objectivity  of  beauty, 
are  we  not  justified  in  deducing  that  the  same  is 
the  case  in  regard  to  all  other  concepts? 

Lastly,  the  opinion  that  beauty  is  purely  sub- 
jective rests  on  a  confusion  of  ideas.  For  it  con- 
founds the  susceptibility  to  beauty  with  beauty 
itself,  it  mistakes  the  effect  for  the  cause.  We 
do  not  deny  that  the  mind  is  so  constituted  as  to 
be  filled  with  delight  when  certain  objects  are 
presented  to  it.  However,  this  constitution  of 
the  intellect  thus  to  react  at  the  sight  of  those 
objects  is  not  beauty  itself,  but  a  disposition,  a 
prerequisite  for  the  enjoyment  of  beauty.  Nor 
do  we  question  that  the  joy  of  the  mind  conse- 
quent upon  the  perception  of  the  beautiful  is  sub- 
jective, but  this  joy  is  not  beauty  itself,  it  is 
merely  the  effect  of  beauty. 

We  might  also  inquire  of  the  upholders  of  the 


Objectivity  of  Beauty  109 

view  under  discussion  why  it  is  that  only  certain 
objects  excite  those  sentiments  in  which  beauty 
is  supposed  to  consist.  If  beauty  is  nothing  in 
the  object  why  should  one  object  have  the  ad- 
vantage over  another  in  arousing  the  sense  of 
beauty  ? 


CHAPTER  EIGHT 
THE  STANDARD  OF  TASTE 

Summary:  Connection  with  previous  thesis  pointed 
out  —  Thesis  —  Proof  of  thesis  —  Confir- 
mation of  thesis  —  Saying,  "  there  is  no 
disputing  about  tastes,"  explained  —  Di- 
versity of  tastes  often  only  apparent  — 
Corollary:  Beauty  not  a  transcendental 
concept. 

8 1.  Connection      with      Previous      Thesis 
Pointed  out.     The  thesis  establishing  the  objec- 
tivity of  beauty  enables  us  to  give  a  satisfactory 
answer   to   the    much    debated    question    as    to 
whether  there  exists  a  fixed  standard  of  taste. 

THESIS  13 

There  exists  a  fixed  standard  of  taste, 
and  hence  taste  is  not  arbitrary. 

82.  Proof  of  Thesis.    Taste,  as  here  under- 
stood, is  the  power  of  discerning  and  estimating 
the  beautiful.1     That  there  is  a  fixed  standard  of 
taste  follows  as  a  corollary  from  the  preceding 
thesis.     For  if  beauty  is  objective  the  concept  of 
beauty   is    also   objective,   and   therefore   fixed, 

1  Cf.  Liberatore,  Log.  et  Metaph.  p.  302. 
no 


The  Standard  of  Taste  in 

definite,  and  determinate.  Now  the  concept  of 
beauty  is  the  standard  of  taste,  namely  that  by 
which  we  estimate  or  pass  judgment  on  what  is 
beautiful.  Consequently,  the  standard  of  taste 
is  likewise  fixed,  definite,  and  determinate,  and 
hence  taste  is  not  dependent  on  each  one's  in^ 
dividual  disposition,  is  not  subject  to  each  indi- 
vidual's caprice  and  private  judgment,  but  is  gov- 
erned by  fixed  rule  and  law,  in  a  word,  it  is  not 
arbitrary. 

83.  Confirmation  of  Thesis.  What  we  have 
thus  shown  by  an  a  priori  argument  is  confirmed 
by  an  appeal  to  common  sense.  For  if  there  is 
no  common  standard  of  taste,  if  taste  varies  ac- 
cording to  every  individual's  personal  disposi- 
tion, why  is  it  that  painters,  sculptors,  poets, 
architects,  and  other  artists  think  that  the  fame 
of  their  works  will  be  eternal  and  that  their  pro- 
ductions will  please  to  the  end  of  time?  Such 
was  the  opinion  of  Horace  who  tells  us : 

"  Exegi  monumentum  acre  perennius, 
Regalique  situ  pyramidum  altius ; 
Quod  non  imber  edax,  non  aquilo  impotens 
Possit  diruere,  aut  innumerabilis 
Annorum  series,  et  fuga  temporum. 
Non  omnis  moriar ;  multaque  pars  mei 
Vitabit  Libitinam  .  .  ."  * 

These  lines  have  been  thus  rendered  by  Lord 
Lytton : 

1  Ode  3,  30. 


112  Beauty 

"  I  have  built  a  monument  than  bronze  more  lasting, 
Soaring  more  high  than  regal  pyramids, 
Which  nor  the  stealthy  gnawing  of  the  rain-drop, 
Nor  the  vain  rush  of  Boreas  shall  destroy ; 
Nor  shall  it  pass  away  with  the  unnumbered 
Series  of  ages  and  the  flight  of  time. 
I  shall  not  wholly  die !     From  Libitina 
A  part,  yea,  much  of  mine  own  self  escapes." 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  masterpieces  of  an- 
tiquity, as  the  poems  of  Homer,  Virgil,  Horace, 
Shakespeare,  the  statues  of  Michael  Angelo,  the 
paintings  of  Raphael,  the  architectural  works  of 
the  Middle  Ages,  give  as  much  delight  now  as 
they  did  when  first  produced. 

Again,  why  is  it  that  numerous  books  have  been 
written  laying  down  rules  and  directions  which 
every  artist  must  observe  under  penalty  of  pro- 
ducing a  fiasco? 

Lastly,  why  do  we  say  that  certain  productions 
are  in  good  or  in  bad  taste?  Such  an  expres- 
sion has  no  meaning  unless  there  is  a  fixed  stand- 
ard of  taste  to  which  the  productions  in  question 
conform  or  from  which  they  depart.  If  taste 
were  altogether  arbitrary,  then  whatever  pleased 
the  fancy  of  the  individual  beholder  would  be 
beautiful,  and  we  would  have  no  right  to  quarrel 
with  a  man  for  his  tastes.  If  he  judged  the 
Moses  of  Michael  Angelo  ugly  and  the  drama  of 
"  Hamlet "  abominable  we  could  not  justly  cen- 
sure his  taste. 

84.    Saying  "There  is  no  Disputing  about 


The  Standard  of  Taste  113 

tastes,"  Explained.  But  what  about  the  saying 
"  De  gustibus  non  est  disputandum,"  "  There  is 
no  debating  about  tastes  "  ?  Does  not  the  diver- 
sity of  tastes  among  men  as  expressed  in  this 
generally  accepted  axiom  prove  that  there  is  no 
common  standard  of  taste?  No,  it  no  more 
shows  this  than  the  many  errors  and  sins  into 
which  men  are  constantly  falling  show  that  there 
is  no  common  standard  of  truth  or  morality. 
The  axiom  merely  states  the  fact  that  there  are 
many  departures  from  good  taste  owing  to  per- 
sonal peculiarities,  uncommon  surroundings,  and 
other  accidental  or  exceptional  conditions  and  cir- 
cumstances. To  realize  this,  observe  that  there  is 
a  twofold  element  in  taste,  a  perceptional  and  an 
emotional.  As  regards  the  perceptional  element, 
taste  imports  discernment  or  the  power  of  nice 
and  correct  judgment  as  to  what  is  beautiful. 
Now  the  power  of  discerning  what  is  beautiful  is 
not  ordinarily  possessed  in  a  very  high  degree  of 
perfection;  for,  as  stated  before  (p.  70),  na- 
ture is  not  lavish  of  those  gifts  the  purpose  of 
which  is  adornment  and  enjoyment  rather  than 
necessity.  Thus  a  talent  for  music  is  compara- 
tively rare,  because  music  is  an  endowment  be- 
stowed chiefly  for  enjoyment.  The  case  is  simi- 
lar in  regard  to  taste  for  beauty.  No  wonder, 
then,  that  so  many  blunders  are  committed  in  de- 
termining what  is  beautiful.  Hence  the  diversity 
of  judgment  in  respect  to  what  is  beautiful  is  not 


1 14  Beauty 

due  to  the  fact  that  there  is  no  common  standard 
of  taste,  but  to  the  fact  that  many  possess  little  or 
no  taste. 

At  times  the  taste  is  perverted  in  one  who  has 
associated  with  others  that  have  no  proper  ap- 
preciation of  the  beautiful.  Thus  it  may  come 
about  that  a  false  standard  of  taste  is  gradually 
set  up  for  an  entire  country  and  the  taste  of  the 
inhabitants  permanently  vitiated.  The  perver- 
sion of  taste  in  this  instance  is  evidently  the  re- 
sult of  peculiar  surroundings  and  accidental  cir- 
cumstances. 

The  emotional  element  of  taste  consists  in  the 
power  of  relishing  or  enjoying  the  beautiful. 
Now  it  is  well  known  that  the  emotional  capaci- 
ties of  men  are  very  various.  Some  persons  are 
more  impressionable  than  others  and  hence  more 
easily  moved  by  beauty.  Overlooking  this  fact, 
many  ascribe  to  the  outward  cause  alone  the  dif- 
ferent estimates  of  beauty.  These  estimates  are 
the  joint  effect  of  the  object  and  the  subject  per- 
ceiving. 

85.  Diversity  of  Tastes  often  only  Appar- 
ent. However,  let  it  be  noted  by  way  of  warn- 
ing, the  diversity  of  judgments  in  regard  to  the 
beauty  of  the  same  object  is  frequently  only  ap- 
parent, and  this  chiefly  for  two  reasons.  In  the 
first  place,  sensible  beauty,  as  explained  thes.  7,  p. 
74  sqq.,  often  consists  in  the  realization  by  the 
mind  of  the  proper  adjustment  between  sense 


The  Standard  of  Taste  115 

and  object.  Now  it  may  happen,  and  frequently 
does  happen,  that  what  is  in  harmony  with  the 
sense-perception  of  one  man  is  out  of  harmony 
with  that  of  another,  or,  at  any  rate,  less  in  har- 
mony with  it.  Hence  it  is,  for  instance,  that  an 
Indian,  considered  handsome  by  one  of  his  own 
tribe,  is  unattractive  in  the  eyes  of  a  white  man. 
There  is  really  no  diversity  in  the  estimation  of 
beauty  in  this  case.  Both  the  Indian  and  the 
white  man  judge  that  adjustment  and  harmony 
are  beautiful.  The  diversity  of  judgments  is 
merely  due  to  the  fact  that  what  is  in  keeping 
with  the  sense  of  the  one,  is  out  of  keeping  with 
the  sense  of  the  other.  The  Indian  declares  that 
to  be  beautiful  which  harmonizes  with  his  sense 
of  sight,  and  so  does  the  white  man.  The  white 
man  is  not  aware  of  the  reason  why  the  Indian 
calls  his  fellow-tribesman  handsome;  hence  he 
imagines  that  the  Indian  has  a  standard  of  beauty 
different  from  his  own.  Nor  does  this  make 
beauty  subjective ;  for  the  relation  existing  be- 
tween sense  and  object  is  as  objective  as  the  ob- 
ject itself.  Beauty  would  be  subjective  if  it  were 
made  to  consist  merely  in  the  subjective  feeling, 
and  not  in  the  adjustment  between  the  sensitive 
faculty  and  the  object  causing  that  feeling  in  the 
sensitive  faculty.  (Cf.  p.  75.) 

There  is  still  a  second  reason  why  many  judg- 
ments regarding  the  same  object  seem  to  be  diver- 
gent, but  in  reality  are  not.  It  is  this.  An  ob- 


n6  Beauty 

ject  is  often  beautiful  considered  from  one  stand- 
point and  ugly  considered  from  another.  Two 
judgments  disagree  merely  because  they  do  not 
relate  to  the  same  object  under  the  same  aspect. 
Thus  a  boy  calls  a  toad  horrid  because  it  dis- 
pleases his  sight ;  the  scientist  pronounces  it  beau- 
tiful on  account  of  the  perfect  adjustment  of  all 
the  parts  of  its  organism.  One  is  repelled  by 
a  person  afflicted  with  a  loathsome  disease  by 
reason  of  his  appearance,  another  is  attracted 
to  him  on  account  of  his  heroic  patience.  This 
is  especially  the  case  when  the  beauty  of  an  ob- 
ject is  due  to  association.  You  find  your  old 
homestead  very  beautiful.  For  the  memory  of 
the  days  of  your  boyhood  spent  in  it  casts  a  halo 
around  it.  Another,  a  stranger,  thinks  the  same 
place  very  ordinary.  And  so  in  many  other  cases 
where  perhaps  the  cause  for  the  difference  in 
judgments  is  not  so  evident.  Were  we  to  con- 
sider all  these  influences,  we  would  understand 
that  two  persons  who  seem  to  be  at  variance  in 
their  estimates  of  beauty  are  really  in  full  accord. 
86.  Corollary:  Beauty  not  a  Transcen- 
dental Concept.  After  treating  the  various 
questions  regarding  beauty,  an  answer  can  now 
be  given  to  an  enquiry  often  made.  Is  beauty 
like  goodness  a  transcendental  concept,  a  con- 
cept applicable  to  all  things,  in  other  words,  can 
all  things  be  called  beautiful  as  all  things  can  be 
called  good? 


The  Standard  of  Taste  117 

If  this  question  is  taken  in  the  strict  sense,  the 
reply  is,  no.  For,  as  pointed  out  (thes.  5),  things 
are  not  termed  beautiful  unless  they  are  perfect 
in  their  own  kind  and  unless  they  moreover  pos- 
sess a  somewhat  conspicuous  degree  of  perfec- 
tion. Now  no  one  will  contend  that  these  two 
conditions  are  verified  in  everything.  The  case 
is  different  as  regards  the  good;  for  a  thing  is 
called  good  by  the  very  fact  that  it  is  something, 
that  it  is  a  reality.  (See  p.  22  sq.)  However, 
in  an  improper  sense,  all  things  may  be  called 
beautiful  in  two  ways.  First  they  may  be  styled 
beautiful  in  so  far  as  they  can  enter  as  parts  into 
the  constitution  of  beautiful  things.  A  skeleton, 
although  considered  hideous,  forms  an  essential 
part  of  every  beautiful  sentient  being.  Piles  of 
stone,  of  lumber,  and  of  cement  have  little  or  no 
beauty.  But  when  combined  so  as  to  constitute, 
say  the  castle  of  Edinburgh,  they  are  truly  a 
thing  of  beauty.  Hence  it  is  correct  to  say  that 
all  things  possess  potential  or  initial  beauty  in  so 
far  as  they  can  enter  in  some  way  or  other  into 
the  constitution  of  beautiful  things. —  In  the 
second  place,  anything  may  have  symbolic  beauty 
in  the  sense  that  it  can  be  the  token  of  something 
beautiful,  as  a  wrinkled,  emaciated  face  can  be 
the  token  of  a  life  well  spent.  Symbolic  beauty, 
however,  is  not  intrinsic  beauty,  but  extrinsic 
beauty,  it  merely  directs  attention  to  something 
that  is  beautiful  in  itself. 


CHAPTER  NINE 
VARIOUS  FALSE  SYSTEMS  OF  BEAUTY 

Summary:  Purpose  of  chapter  set  forth  —  Beauty  and 
utility  —  Beauty  and  sensitive  gratification 
— Beauty  and  the  associationist  theory  — 
Beauty  and  custom  —  Pantheistic  concep- 
tion of  beauty. 

87.  Purpose  of  Chapter  Set  Forth.  Now 
that  we  have  established  the  positive  part  of  our 
treatise  it  remains  for  us  to  say  something  about 
the  false  theories  of  beauty,  of  which  there  are 
a  considerable  number.  The  chief  of  these 
theories  are  those  which  make  beauty  consist  in 
utility,  in  pleasure  of  sense,  in  association,  in  cus- 
tom, and  in  the  Divine  idea.  They  have  been 
all  refuted  by  implication  before.  For  if  our 
view  of  the  beautiful  is  correct,  then  all  other 
views  at  variance  with  it  must  be  false.  Never- 
theless it  will  be  useful  to  add  a  few  words  in  di- 
rect refutation  of  them.  However,  our  main 
purpose  is  not  so  much  to  refute  these  false  theo- 
ries as  to  point  out  how  it  came  about  that  in 
this  matter  of  beauty  there  exists  such  a  multi- 
plicity of  views.  The  general  reason  for  this 
great  variety  of  views  would  seem  to  be  the  great 
118 


Various  False  Systems  of  Beauty       119 

difficulty  there  is  in  disentangling  beauty  from  its 
mere  accompaniments,  effects,  and  prerequisite 
conditions.  In  consequence  of  this  difficulty, 
the  mind  is  apt  to  confound  beauty  with  one  or 
other  of  those  things  which  always  or  usually  ac- 
company it.  Let  us  now  show  this  in  the  case 
of  each  of  the  above  opinions  in  particular. 

88.  Beauty  and  Utility.  And  first,  as  re- 
gards utility.  That  utility  or  usefulness  consti- 
tutes beauty  has  been  held  by  many.  Socrates  is 
credited  with  this  view  by  Xenophon  who  in  his 
"  Memorabilia  "  3,  8,  makes  him  say :  "  What- 
ever is  beautiful  is  for  the  same  reason  good, 
when  suited  to  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  in- 
tended." And  again,  "  Whatever  is  suited  for 
the  end  intended,  with  respect  to  that  end  is  good 
and  fair;  and  contrariwise,  it  must  be  deemed 
evil  and  deformed  when  it  departs  from  the  pur- 
pose which  it  was  designed  to  promote."  He 
goes  on  to  apply  this  theory  of  fitness  to  such 
things  as  houses.  Those  houses  are  most  beau- 
tiful which  are  most  convenient.1  In  modern 
times,  similar  views  have  been  advanced  by  Adam 
Smith  in  "  The  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments," 
by  Berkeley  in  "  Alciphron,"  and  by  others. 

As  to  this  theory,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the 
useful  is  very  frequently  beautiful,  not,  however, 
just  because  it  is  useful,  but  because  it  shows 

1  See  W.  Knight,  "  The  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful," 

V.  I,  p.  22. 


I2O  Beauty 

forth  fitness,  proportion,  adaptation  of  means  to 
end,  in  a  word,  because  it  involves  order.  How- 
ever, it  does  not  follow  that  what  is  beautiful  is 
necessarily  useful.  There  are  many  things  which 
impress  us  as  beautiful  without  any  regard  to 
their  usefulness,  as  the  evening  star  rising  above 
the  horizon,  the  foaming  surge,  a  lion  crouching 
in  the  jungle,  a  hawk  soaring  on  high.  But 
when  an  object  of  a  somewhat  complex  nature, 
as  a  well  constructed  machine,  is  useful  it  is  also 
beautiful.  Nevertheless,  although  the  useful  and 
the  beautiful  are  often  identified  in  external  na- 
ture, they  always  differ  in  concept.  A  thing  is 
considered  useful  in  as  far  as  it  is  helpful  and 
beneficial,  and  beautiful  in  as  far  as  it  stands  in 
harmonious  relation  to  the  end  which  it  sub- 
serves. The  reason  then  for  confounding  the 
useful  with  the  beautiful  is  the  close  connection 
of  the  useful  with  the  beautiful. 

89.  Beauty  and  Sensitive  Gratification. 
According  to  another  view  beauty  relates  only 
to  sense  cognition  and  feeling.  The  chief  repre- 
sentative of  this  view  is  Alexander  G.  Baum- 
garten,  the  founder  of  the  science  of  esthetics. 
He  says :  "  Aesthetices  finis  est  perfectio  cog- 
nitionis  sensitivae  qua  talis.  Haec  autem  est  pul- 
chritudo,"  *  "  The  end  of  esthetics  is  the  perfec- 
tion of  sensuous  cognition  as  such ;  and  this  is 
beauty."  George  T.  Meier,  Baumgarten's  pupil, 

1Aesthetica,  14. 


Various  False  Systems  of  Beauty       121 

following  in  the  footsteps  of  his  master,  declares 
that  "  every  perfection  perceived  by  the  senses 
is  a  beauty,  and  every  sensible  imperfection  in 
like  manner  an  ugliness."  And  for  illustration 
he  adds :  "  Wine  tastes  beautifully  and  flowers 
smell  beautifully;  music  sounds  beautifully  and 
a  handsome  face  looks  beautifully."  1 

As  regards  this  theory,  we  have  shown  in 
thesis  2  that  the  beautiful  as  such  cannot  be  per- 
ceived by  sense,  but  by  the  intellect  only.  No 
doubt,  the  apprehension  of  the  beautiful  is  fre- 
quently accompanied  by  sensitive  gratification  of 
the  eye  and  ear,  both  because  charming  sights  and 
sounds  are  in  harmony  with  the  eye  and  ear  and 
because  intellectual  delights  often  react  on,  and 
overflow  into,  the  channels  through  which  beau- 
tiful sensitive  objects  are  transmitted  to  the 
mind.  But  beauty  is  one  thing,  and  a  mere  ac- 
companiment of  beauty,  quite  another.  Those 
philosophers,  then,  who  mistake  sensuous  cog- 
nition and  pleasure  for  beauty  confound  a  mere 
concomitant  of  beauty  with  beauty  itself,  and 
thus  degrade  the  enjoyment  of  the  beautiful,  one 
of  the  intellect's  noblest  prerogatives,  to  the  low 
level  of  mere  sensuous  pleasure. 

90.  Beauty  and  the  Associationist  Theory. 
We  now  pass  to  the  third  false  theory  of  the 
beautiful.  This  theory,  which  is  quite  common 
with  English  writers,  makes  beauty  consist  in 

1  Cf.  Ueberweg,  History  of  Philosophy,  v.  II,  p.  117. 


122  Beauty 

association.  According  to  this  view  an  object  is 
beautiful  because  it  is  associated  with,  or  sug- 
gests things  which  are  calculated  to  arouse  pleas- 
urable feelings  in  us.  Thus  you  find  a  nosegay 
sent  you  by  a  kind  friend  beautiful,  because  the 
thought  of  your  friend's  love  and  fidelity,  which 
the  present  suggests,  gives  rise  to  agreeable  emo- 
tions in  you.  —  An  old,  faded  copy-book  is  beau- 
tiful in  your  eyes,  because  it  stirs  up  in  you  sweet 
recollections  of  the  days  of  your  youth  and  of 
your  efforts  and  struggles  and  final  success. 
But  lest  we  may  seem  to  be  beating  the  air  by  re- 
futing imaginary  enemies,  let  us  set  down  the 
statements  of  two  representatives  of  this  view, 
Mr.  Alison  and  Lord  Jeffrey.  Mr.  Alison  says : 
"  The  conclusion  in  which  I  wish  to  rest  is  that 
the  beauty  and  sublimity  which  is  felt  in  the 
various  appearances  of  matter  are  finally  to  be 
ascribed  to  their  expression  of  mind,  or  to  their 
being  either  directly  or  indirectly  the  signs  of 
these  qualities  of  mind  which  are  fitted  by  the 
constitution  of  our  nature  to  affect  us  with  pleas- 
ing and  interesting  emotion."  x  And  Lord  Jeff- 
rey formulates  his  view  thus :  "  It  appears  to 
us,  then,  that  objects  are  sublime  or  beautiful  — 
first,  when  they  are  the  natural  signs  and  per- 
petual concomitants  of  pleasurable  sensations,  as 
the  sound  of  thunder,  or  laughter,  or  at  any  rate, 
of  some  lively  feeling  or  emotion  in  ourselves,  or 

1  Essay  on  the  Nature  and  Principles  of  Taste. 


Various  False  Systems  of  Beauty       123 

in  some  other  sentient  beings ;  or  secondly,  when 
they  are  the  arbitrary  or  accidental  concomitants 
of  such  feelings,  as  ideas  of  female  beauty;  or 
thirdly,  when  they  bear  some  analogy  or  fancied 
resemblance  to  things  with  which  these  emotions 
are  necessarily  connected.  All  poetry  is  founded 
on  the  last  —  as  silence  and  tranquillity  —  gradual 
decay  and  ambition  —  gradual  descent  and  de- 
cay." *  To  make  the  meaning  of  the  associa- 
tionists  still  clearer  we  shall  cite  another  passage 
from  Lord  Jeffrey's  "  Essay  on  Beauty."  "  Our 
sense  of  beauty,"  he  says,  "  depends  entirely  on 
our  previous  experience  of  simpler  pleasures  or 
emotions  and  consists  in  the  suggestion  of  agree- 
able and  interesting  sensations  with  which  we 
had  formerly  been  made  familiar,  by  the  direct 
agency  of  our  common  sensibilities;  and  that 
vast  variety  of  objects  to  which  we  give  the  com- 
mon name  of  beautiful  become  entitled  to  that 
appellation  merely  because  they  all  possess  the 
power  of  recalling  or  reflecting  those  sensations 
of  which  they  have  been  the  accompaniments,  or 
with  which  they  have  been  associated  in  our 
imagination  by  any  other  more  casual  bond  of 
connection." 

Now  what  is  to  be  said  of  the  theory  of  the 
associationists ?  If  the  theory  merely  maintains 
that  there  is  a  kind  of  beauty  generally  called 
symbolic,  it  is  perfectly  sound ;  but  if  it  upholds, 

1  Article  "Beauty"  in  the  Encyclopaedia  Britannica. 


124  Beauty 

as  it  actually  does,  that  all  beauty  whatever  con- 
sists in  association,  then  it  is  full  of  inconsist- 
encies. For  if  a  thing  is  beautiful  because  it 
suggests  a  pleasing  emotion  we  naturally  ask,  Is 
the  emotion  which  is  suggested  beautiful  or  is  it 
not?  If  it  is,  we  wish  to  know  why.  Is  it  be- 
cause the  pleasing  emotion  suggests  another 
pleasing  emotion  or  is  it  because  the  pleasing 
emotion  is  beautiful  in  itself?  If  the  emotion  is 
beautiful  because  it  suggests  another  agreeable 
emotion,  this  second  emotion  will,  in  its  turn,  be 
beautiful  because  it  suggests  a  third  agreeable  emo- 
tion and  so  on  forever.  Hence  in  this  supposi- 
tion beauty  would  be  without  a  foundation,  with- 
out an  ultimate  support,  without  anything  to  give 
it  its  beauty,  and  consequently  no  beauty  at  all. 
—  But  if  our  opponents  say  that  the  emotion  sug- 
gested is  in  itself  beautiful,  then  they  evidently 
abandon  their  contention  that  all  beauty  results 
from  association. 

Next  let  us  see  what  would  follow  if  the 
associationists  should  take  the  other  horn  of 
the  original  dilemma  and  say  that  the  emotion 
suggested  possesses  no  beauty  in  itself.  If  this 
be  the  case,  namely  if  the  emotion  suggested 
by  an  object  is  not  beautiful,  neither  can  it 
impart  beauty  to  the  object  suggesting  it.  For 
nothing  can  impart  to  another  what  it  does  not 
itself  possess.  We  see  then  that  the  doctrine 
making  all  beauty  consist  in  association  leads  to 


Various  False  Systems  of  Beauty       125 

many  contradictions  and  consequently  is  an 
illogical  doctrine.  This  conclusion  is  confirmed 
by  William  Knight :  "  Jeffrey's  theory  is  an 
irrelevancy  from  first  to  last,  even  more  than 
Alison's."  1  The  mistake  of  the  associationists 
arises  from  the  confusion  of  symbolical  (ex- 
trinsic) beauty  with  beauty  in  general.  Seeing 
that  some  things  are  beautiful  owing  to  associa- 
tion, they  infer  that  all  beauty  results  from  asso- 
ciation. 

91.  Beauty  and  Custom.  Another  view 
somewhat  akin  to  the  one  just  rejected  identifies 
beauty  with  custom,  fashion,  and  habit.  One  of 
the  representatives  of  this  view  is  Sir  Joshua 
Reynolds  who  in  a  discourse  delivered  to  the 
students  of  the  Royal  Academy  says :  "  We  ad- 
mire beauty  for  no  other  reason  than  that  we  are 
used  to  it.  I  have  no  doubt  that  if  we  were  more 
used  to  deformity  than  beauty,  deformity  would 
then  lose  the  idea  annexed  to  it  and  take  that  of 
beauty,  and  that,  if  the  whole  world  would  agree 
that  yes  and  no  should  change  their  meaning,  yes 
would  then  deny  and  no  would  affirm." —  Accord- 
ing to  this  view  then,  an  object  or  a  practice  is 
beautiful,  because  we  have  grown  familiar  with  it, 
whether  this  familiarity  rests  on  a  custom  of  the 
nation  or  community  to  which  we  belong,  or  on 
a  prevailing  fashion,  or  on  a  personal  habit  ac- 
quired through  a  frequent  repetition  of  the  same 


126  Beauty 

act.  For  a  better  understanding  of  this  theory 
consider  a  few  instances:  The  people  of  one 
country  regard  a  certain  style  of  building,  a  cer- 
tain cut  of  dress,  certain  fashions  of  social  inter- 
course as  most  appropriate  and  beautiful,  whereas 
the  people  of  another  country  consider  the  same 
style,  cut,  and  fashions  as  most  odd,  singular, 
and  laughable.  In  some  parts  of  the  Orient,  a 
man  without  a  beard  is  looked  upon  with  dis- 
favor, in  the  West,  a  beardless  man  may  be  re- 
garded as  handsome.  The  inhabitants  of  some 
regions  imagine  that  they  are  attractively  dressed 
when  their  clothes  display  all  the  colors  of  the 
rainbow,  but  the  people  of  other  countries  are  of 
an  altogether  opposite  opinion.  Custom  would 
seem  to  be  the  only  way  to  account  for  this  di- 
versity of  tastes. —  In  ancient  times,  gladiatorial 
shows  were  held  in  Rome.  Men  fought  with 
each  other  or  with  wild  beasts  in  the  arena  before 
immense  crowds  of  spectators.  These  contests 
were  thought  to  be  splendid  exhibitions  of  hu- 
man prowess  and  worthy  to  be  attended  by  the 
flower  of  the  nation.  We,  in  our  day,  turn  from 
such  scenes  of  carnage  with  horror  and  loathing. 
No  excuse  can  be  urged  for  such  practices  ex- 
cept that  they  were  the  custom  in  those  days. — 
To  add  another  example  from  the  domain  of  lan- 
guage where  custom  seems  to  reign  supreme. 
That  pronunciation  and  accentuation  of  words 
appear  beautiful  to  you  to  which  you  have  been 


Various  False  Systems  of  Beauty       127 

accustomed.  If  you  leave  your  home  and  settle 
down  among  people  who  pronounce  and  accen- 
tuate differently  from  the  way  to  which  you  are 
used,  you  feel  at  first  disgusted  at  the  novel 
mode  of  oral  expression.  But  gradually  the 
peculiarities  of  language  in  the  new  locality  lose 
their  strangeness  and  grow  agreeable.  Custom 
makes  all  the  difference. —  These  are  facts.  Do 
they  prove  that  custom  constitutes  beauty,  do 
they  show  that  a  thing  is  beautiful  because  we 
are  accustomed  to  it,  and  ugly  because  we  are 
not  accustomed  to  it?  No,  they  do  not.  They 
prove  only  that  custom  is  often  closely  associated 
with  beauty,  but  not  that  custom  is  beauty.  Cus- 
tom and  habit  cannot  be  beauty;  for  beauty  is 
in  the  thing,  it  is  objective;  habit  and  custom  are 
in  the  one  contemplating  beauty,  they  are  sub- 
jective.—  Again,  many  things  strike  us  as  beauti- 
ful on  first  acquaintance.  In  fact,  first  impres- 
sions are  often  the  strongest,  so  much  so  that 
some  philosophers,  going  to  the  other  extreme, 
have  identified  beauty  with  novelty.  When  you 
saw  the  rainbow  for  the  first  time  you  found  it 
beautiful,  perhaps  more  than  ever  after.  When 
you  heard  the  organ  peal  forth  its  rich,  full  notes 
on  your  first  visit  to  church  you  were  charmed, 
may  be,  more  intensely  than  at  any  other  time. — 
Lastly,  there  are  many  things  to  which  no  ac- 
quaintance, no  matter  how  long,  can  reconcile  us. 
A  sightless  man  never  appears  beautiful,  even 


128  Beauty 

though  we  see  him  ever  so  often.  An  ungrateful 
child  will  always  be  an  abomination  in  our  sight. 

However,  there  exists  a  very  intimate  con- 
nection between  custom  and  beauty,  and  it  is  on 
account  of  this  connection  that  beauty  has  been 
confounded  with  custom-.  This  connection  we 
shall  now  endeavor  to  trace. —  Long,  familiar 
acquaintance  with  an  object,  in  the  first  place, 
gives  us  an  opportunity  of  finding  out  its  good 
points.  Hence  custom,  though  not  beauty,  may 
be  an  indispensable  condition  for  the  realization 
of  beauty;  for  it  helps  to  promote  clearness  of 
perception,  which  we  showed  to  be  a  necessary 
prerequisite  for  the  due  perception  of  beauty 
(thesis  6).  How  often  has  it  not  happened  that 
two  destined  to  be  bosom-friends,  on  first  meet- 
ing, looked  at  each  other  askance  and  mistrusted 
one  another?  It  was  only  gradually,  after  long 
fellowship,  that  the  beautiful  qualities  of  each 
broke  upon  the  other  and  that  the  links  of  friend- 
ship which  nothing  could  sever,  were  forged. — 
People  of  different  nationalities  would  not  dis- 
like one  another  as  they  sometimes  do,  if  the 
barriers  of  diversity  of  language,  rendering  mu- 
tual intercourse  and  exchange  of  ideas  difficult, 
were  removed. 

A  second  reason  why  custom  makes  attractive 
what  at  first  repelled  is  this.  By  living  in  certain 
conditions  and  surroundings  habitually,  our  phys- 
ical and  mental  attitude  towards  certain  things 


Various  False  Systems  of  Beauty       129 

changes  and  thus  what  once  offended  us,  now 
pleases.  The  object  itself  has  not  become  beauti- 
ful through  custom  or  habit,  but  we  have  changed 
under  the  long  continued  influence  of  our  new  con- 
ditions and  surroundings,  and  consequently  we 
now  stand  in  different  relation  to  the  object.  It  is 
in  this  matter  of  beauty  pretty  much  as  it  is  with 
organic  tastes.  Here  is  some  one  who  has  left 
his  home  and  taken  up  his  abode  with  strangers. 
Many  of  their  dishes  in  the  beginning  repelled 
him;  but  little  by  little  his  system  adapted  itself 
to  their  diet,  and  now  he  partakes  of  their  food 
with  as  much  relish  as  any  of  the  rest.  Think 
of  the  nausea  and  misery  the  first  cigar  caused 
that  inveterate  smoker.  Habit  has  made  delight- 
ful what  in  the  beginning  was  almost  a  torture. 
Custom  acts  in  a  similar  manner  in  the  case  of 
beauty.  A  certain  way  of  acting,  a  certain  fash- 
ion of  dress,  a  certain  tune,  the  features  of  some 
man  or  the  appearance  of  some  animal  at  first 
fills  us  with  aversion  and  repugnance.  But  little 
by  little  we  adjust  ourselves  to  these  things;  we 
are  no  longer  out  of  harmony  with  them;  con- 
sequently what  seemed  so  offensive  before,  ap- 
pears attractive  now.  Hence  custom  and  habit 
are  not  beauty,  but  they  often  aid  in  establishing 
adjustment,  agreement,  harmony  between  the  sub- 
ject perceiving  and  the  object  perceived. 

92.    Pantheistic     Conception     of     Beauty. 
There  is  still  one  more  false  system  concerning 


130  Beauty 

the  nature  of  beauty  which  it  will  be  useful  to 
notice,  namely  the  system  which  identifies  beauty 
with  the  Divine  idea,  with  God  revealing  Him- 
self in  the  finite,  with  the  Absolute  realizing  it- 
self in  the  relative.  The  advocates  of  this  view 
are  chiefly  Schelling  and  Hegel.  Thus  in  the 
opinion  of  Schelling,  "  the  infinite  finitely  rep- 
resented is  beauty.  Where  beauty  is,  there  the 
infinite  contradiction  is  removed  in  the  object 
itself."  x  With  Hegel  "  the  beautiful  is  the  abso- 
lute in  sensuous  existence,  the  actuality  of  the 
idea  in  the  form  of  limited  manifestation."  2 

These  descriptions  of  beauty  recall  what  we 
said  of  the  relation  of  the  beautiful  to  the  Divine 
ideals  of  which  the  beautiful  objects  are  copies 
(theses  10  and  n).  However,  it  is  hardly  pos- 
sible to  connect  the  doctrines  of  such  men  as 
Schelling  and  Hegel  with  our  own.  For  their 
doctrines  are  based  on  pantheistical  and,  there- 
fore, radically  false  views  of  philosophy,  namely 
on  the  assumption  that  God  is  the  world,  and 
consequently  that  there  is  no  personal  God.  On 
this  account,  there  is  no  point  of  contact  between 
our  doctrine  on  beauty  and  theirs. 

1  Cf.  Ueberweg,  History  of  Philosophy,  v.  II,  p.  219. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  242. 


CONCLUSION 

We  have  thus  completed  our  treatise  on  the 
beautiful.  We  started  out  by  directing  attention 
to  an  effect  which  the  beautiful  produces,  namely 
delight  in  the  one  contemplating  it.  We  next 
inquired  into  the  relations  of  the  beautiful  to  our 
cognitive  faculties  and  found  that  the  senses  as 
such  are  incapable  of  perceiving  the  beautiful  and 
that,  consequently,  the  intellect  alone  is  capable 
of  doing  so.  We  then  asked  ourselves  what  kind 
of  delight  the  beautiful  engendered  in  the  soul. 
We  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  beauty  as  such 
produces  none  but  intellectual  delight  and  that 
it  excites  love  in  the  soul  only  in  so  far  as  it  is 
identified  with  the  good.  Having  settled  these 
preliminary  questions  we  ascertained  that  the 
essence  of  beauty  consists  in  the  "  splendor  of 
order,"  and  further  that  for  beauty  to  be  fully 
appreciated  and  enjoyed,  it  must  be  clearly  per- 
ceived by  the  mind.  We  next  passed  on  to  the 
investigation  of  sensible  beauty  as  a  preparatory 
step  to  the  investigation  of  the  beauty  most  con- 
genial to  man,  namely  spiritual  beauty  manifested 
through  an  appropriate  sensible  symbol.  From 
the  consideration  of  beauty  in  itself  we  turned 
131 


132  Beauty 

to  the  consideration  of  beauty  in  relation  to  God, 
the  pattern  and  source  of  all  finite  beauty.  After 
this  we  showed  that  beauty  is  not  a  mere  internal 
feeling,  but  something  objective  and  that,  con- 
sequently, there  exists  a  fixed  standard  of  taste. 
In  the  last  chapter  we  enumerated  the  chief  false 
systems  of  beauty  and  subjected  them  to  a  critical 
examination  according  to  the  principles  laid  down 
before. 

Man  lives  then  in  a  world  of  beauty,  but  this 
beauty  is  from  above,  from  the  infinite,  uncreated 
Beauty  of  God,  the  All-Beautiful. 


ALPHABETICAL  INDEX 


(THE  NUMBERS  REFER  TO  THE  PAGES.) 


Artistic  beauty  defined, 
48. 

Association,  association 
of  ideas  defined,  89; 
Symbolic  beauty,  a  par- 
ticular case  of  associa- 
tion of  ideas,  89; 
beauty  according  to 
the  associationist 

theory,  121. 

Architecture  and  beauty, 
92. 

Beauteous,  synonym  of 
beautiful,  96. 

Beautiful,  the  beautiful 
defined  from  its  effect, 
I,  14;  essential  defini- 
tion of  the  beautiful  in 
the  abstract,  60;  the 
beautiful  begets  intel- 
lectual delight,  17;  the 
beautiful  as  identical 
with  the  good  pro- 
duces love  in  the  soul, 
17;  how  the  beautiful 
contributes  to  our  own 
good,  40;  relationship 


between  the  true,  the 
beautiful  and  the 
good,  65;  synonyms  of 
the  beautiful,  95;  how 
the  sublime  and  the 
beautiful  differ,  98; 
God  beautiful  in  the 
strict  sense  of  the 
word,  105. 

Beauty  defined  in  the 
concrete  from  its  ef- 
fect, i,  14;  essential 
definition  of  beauty, 
60;  beauty  not  perceiv- 
able by  sense,  5;  so- 
called  sense  of  beauty, 
37;  uncreated  and  cre- 
ated beauty,  47;  spir- 
itual and  material 
beauty,  47;  intellectual 
and  moral  beauty,  47; 
supersensible  and  sen- 
sible beauty,  47;  beauty 
of  color,  sound,  and 
movement,  47;  natural 
and  artistic  beauty,  48; 
symbolic  and  internal 


133 


134 


Alphabetical  Index 


beauty  defined,  48; 
symbolic  beauty  anal- 
yzed, 86;  symbolic 
beauty  a  particular 
case  of  association  of 
ideas,  89;  beauty  im- 
plies order,  46;  beauty 
the  splendor  of  order, 
6b;  scale  of  beauty,  65; 
beauty  to  be  fully  ap- 
preciated and  enjoyed 
must  be  clearly  per- 
ceived, 68;  obstacles  to 
the  appreciation  of 
beauty,  68;  beauty,  in 
what  sense  relative, 
70;  twofold  aspect  of 
sensible  beauty  estab- 
lished, 72;  sensible 
beauty  and  movement, 
73;  sensible  beauty  and 
light,  78;  how  the 
senses  enjoy  beauty, 
79;  imagination  in  re- 
lation to  beauty,  80; 
the  higher  and  the 
lower  senses  in  rela- 
tion to  beauty,  81; 
beauty  and  touch,  83; 
dangers  incident  to  the 
contemplation  of  sen- 
sible beauty,  84;  beauty 
proper  to  man,  90; 
beauty  in  relation  to 
God,  101;  Divine  ideals, 
measure  of  created 


beauty,  101;  created 
beauty  a  reflection  of 
uncreated  beauty,  103; 
beauty  objective,  not 
subjective,  106;  beauty 
not  a  transcendental 
concept,  116;  false  sys- 
tems of  beauty,  118; 
beauty  and  utility,  119; 
beauty  and  sensitive 
gratification,  120; 

beauty  according  to 
the  associationist 

theory,  121;  beauty  not 
custom,  nor  habit,  nor 
fashion,  125;  pantheis- 
tic conception  of 
beauty,  129. 

Color,  beauty  of,  47. 

Comely,  synonym  of 
beautiful,  97. 

Created  beauty  defined, 
47- 

Custom,  beauty  not  cus- 
tom, 125. 

Delight,  beautiful  begets 
intellectual  delight,  17; 
two  kinds  of  intellec- 
tual delight,  42. 

EVil  defined,  31;  evil  in 
itself  and  in  regard  to 
another,  31. 

Fair,  synonym  of  beauti- 
ful, 97- 

Falsity,  ontological  fal- 
sity defined,  20;  two 


Alphabetical  Index 


135 


kinds  of  ontological 
falsity,  20. 

Fashion,  beauty  not  fash- 
ion, 125. 

God,  beauty  in  relation 
to  God,  101;  God  beau- 
tiful in  the  strict  sense 
of  the  word,  105. 

Good,  the,  defined,  21; 
everything  is  good,  22; 
relationship  between 
the  true,  the  beautiful, 
and  the  good,  65. 

Graceful,  synonym  of 
beautiful,  97. 

Habit,  beauty  not  habit, 
125. 

Handsome,  synonym  of 
beautiful,  96. 

Hatred  defined,  32. 

Ideal  defined,  101;  Di- 
vine ideals  measure  of 
created  beauty,  101. 

Idealism  opposed  to 
common  sense,  106. 

Imagination  in  relation 
to  beauty,  80. 

Intellectual  beauty  de- 
fined, 47. 

Intrinsic  beauty  defined, 
48. 

Light  and  sensible 
beauty,  78. 

Logical  truth  defined,  17. 

Love  defined,  22;  love 
of  complacence,  23; 


love  of  benevolence, 
34;  love  of  friendship, 
23;  wholly  unselfish 
love,  24;  love  of  an  ob- 
ject not  always  pro- 
portionate to  its 
beauty,  39;  the  beauti- 
ful as  identical  with 
the  good  arouses  love 
in  the  soul,  17. 

Lovely,  synonym  of 
beautiful,  97. 

Material  beauty  defined, 
47- 

Materialist  view  of 
beauty,  13. 

Moral,  moral  truth  de- 
fined, 17;  moral  beauty 
defined,  47. 

Movement,  movement 
and  sensible  beauty, 
73;  beauty  of  move- 
ment, 47. 

Music  and  beauty,  91. 

Natural  beauty  defined, 
48. 

Objectivity  of  beauty, 
1 06. 

Ontological  truth  de- 
fined, 17;  two  kinds  of 
ontological  truth,  18; 
ontological  truth  in  a 
wider  sense,  18. 

Order,  beauty  implies  or- 
der, 46;  concept  of  or- 
der defined,  48;  simple 


136 


Alphabetical  Index 


and  compound  order, 
49;  static  and  dynam- 
ical order,  50;  neces- 
sary and  changeable 
order,  50;  symbolic  and 
harmonious  order,  50; 
order  of  which  the 
principle  is  some  end 
to  be  obtained,  50; 
beauty  the  splendor  of 
order,  60. 

Painting  and  beauty,  91. 

Pantheistic  conception  of 
beauty,  129. 

Picturesque,  synonym  of 
beautiful,  97. 

Poetry  and  beauty,  92. 

Pretty,  synonym  of  beau- 
tiful, 96. 

Sense,  so-called  sense  of 
beauty,  37;  how  the 
senses  can  be  said  to 
enjoy  the  beautiful,  79; 
the  higher  and  the 
lower  senses  in  rela- 
tion to  beauty,  81. 

Sensible,  sensible  beauty 
defined,  47;  twofold  as- 
pect of  sensible  beauty, 
72;  sensible  objects 
often  possess  sym- 
bolic beauty,  86. 

Sound,  beauty  of  sound, 
47- 

Spiritual  beauty  defined, 
47- 


Symbolic  beauty  defined, 
48;  sensible  objects 
often  possess  symbolic 
beauty,  86;  symbolic 
beauty  a  particular 
case  of  association  of 
ideas,  89. 

Sublime,  the,  defined,  97; 
how  the  sublime  and 
the  beautiful  differ,  98. 

Supersensible  beauty  de- 
fined, 47. 

Taste  in  esthetics  de- 
fined, no;  the  standard 
of  taste,  no;  saying, 
"there  is  no  disputing 
about  tastes,"  ex- 
plained, 112;  diversity 
of  tastes  often  only  ap- 
parent, 114. 

Touch,  beauty  and  sense 
of  touch,  83. 

Truth  in  general,  17;  log- 
ical, ontological,  and 
moral  truth  defined, 
17;  two  kinds  of  on- 
tological truth,  18;  on- 
tological truth  in  a 
wider  sense,  18;  every- 
thing is  true,  19;  things 
true  absolutely  in  re- 
lation to  God,  but  only 
in  a  restricted  sense  in 
relation  to  creatures, 
20;  relationship  be- 
tween the  true,  the 


Alphabetical  Index  137 

beautiful,  and  the  good,      Uncreated     beauty     de- 
65-  fined,  47. 

Ugly,  the,  99.  Utility,  beauty  and  util- 

ity, 119. 


A     000  1 1 1  830     6 


